Benutzerinformation 3. KurzbeschreibungDas DE04 und das DE10 sind absolute, elektronische Positionsanzeigen. Die werkseitig vorprogram-mierten Anzeigen in Hohlwellenbauform dienen DE04; DE10 zur direkten Ablesung von Positionswerten an Ver- stellspindeln.Durch höhere Auflösung und Genauigkeit, ein güns-tigeres Drehzahlverhalten, sowie weitere Funkti-
Turkey after the start of negotiations with the european union (part 1)OÂRODEK STUDIÓW WSCHODNICH IM. MARKA KARPIA
Raport OSW / CES Report RAPORT OSW
Rafa∏ Sadowski, Wojciech Paczyƒski urkey after the start of negotiations T with the European Union – foreign relations and the domestic situation Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies Project co-ordinator Adam Balcer
OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia /
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland tel. / phone +48 /22/ 525 80 00 fax + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 The Centre's analytical materials can be found
on the Internet at www.osw.waw.pl
More information about the Centre for Eastern Studies is available at the same web address Spis treÊci / Contents TURKEY AFTER THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION – FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. PART I The hurdle race. The greatest political and social barriers in Turkey's path to the European Union / 7 The cold alliance. Turkish-US political relations Chasing Europe: the Turkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union / 71 Wojciech Paczyƒski The start of accession negotiations between An-
kara and the EU is vital for the future of both
Turkey and the Union, including Poland as its
member state, as well as for the geopolitical si-
tuation in Eurasia (the Black Sea region, Cauca-
sus, Central Asia and the Middle East). Appre-
ciating the significance of these issues, the
Centre for Eastern Studies in early 2005 decided
to launch a project entitled ‘Turkey after the
start of negotiations with the European Union
– foreign relations and the domestic situation'.
The goal of this project is to present, within the
context of accession negotiations, Turkey's
Turkey after the start greatest internal challenges as well as Ankara's
relations with its neighbour regions, the EU and
of negotiations with the USA. This Report is the first of three which
will be published as part of the project. The Re-
the European Union – port includes texts on Turkish-US relations since
2003, major political and social challenges on
Turkey's path towards the EU and the current
foreign relations and condition of the Turkish economy. The Report
was developed between July 2005 and Novem-
the domestic situation.
ber 2006, over which time CES workers and asso-
t of negotiations with the European Union ciates searched for publicly available materials
in Poland, Turkey and EU countries, and went on
three research trips to Turkey, where they met
local researchers, analysts, politicians and offi-
ter the star cials. The authors of the Report would like to
express their gratitude to everyone who have
shared their opinions with them, and to the Po-
lish Embassy in Ankara, especially to Ambassa-
dor Grzegorz Michalski and Minister Andrzej
Ananicz for their expert support and assistance
in the authors' work on this Report. This Report
does not present the official stance of the Polish
government on the issues discussed therein;
instead it reflects the personal views of its au-
thors, who have made their best efforts to en-
sure that their work is reliable.
chanisms which have so far mobilised the pub-
lic and the political class to reform their country.
1. Turkey is an important element of the foreign
policies of the EU and the USA because of its de-
5. Turkish-US relations have cooled since 2003,
mographic, military and economic potential, as
principally due to the US intervention in Iraq,
well as its strategic location in the basins of the
which resulted in an alliance between the USA
Mediterranean and the Black Seas, on the fron-
and the Iraqi Kurdish population. This has in
tiers with the Middle East, the Caucasus and the
turn has made it more difficult for Turkey to
Balkans, and because of its NATO membership
combat Kurdish separatism, and has posed a risk
and the opening of EU accession negotiations.
of Iraq disintegrating as one effect of a possible
After Russia, Turkey is the EU's second most sig-
large-scale civil war and the subsequent emer-
gence of an independent Kurdistan. Although re-
lations between Ankara and Washington have
2. Relations with the EU and the USA are essen-
to a certain extent gradually improved, a defi-
tial elements of Turkey's foreign policy, consi-
nite thaw can hardly be expected for some con-
dering their intense and asymmetric economic,
siderable time. The shape of US-Turkish relations
political and military ties, and the fact that tigh-
depends on the situation developing in the Mid-
tening bonds with the West is deemed to be the
dle East, while stabilisation of the region is high-
most important strategic goal of Turkish foreign
ly unlikely in the nearest future.
policy. Relations with the EU and the USA have
also greatly affected the internal situation in
6. A scenario of Turkey's relations of with the
Turkey, considering the requirement of democ-
EU and the USA cooling at the same time seems
ratisation which is connected with the criteria
possible for the first time in Turkey's modern
of EU membership, together with the US' very
history. If this does in fact come about, Ankara
t of negotiations with the European Union active engagement in the Middle East (especial-
will be brought closer to Russia and other Mus-
ly regarding the Kurdish issue).
lim states, and cause a regression of the demo-
cratisation process. However, considering the
3. The prospect of EU membership has been the
scale of relationships between Turkey and the
ter the star key booster of democratic reform in Turkey. Ne-
West, Ankara seems unlikely to adopt a radical-
vertheless, in the case of Turkey – in contrast to
ly anti-Western line in its foreign policy.
other EU candidates – this prospect cannot serve
as a lasting stabiliser for the domestic situation
because Turkey has more serious internal pro-
blems and greater tension in relations with the
EU and the Union's individual member states
than the previous candidates had. In effect, it is
highly probable that negotiations between An-
kara and Brussels will be significantly extended,
and possibly even periodically withheld. A sce-
nario in which negotiations are deadlocked for
good cannot be excluded either.
4. Since 2001, Turkey has managed to carry out
changes which significantly strengthen its eco-
nomy. The prospect of integration with the Euro-
pean Union has given extremely strong encou-
ragement to improving the economic policy and
reforms in other sectors. Doubts about the path
of accession negotiations, which are already ap-
pearing now, may yet damage these strong me-
1. Although accession negotiations started in Oc-
tober 2005, it is still uncertain whether Turkey
will be accepted as a member of the European
Union. In its relations with EU member states,
Turkey has more serious internal and external
problems than previous candidates to EU mem-
2. The greatest challenges on Turkey's path to the
– the unenthusiastic attitude of most EU residents
towards Turkey's potential membership;
– the ambivalent attitude of Turkish society to-
's path to the European Union The hurdle race. wards the EU and the West;– cultural differences; The greatest political – the Kurdish issue;– problems with respecting human rights; and social barriers – the role of the army in the Turkish political sys- riers in T in Turkey's path to the – tensions between the secular establishment andthe governing party, which has an Islamic base; – the need to regulate Ankara's relations with Cy-prus and, to a lesser extent, with Greece;– references made by some EU member states to the deportations and massacres of the Armenianscommitted during World War I by the YoungTurks' regime as genocide, and the related issueof improving relations with Armenia; and– rising nationalism in Turkey, provoked by the Cy-priot, Kurdish and Armenian issues, which trans-lates into Euroscepticism.
3. Those problems are very likely to cause signifi-
cant extension of the negotiation period between
Turkey and the EU, and even a temporary suspen-
sion. The possibility of breaking off talks comple-
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar tely cannot be ruled out either.
Box 1. The historical background of relations between Turkey andEurope Turkey is a unique candidate for EU member-ship. The vast majority of its population is Mu-slim (nearly 97%), while the societies of all EUmember states and other candidate states arepredominantly or mostly Christian, or identifythemselves with Christianity in terms of cul- ture. Since the seventh century, the Mediter- tions. However, the Ottoman state had also in- ranean Sea area has been the scene of confron- herited the tradtions of the Byzantine state.) tation and coexistence at the same time, which From the end of the seventeenth century, as a re- contributed to cultural diffusion between Chris- sult of military defeats, the Ottoman Empire lost tians and Muslims. Experiences linked to con- vast territories to the Western powers & Rus- flicts and feelings of mutual incompatibility sia, as well as to Ottoman Christian nationali- played a greater part than those of coexistence ties, supported by the former. Its sovereignty in developing the image of Muslims among was significantly limited. Numerous massacres Christians, and vice versa. In effect, Turkey's re- and ethnic cleansings committed by Christians ligious distinctness, combined with the nume- against Muslims and vice versa during the con- rous wars fought in the past between Ottoman flicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Anato- Turks and Christians, gave rise to feelings of lia gave rise to mutual prejudices, which are mutual strangeness, anxieties and negative ste- still alive in various forms today.
reotypes between Turkish and European socie- Under the treaty of S¯vres (1920), the Empire 's path to the European Union ties. As a consequence, the cultural diffusion became a protectorate of the Western powers, from the best-developed Western European cut down to the size of a part of Anatolia. The countries into Turkey happened later than had struggle against the treaty's provisions and the been in the case of other European regions in- memory of the loss of vast territories and com- habited by Christians. At the beginning of the plete sovereignty as a consequence of the sepa- riers in T modern era, Muslim communities in the Medi- ratism and expansion of European powers in terranean region and in Europe proper (with pre-republican times became the founding the exception of Russia) were predominantly grounds for the Republic of Turkey and the poorer, more conservative, patriarchal and au- main reference points for the modern Turkish thoritarian than Christian ones, mainly for non- national identity. This phenomenon is referred religious reasons. For this reason, in the mod- to as the S¯vres syndrome.
ern period some elements of Western culture(such as the emancipation of women, the sepa- The loss of vast territories and complete sove- ration of religion from the state and liberal is- reignty contributed to the Empire's decision sues) were extremely difficult to adapt to Mu- to reform, using the legacy of Western civilisa- slim countries, including Turkey. On the other tion. Turkey's desire to join the EU is perceived hand, geography and history deemed that the in Turkey as a continuation of the nearly 300- West would influence Turkey much more strong- year-old tradition of pro-Western transforma- ly than other Muslim countries in the Mediter- tion. The establishment of a secular national ranean area. Ottoman rule in the Balkans and state, the Republic of Turkey, by Kemal Atatürk Anatolia, which had lasted for several centu- in 1923 was a breakthrough. Atatürk's inten- ries, contributed to the development of nume- tion was to build a homogenously national, de- rous common cultural elements shared by both cidedly secular and modern society based on The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Christian and Muslim residents of the regions.
equal rights for men and women and close tieswith Europe. The implementation of that radi- The Republic of Turkey emerged in 1923 out of cal and very ambitious programme had to be the Ottoman Empire, which as a result of its carried out against the will of most of the coun- conquests of a significant part of Europe (the try's population. In effect, the Republic of Tur- Balkans and Central Europe) and areas of Asia key carried on some pf the authoritarian ele- which had had special historical ties with Eu- ments of the political model which had existed rope (Anatolia) had become a part of the Euro- in Ottoman times. The greatest consequence pean system of international and economic re- of the changes initiated by Atatürk is that Tur- lations, fighting numerous wars, making allian- key is different from the other Muslim states ces and signing trade treaties1. (The Ottoman in the Mediterranean region. This has been ma- expansion had a religious aspect (jihad) and the nifested by Turkey's membership in all the state had been founded on the Islamic tradi- Western world's organisations (with the excep- tion of the EU), its status as a candidate for EU ed a will to join the European Union, with the membership, its functioning as a democracy exception of Turkey. The main reason was the (although not free from imperfections) since same as in 1989. After that summit, Turkish-EU the 1940s, the positive perception of the sepa- relations plunged into the worst crisis in their ration of religion and state by Turkish society, history; diplomatic relations were even sus- the smaller percentage than usual of religious- pended for some time. A breakthrough in rela- ly active people, the greater role of national tions between Ankara and the EU happened in identity as the basis of social identity, the bet- December 1999, when Turkey received candi- ter social and legal position of women and the date status at the Helsinki summit. However, smaller technological gap between it and West- this did not happen because the human rights ern Europe. On the other hand, Turkey is still situation in Turkey had significantly improved.
much poorer and less democratic than West- What really decided the matter was the diffe- ern states are. Turkish society is also more pa- rent distribution of political forces inside the triarchal and conservative (especially the fun- EU than that which had existed in 1997. Ger- 's path to the European Union damentalist minority) and much more poorly many, the most powerful EU member state, educated and less urbanised than societies in since 1998 had been governed by the Social De- Western Europe.
mocrats, who were favourably disposed to-wards granting the status of candidate to Tur-key. Additionally, relations between Turkey and riers in T Box 2. A brief outline of relations Greece improved in 1999. Had the Union reject- between Turkey and the European ed Turkey's candidacy, the integration process would have been inhibited for a long time. New,more realistic hopes for EU membership had Turkey started making efforts to sign an asso- contributed to initiating unprecedentedly deep ciation agreement with the European Econo- democratic reforms in Turkey, which started in mic Community (EEC) in 1959, two years after late 2001. The EU determined at the Copenha- the organisation had come into existence. The gen summit on 12–13 December 2002 that Tur- association treaty was signed on 12 September key was not ready to start negotiations. How- 19632. On 14 April 1987, Turkey officially sub- ever, it decided to reconsider the issue by the mitted its candidacy for EEC membership and end of 2004. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkey adopted laws that expanded the scope of de- implemented eight legislation packages, which mocracy in the country. The European Com- significantly broadened the scope of democracy mission rejected Turkey's application in Decem- and brought the Turkish legislative system clos- ber 1989. However, the Commission deemed er to EU standards5.
Turkey as a potential candidate, i.e. a Europeancountry3. The Commission's major reservations On 17 December 2004, the European Council included the issue of the Turkish army's occu- positively evaluated the reforms, and set a start pation of Northern Cyprus, territorial disputes date for negotiations of 3 October 2005. Nego- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar between Turkey and Greece (the latter being an tiations could start on condition that Turkey EEC member), large-scale violations of human signed a protocol to extend the customs union rights (tortures, assassinations and violations to the 10 new EU member states – including of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities), Cyprus – which had not been recognised by An- the insufficiently democratic nature of the Tur- kara, and that it adopted a new criminal code kish political system (especially the unusually complying with EU standards. In its conclu- prominent position of the army) and the prob- sions, the Council presented its framework for lems of the Turkish economy. A Turkish-EU cus- negotiations with Turkey. Unlike previous Nego- toms union came into force on 1 January 19964.
tiating Frameworks, this one included a provi- At the Luxembourg summit in December 1997, sion which enabled permanent exclusions (de- EU member states granted the status of a can- rogations) by member states6. The exclusions, didate to all those countries which had declar- according to the Council, should be revised for impact on the operation of the EU internal 1. Turkey's accession as seen market. The Framework stated that the shared objective of the negotiations was Turkey's ac-cession. However, it was explicitly laid down European societies' support for Turkey's mem- for the first time in EU history that the nego- bership in the EU is vital for the success of the tiations were open-ended by nature, and that process of this country's integration for the fol- the outcome was not a foregone conclusion7.
Pursuant to the Framework, in case of a serious – Turkey's accession agreement has to be ratified breach of human rights by Turkey, the negotia- by the parliaments of all EU member states and tions would be suspended if a motion to that in a referendum by the French public. When vot- effect forwarded by either the Commission or ing on the accession agreement, Europe's politi- one-third of the member states is supported by cal elites will take into consideration their socie- a majority of EU member states8. In practice, ties' opinions on Turkey's accession to the EU; a veto by one country may cause a negotiating – the negative attitude towards Turkey's mem- 's path to the European Union deadlock, since closing and opening each ne- bership shown by European societies, and the rea- gotiating chapter requires approval by all the listic prospect that the EU member states or their EU member states. On 29 June 2005, the Turk- societies will reject Turkey's accession, regard- ish parliament adopted a new criminal code.
less of the possible outcome of the negotiations, On 29 July 2005, the Turkish government sign- has reinforced Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey; riers in T ed a protocol to extend the customs union to – due to the uncertainty of EU membership, its the 10 new member states. The negotiations prospect in the case of Turkey does not play the between Turkey and the EU were put on track role of an ‘anchor' stabilising transformation to on 3 October 2005, following the dramatic half- the same extent that it did in the case of those day-long talks between the United Kingdom candidates accepted to the EU in 2004, and lat- (which then held the presidency) and Austria9.
terly Romania and Bulgaria.
The EU amended the Negotiating Frameworkto state that the possibility of absorbing new None of the previous candidates or the potential members was one of the criteria necessary for candidates (in the Western Balkans) has raised Turkey's accession10. In January 2006, the Euro- such serious reservations in the EU as Turkey pean Council adopted the document entitled does. According to surveys conducted in 2006, ‘Accession Partnership', which had been pre- a majority – either absolute or relative – of EU resi- pared several weeks earlier by the European dents are against Turkey's membership12.
Commission. The document was also acceptedby Ankara11. The EU will evaluate Ankara's ful- Opposition to Turkey's EU membership prevails filment of the Accession Partnership's under- in most countries where numerous emigrant Mu- takings at the end of 2007, and decide on the slim communities live (France, Germany, Austria, nature of its further relations with Turkey on Belgium and Denmark). The societies of a definite The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar the basis of the evaluation. In June 2006, re- majority of those countries which negatively per- gardless of Cyprus's attempts to thwart the ceive future EU enlargement also show a negative beginning of negotiations, Turkey opened and attitude towards Turkey's accession (in addition to closed the first chapter, concerning science and the aforementioned countries, Finland and Luxem- research. Between October 2005 and October bourg). Turkey's accession is also seen in negative 2006, the Turkish legislation was screened for terms by the societies of most countries which compliance with the community's law legacy joined the EU in 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, (the acquis). In December 2006, the EU decided Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus). Fear of com- to suspend eight negotiation chapters, due to petition in the allocation of EU funds may be one Turkey's failure to extend the customs union reasons for this. The unwelcoming attitude of the to Cyprus. In March 2007 the EU opened the Greek and Cypriot societies to Turkey's accession second chapter of Turkish accession negotia- is strongly linked to their serious problems in bi- tions (enterprise and industrial policy).
lateral relations with Ankara. Most societies whohave a positive stance on further EU enlarge- ment are also positive about Turkey's accession.
opening negotiations with Ankara was pointless European political elites, most of whom support because Turkey's internal problems and cultural accession, are less sceptical about Turkey's EU & religious differences will not allow it to meet the membership. The circles which do not want Tur- Union's requirements. Moreover, the negotiating key in the EU include the radical right, a signifi- process itself may destabilise the internal situa- cant part of the right wing and a small part of the tion in Turkey because democratisation will bring left wing (such as the socialists in Austria).
radicals to power. For a large group of opponents The key reason usually presented against Turkey's to Turkey's EU membership, the country's inter- membership is the cultural difference of Turkish nal problems are more important than the reli- society as Muslims, with Islam often being de- gious difference. According to surveys, many of scribed in radical terms13. According to opponents them declare they could change their opinion on of Ankara's European aspirations, if Turkey join- Turkey's accession if the country achieved sustain- ed the EU, this would upset the European Union's able economic stabilisation and democratisation.
internal integrity, which should be based on Supporters of Turkey's membership believe that a common cultural and religious background. This Islam is not an impediment to Turkey meeting EU 's path to the European Union feeling of difference has intensified since the Sep- criteria. They emphasise the historical and cul- tember 11 terrorist attacks. This is also linked to tural ties existing between Turkey and Europe.
problems with the integration of Muslims in West- Their arguments for Turkey's integration are ern Europe, resulting from the unwillingness of mainly geopolitical, and are as follows: significant groups of Muslims to adapt to the Eu- – as a result of the integration process Turkey will riers in T ropean system of values, European societies' pre- become stable and democratic, which will have judices against them, and integration policies a positive impact on the neighbouring regions which have been either bad or completely absent.
(the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia), Emigrants from Turkey constitute the most nume- improve the efficiency of the EU's policy towards rous group among the Muslim diaspora in the them, and reduce the pressure of Turkish migra- EU14. Other weighty arguments used by oppo- nents of Turkey's accession include the fact that – Turkey will serve as a model for the Muslim 97% of Turkey's territory is located in Asia, its bor- world and a bridge between it and the West; ders with the Middle East and the Caucasus, its – the negative consequences of rejecting Turkey problems with respecting human rights and the (intensifying anti-Western sentiments in Turkey, functioning of democracy, a fear of mass Turkish worsening relations with EU countries, holding emigration and of the costs of accepting a poor back the democratisation process and raising ten- country with a large agricultural sector. Many sion between the state and the Kurds and reli- opponents of Turkey's membership believe that gious communities); Table 1. Review of European societies' attitudes to Turkey's accession to the EU
Attitude to Turkey's membership
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Absolutely negative No chance of changing the society's attitude.
France, Germany, Greece, Small or moderate chance (a definite majority of polls) Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, of changing the society's Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Cyprus Indefinite (mixed poll results) Italy, Holland, Lithuania, Malta An open-ended issue Moderately positive Spain, Ireland, Poland, (all or a definite majority Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, of societies' support United Kingdom, Hungary; Bulgaria and Romania (EU members since 2007) Source: Eurobarometer, institutions for analysing public opinion in member states
– Turkey will serve as a transit country for trans- 2. Turkish society's attitude port of oil and gas to Europe and a guarantee of to the EU; differences in culture the Union's energy security (diversification of ener- gy sources);– its accession will guarantee illegal migrationand drug smuggling from Asia to Europe through The attitude of Turkish society to the EU and the the territory of Turkey will be combated more European system of values is an important issue for Turkey's integration with the Union for the – Turkey's contribution, owing to its military po- following reasons: tential, to the development of European security – the S¯vres syndrome, widely shared by Turks (namely a fear of partition of the country by ex-ternal forces supporting separatism), may in a cri- The role of public opinion in relations between sis undermine support for EU membership; Turkey and the EU has significantly grown since – public support for membership is essential, con- 's path to the European Union the French parliament amended the French con- sidering the need to implement the controversial stitution in March 2005, imposing the obligation reforms required by the EU; to hold a referendum on each enlargement of the – the Turkish society is much more conservative EU after Bulgaria and Romania's accessions. It than other EU societies, and as a result of their cannot be ruled out that other EU member states conservatism Turks may have problems accept- riers in T will also impose such an obligation.
ing some EU standards in the social sphere;– the strong devotion to sovereignty may make it difficult to accept the limitation thereof which isconnected with the integration process.
In autumn 2006, approximately 55% of the Turk-ish public supported Turkey's membership of theEU, and around 35% opposed it15. People supportaccession because they believe it will contributeto improving their financial situation and the de-mocratisation of the country16.
Turkish society's support for the EU is greaterthan their identification with the West and Eu-rope. Public opinion polls have indicated thata majority of Turkish society perceives Turkey asa part of the West and Europe, and Turks as Eu-ropeans. Nevertheless, a significant part of thesociety do not identify themselves with the Westor Europe, and some of those who identify them- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar selves with Europeans have a rather moderatesense of this identity. A clear sign of Turks' aliena-tion in Europe is the belief shared by a large partof Turkish citizens that the European Union isa Christian club, which has no place to offer forMuslim Turkey17 More than 50% of Turks consid-er being a Muslim as a condition of being a Turk.
Additionally, most Turks share a negative opinionof Christians, although they perceive individualEuropean nations in different ways18. Public opi-nion polls indicate that most Turks perceive de-mocracy as the best possible system and gener-ally support basic human rights and, as a conse-quence, the main pro-EU reforms in the political sphere. On the other hand, Turkish society is only military, the bureaucracy, the judiciary and some moderately ready to take over the Western system academic staff), religious fundamentalists and the of values in the cultural and social spheres. Turk- nationalist-conservative Turkish population of ish society is much more conservative than EU so- central Turkey (which strongly adhere to Islam cieties are19. The conservatism of Turkish society as the basis of national identity). The urban popu- is based on the major social role of the family, lation shows greater support for accession than which is perceived as the foundation of an indi- do residents of agricultural areas.
vidual's identity, more important than the state, Of the key political parties, Turkey's EU member- nation or religion20. EU accession raises serious ship is supported most strongly by the ruling Isla- fears among Turks of negative cultural changes mic-democratic Justice and Development Party (moral decay, crisis of the family and weakening (AKP), the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) religiousness) and a loss of cultural identity.
and to a similar extent by the centrist Motherland Turks, unlike European societies, are exceptionally Party of Turkey (ANAP). The opposition centre- strongly attached to the sovereignty of their ho- right True Path Party (DYP) is a cautious supporter mogenous national state; they have the feeling of Turkey's accession, although it continues to em- 's path to the European Union that they are deprived of allies in the internatio- phasise the need to treat sovereignty and inte- nal arena21 and a strong anxiety of loss of territo- rests of the country as top priority issues. The left- rial integrity. Such tendencies are the effects of wing nationalist Republican People's Party (CHP), the traditional state control, the S¯vres syndrome the largest opposition party, represents a Euro- and such modern factors as long-lasting bad re- sceptic point of view23. The radically right-wing riers in T lations with almost all their neighbours as well Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the funda- as the lengthy and bloody struggle against Kur- mentalist Saadet (Felicity) Party are staunch op- dish separatism. The struggle, combined with the ponents of Turkey's EU membership.
devotion to the national homogeneity of the state, Social sentiments clearly changed in Turkey be- leads to a majority of the Turkish society opposing tween 2005 and 2006. Support for EU membership the granting of cultural rights to Kurds, and to de- fell from nearly 75% to nearly 55%. Opponents claring its readiness to accept some restrictions increased from 15%–20% to around 35%. Confi- to democracy in an emergency situation in order dence in the EU and the perception of accession to guarantee the state's security. Moreover, a sig- as a necessity and a good thing have clearly wea- nificant minority support the authoritarian rule kened. The lessening support for EU membership of the army. A clear majority of Turks believe that means weaker identification with the West and the EU member states are sponsors of Kurdish se- Europe. Dislike of Christians and fears of the con- paratism and intend to partition Turkey.
sequences of accession have become stronger.
Turks commonly share the belief that the Euro- Such negative trends have arisen for the follow- pean Union employs double standards with re- ing reasons, among others: gard to their country. Although this belief is not – the escalation of the Kurdish rebellion in au- groundless, signs of inconsistencies in the Union's policy are often exaggeratedly perceived in Tur- – the disillusionment of the Turkish public with The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar the EU's stance on Turkey as presented at the sum- In sociological terms, Turkey's accession is most mit in December 2004 (e.g. the contents of the Ne- strongly supported by the Kurds, both the re- gotiating Framework, the failure to keep the pro- ligiously conservative and the liberal middle class, mises made by the European Commission to the the intelligentsia and big business. These social Turkish Cypriots, accompanied by the demand groups are interested in expanding the scope of that Turkey should extend the customs union to political and economic freedom (the conservative middle class and the Kurds), and they identify – resolutions on the Armenian genocide passed by themselves most in cultural terms and have ties the parliaments of some EU member states and with the West (the liberal middle class and big bu- the European Parliament (see Appendix 2); siness). Support for accession is the weakest – imposition of the obligation to hold referendums among the nationalist section of those secular so- on each subsequent enlargement by the French cial groups who are tied to state structures (the parliament, and declarations by politicians from other countries that similar laws should also be 3. The Kurdish issue adopted in their countries; and– tensions in relations between Muslims and The Kurdish issue is the most vital for the pros- Christians (such as the publication of the carica- pects of Turkey's integration with the EU, for the tures of Mohammed or the fragment of the lec- following reasons: ture on Islam delivered by Pope Benedict XVI in – Turkey's most serious internal problem is its military conflict with the Kurdish guerrilla forces,which has lasted for more than two decades, has There is a correlation between the government's claimed the lives of over 37,000 people and has ability to carry out controversial reforms or make cost US$150 billion in direct expenses; concessions regarding the Kurdish, Cypriot and – the Kurdish issue is strongly linked to numerous Armenian issues required by Brussels and the like- economic, political and social problems (poverty, lihood of the membership prospect. The less rea- conservatism, fundamentalism, patriarchy, human listic the prospect of EU accession seems, the rights, the position of the army and developing 's path to the European Union weaker Turkish society's support for accession, of the so-called ‘deep state', a shadowy network and hence the smaller the probability that they of security structures), which are at the same time will accept the most controversial decisions as serious reasons for some EU communities' reluc- a lesser ‘necessary' evil.
tance towards Turkey's accession;– conditions of accession include guarantee of the riers in T cultural rights of ethnic minorities as well as de-centralisation of the administration, while meet- ing such conditions will arouse concern about theintegrity of the state among a great majority ofTurks, and will entail the need to revise the defini-tion of the state (national homogeneity), whichis one of the fundaments of the Republic of Turkey;– the prospect of EU integration has played a keyrole in Ankara modifying its policy on Kurds;– a definite majority of Turks accuse EU memberstates of supporting Kurdish separatism and thedivision of their country; the EU requirements re-garding cultural rights and the activity of Kurdishseparatist circles in EU member states are perceiv-ed by Turks in this context;– the support for accession is much strongeramong Kurds than among ethnic Turks. A clearweakening of likelihood of accession will under- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar mine Kurdish nationalists' support for the conti-nued territorial integrity of Turkey;– the serious losses inflicted by the Turkish armyon the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and thetruce declared by Kurdish separatists created fa-vourable conditions for implementing pro-EU re-forms between 2001 and 2004. The re-eruption offights against the Kurdish guerrilla forces in 2004was the main reason for the growing national-ism in Turkey, weakening support for accession,and consequently, a slowdown in the implemen-tation of reforms. The conflict puts the continua-tion of reforms in jeopardy.
Box 3. Basic information on Kurds more reasonable to use the term ‘people of Kur-dish origin' to define the whole Kurdish popu- Most Kurds live in regions where they are a mi- nority. This tendency has been reinforced by the According to estimates by the Turkish polling large-scale migration of Kurds to metropolises centre KONDA, which conducted the largest (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Damascus, Tabriz, Teh- survey on identity of Turkish citizens in the hi- ran and Baghdad). This has been happening on story of the country (around 45,000 respon- the largest scale in Turkey. Turkey also differs dents), nearly 15% of residents of Turkey indi- from the other countries in terms of its linguis- cated Kurdish and Zaza (1%) as their mother tic assimilation of its Kurdish population.
tongues, and over 10% declared themselves to It is difficult to precisely determine the number be Kurds and Zaza (0.5%). Nearly 10% of re- of the Kurdish population due to the lack of ac- spondents who declared themselves as Kurds curate statistical data and the complicated na- and Zaza indicated Turkish as their native lan- ture of national and religious identity in the guage. In turn, 20% of residents of Turkey who Middle East. The importance of religious identi- 's path to the European Union indicated Kurdish and Zaza as their respective ty in the Middle East (Kurds often present a high- mother tongues admitted that they used Tur- er level of religious activity than their non-Kur- kish more often than they did their mother ton- dish neighbours), strong family structures, the gues. Mixed Kurdish-Turkish families account religious and linguistic diversity among Kurds, for almost 4% of all marriages entered into in riers in T their minority status in the countries which Turkey. It can be estimated that a certain per- apply the policy of assimilation and use the 'di- centage of Turkish residents who identify them- vide and rule' principle with regard to Kurds, selves as Turks and indicate Turkish as their violent conflicts inside the Kurdish community, native tongue are of Kurdish origin.
the complex ethnic structure of the territoriesinhabited by Kurds, their coexistence with other The Kurdish problem in Turkey includes the fol- ethnic groups (numerous mixed marriages) lowing five interrelated aspects; (1) the politi-
and the underdeveloped nature of the Kurdish cal dispute between the Kurdish elites and the modern national identity cause the following: Turkish state about the definition of the state – many Kurds hold religious and tribal identity and the status of Kurds, (2) the military conflict
in higher esteem than a national identity; with Kurdish separatists, (3) the clear socioeco-
– some of them identify themselves with other nomic backwardness of the region predomi- national groups than the Kurdish one; nantly inhabited by Kurds, (3) the trans-border
– identification with the state is very impor- nature of the Kurdish community, which resides tant for them (especially in Turkey).
in four countries, and (5) the link between the
Consequently, treating Kurds as a uniform na- situation of the Kurds in Turkey and Ankara's tional community is a simplification, while it is relations with the EU.
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Table 2. Population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East
Country Population Percentage
The most numerous
Turkish (a large part), (nearly 65–70%) Zaza (a minority) Sorani (the largest group), Kurmanji, Gurani, South- -Eastern dialects, Persian (small minorities) Distribution of the population of Kurdish origin in the Middle East 's path to the European Union a) The Turkish state's policy on Kurds in the Turkish army than in the PKK. Desertions riers in T and their response thereto happen rarely.
The military and autonomy-related traditions of The Republic of Turkey, which was founded in highlander Kurdish communities, the unpreven- 1923 by Kemal Atatürk, defined the Turkish na- table development of nationalist ideology among tion as a community based on culture, the Turkish Kurds (the concept of their own state), favourable language and citizenship. This definition excluded geographic conditions (mountains) and external the possibility of other ethnic communities func- support from countries hostile to Turkey (such as tioning in the public sphere24. Every resident of the USSR and Syria) were among the reasons why Turkey was automatically identified by the state the Turkish state's assimilation policy has met as a Turk25. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds have with armed resistance from Kurdish guerrilla for- undergone ethnic assimilation. For many of them, ces. The Turkish army quashed many local Kur- even though they have preserved their ethnic dish uprisings in the 1920s and the 1930s29. In the identity as Kurds, the Turkish language has be- 1960s and 1970s, urbanisation, secular education come their mother tongue26. However, the pro- and the influence of Kurdish autonomy in North- cess of assimilation never had a chance of being ern Iraq led to a developing Kurdish national iden- fully successful. Kurds constitute a populous mi- tity in Turkey. The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), nority concentrated in one region which has with Abdullah Öcalan as its dictatorial leader, was a clear Kurdish character. The population growth established in 1978. The PKK started terrorist ac- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar rate among Kurds is much higher than it is in the tivity, which erupted into full guerrilla warfare case of Turks27. On the other hand, most Turkish in 1984. Its main goal was to unite all Kurds into Kurds do not identify themselves with Kurdish one state, which distinguished it from other Kur- nationalism28. Kurds usually vote for Turkish par- dish groups in the Middle East. The Turkish army ties, especially for those close to Islamic tradition.
& police forces and the PKK violated human rights According to independent public opinion polls, on a massive scale (tortures, killing civilians and the vast majority do not support secession, and prisoners of war, more then a million people dis- most of them do not sympathise with the idea of placed)30. The state radically restricted the Kurds' transforming Turkey into a bi-national Turkish- rights and imposed antiterrorist laws, which -Kurdish state. The confrontation of the Turkish strongly restricted human rights, freedom of army against the separatist guerrillas and terro- speech and democracy. A ban on speaking Kurdish rists has not erupted into an open ethnic conflict.
in public places was in force between 1984 and Many more Kurds serve in the village militias and 1991. A state of emergency (OHAL) was declaredin south-eastern Turkey in 1987.
The struggle between the army and the PKK led April 2006; 14 people were killed during the riots.
to informal relations being created between the An equally dangerous tendency was demonstrat- security structures and the criminal underworld, ed by street fights between Turkish and Kurdish leaders of Kurdish clans loyal to the state, and Turk- nationalists and attempted lynches. Such tensions ish radical nationalists31. Secret structures acting between ordinary citizens had been rare in the outside the law (whose methods included assassi- 1990s34. Following the re-eruption of fights, the nations, attacks and kidnappings) were created in- PKK became more radical. The Kurdistan Freedom side the armed forces. These structures are referred Falcons (TAK), which plotted many terrorist attacks to as the ‘deep state' (derin devlet). On the other between 2005 and 2006, including on tourist re- hand, the conflict produced connections between sorts, left the party. The PKK announced a cease- Kurdish organised crime and the guerrillas32.
fire on 1 October 2006, and clashes between thearmy and PKK have become rarer since that time.
The first Kurdish political party linked to the PKKwas established in 1990. It has been delegalised b) The regional aspect (Iraq) and has changed its name three times. Since Octo- 's path to the European Union ber 2005, it has been operating under the name of The development of Kurdish guerrilla forces in the Democratic Society Party (DTP). Kurdish parties Turkey was strongly linked to the existence of usually have a more moderate programme than their bases in neighbouring countries, especially the PKK (autonomy rather than independence).
Iraq, as well as to the support offered to them by However, they cannot enter the national parlia- Syria, and to a lesser extent Iran. In 1998, the riers in T ment due to the high election threshold of 10%33.
threat of a military intervention by Turkey made Several offensives launched by the Turkish army Damascus change its policy on this issue. Iran in the second half of the 1990s seriously weaken- gradually changed its policy after the election of ed the PKK, which declared a truce at the end of the moderate president Khatami. Turkey's rela- 1998. Clashes became significantly less intense.
tions with these two of its neighbours clearly im- A breakthrough came with the arrest of Öcalan in proved after the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
1999, who was sentenced to death, although this It significantly strengthened the Iraqi Kurds, which was thereafter commuted to life imprisonment.
was seen as a serious threat by Syria and Iran.
Although the PKK leader is in a high-security pri- South-eastern Turkey has especially strong geo- son, he still has a great influence on the military graphical, historical and economic ties with north- & political Kurdish movement. In April 2005, at his ern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan has been the most inde- initiative, the PKK adopted a new programme for pendent and politically & culturally autonomous a ‘democratic Kurdish confederation', which pro- Kurdish region for over 50 years. In fact, it is rea- vides for setting up Kurdish republics in Turkey, sonable to state that an independent Kurdish Iran, Iraq and Syria that will be united in a confe- state has existed in northern Iraq since 1991. The deration while at the same time formally remain- region has been used as a logistical base by Kur- ing integral parts of the aforementioned countries.
dish separatist organisations from Turkey and The end of the fight against the PKK and the re- Iran. In the 1990s, Turkey, using the internal con- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar quirement to change the status of Kurds, which flicts existing among Iraqi Kurds, managed to con- was set as a condition for opening negotiations by vince some of them to engage in a common strug- the EU, led to an extension of Kurds' cultural gle against the PKK. Serious losses were inflicted rights. However, the PKK decided these rights we- on the PKK owing to the Turkish army's ability to re insufficient. On 1 June 2004, the PKK withdrew carry out raids deep into Iraq and its co-operation from the truce, which caused an escalation of with Iraqi Kurds. The situation radically changed armed clashes. The conflict between the PKK and in spring 2003, when the Turkish parliament vot- the army in south-eastern Turkey was accompa- ed against the agreement with the USA which pro- nied by violent demonstrations by Kurdish natio- vided for launching US attacks on Iraq from Turk- nalists between 2005 and 2006, during which de- ish territories and for the durable deployment of monstrators engaged in clashes with the police Turkish troops tens of kilometres deep into north- and the army. The bloodiest riots, the biggest ern Iraq35. As a consequence, Iraqi Kurds have be- since the mid-1990s, broke out in late March/early come the key US ally in the region, and the Turk- ish army cannot carry out large-scale operations d) The EU's influence on Ankara's in northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurds have significantly ex- panded the area territory under their controlthanks to the collapse of Saddam Hussein's re-gime and to their alliance with the USA. They have In the early 1990s, Ankara's efforts to gain candi- never been as strong as they are today. They do date status for the EEC/EU contributed to the libe- not want to fight their compatriots from the PKK, ralisation of its policy on the Kurdish issue. The who pose no threat to their interests, and they op- ban on speaking Kurdish in public places was lift- pose Turkish intervention in northern Iraq36.
ed in 1991. Since that time, Kurdish newspapersand books have been regularly published (albeit c) The socioeconomic aspect with great problems until recently) and records in of the Kurdish issue the Kurdish language have been issued. A Kurdishcultural centre was established in Istanbul in Kurdish nationalism has also developed due to the 1991. The serious weakening of the PKK, the arrest 's path to the European Union dissatisfaction of a significant part of the residents of Öcalan and conferring EU candidate status on of south-eastern Turkey with the socioeconomic Turkey in 1999 provided grounds for the greatest situation in the region, which is characterised by changes to the Kurdish policy in the history of exceptional socio-cultural backwardness (the low the Republic of Turkey. Brussels made setting the social position of women, religious and social con- negotiation beginning date conditional on these riers in T servatism, low levels of education and the high il- changes. In August 2002, the Turkish parliament literacy rate)37 and by a low level of economic de- passed amendments to legalise the usage of non- velopment. In this context, the Kurdish issue has Turkish languages on TV and radio, and on educa- a direct link to EU accession, since these pheno- tion in languages other than Turkish. The amend- mena cause many Europeans to oppose Turkey's ments were brought to practice two years later.
membership in the EU.
In June 2004, public radio and television started The slow process of socio-cultural modernisation broadcasting short programmes in Kurdish. Before is in the first order an effect of the feudal and fa- 2006, the Kurdish language appeared only spora- mily-based structure and the conservative reli- dically in local private media. The first program- giousness prevalent in the region38, which have mes appeared in March 2006, and they cover preserved their significance for the following rea- a much wider scope than those broadcast by pu- blic television42. The first Kurdish daily newspa- – the limited openness of the region to external per in Turkish history has been published since August 2006.
– concessions by the state, which does not have The first private Kurdish language course, follow- sufficiently effective institutions and economy40; ing lengthy efforts, was made available in March – social needs resulting from military conflicts and 200443. Gradually, more courses were launched.
accelerated urbanisation; and However, all the courses were closed by mid-2005 The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar – poverty41.
due to the lack of people willing to attend them44.
Regardless of such negative phenomena, the Kur- A new Kurdish course was opened in November dish community in Turkey is not a static and ar- 2006. The AKP party, which has ruled Turkey since chaic monad. Some social changes took place in late 2002, has been making attempts to improve the second half of the twentieth century. Current- the socioeconomic situation in south-eastern Tur- ly, most Kurds in Turkey can read and write, live in key by measures including promoting girls' edu- cities and do not treat family identity as the main cation and improving the infrastructure (build- point of reference. Their religiousness has become ing roads)45. The process of paying compensations less orthodox, and their women have been eman- to Kurds who had been forced to migrate to bor- cipated to a limited extent. The most important der regions by the army during military actions sign of the modernisation process is secular Kur- has also begun, yet its implementation has been dish nationalism.
rather slow46. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo-gan has also initiated a discussion on the nationaldefinition of Turkey, supporting the concept of po- litical identification as the principal one (Türkiyeli) criminal activities (drug trafficking). The fact that after the American fashion, and recognising the circles linked to the Kurdish guerrilla organisa- Turkish identity as one of the sub-identities47.
tion exist in European countries has led to deep Political freedom has also been enhanced. The dissatisfaction on the part of the Turkish govern- state of emergency in south-eastern Turkey was ment and society and reinforces the S¯vres syn- lifted in late 2002/early 2003. Kurdish political drome. The conflict between Turkey and the PKK leaders who had been sentenced to imprisonment also directly affects EU member states. This is ma- in 1994, including Leyla Zan, were released in June nifested in tensions between Kurdish and Turkish 2004. Between 2005 and 2006, the government nationalists, Kurdish attacks on Turkish embas- granted consent to the gathering of signatures for sies, anti-Turkish demonstrations held by the Kur- petitions to transform Turkey into a Turkish-Kur- dish diaspora and the involvement of some PKK dish federation and expressing support for Öcalan.
supporters in criminal activities50. Additionally, However, the usage of non-Turkish languages in European tourists have become a target of terrorist political activities (meetings, congresses and pos- attacks staged by the TAK organisation since 2005.
ters) is still banned. The local government reform, 's path to the European Union which was blocked by the president's veto in f) The prospects for resolving 2004, has not been carried out.
the Kurdish issue Minority cultural rights were introduced onlyslowly due to the resistance shown by nationalist A durable settlement of the armed conflict with circles in bureaucracy and justice authorities, and the Kurdish guerrilla forces cannot be achieved by riers in T by limited public support for the reforms48. Gra- military means alone. The sources of the conflict dually, many Turks, considering their support for are deeply rooted in social, economic and politi- EU accession, ‘forgave' the AKP for giving Kurds cal problems, and can only be resolved by clearly cultural rights, and have accepted this as a ‘nec- improving the position of the Kurds in Turkey. The essary evil' on their road to opening the negotia- major impediments on the path to ending the con- tions49. However, this public forbearance has sig- nificantly lessened as a consequence of the inten- – a lack of any clear prospect of Turkey's member- sifying clashes between the Turkish army and the ship in the EU, without which the implementation Kurdish guerrilla forces.
of pro-Kurdish reforms and the resultant margi-nalisation of extremists is rather unlikely; – serious differences of opinions between thestate and the Kurdish elites51; Nearly one million Kurds, the great majority of – the existence of circles opposing a peaceful re- who come from Turkey, live in EU member states.
solution of the conflict on both sides52; They are both economic and political emigrants.
– growing support for Kurdish nationalists53; The largest Kurdish communities are in Germany, – the lack of any strong Kurdish political forces un- France, Holland, Sweden and Denmark, where connected with the insurgents54; and they live close to Turkish emigrants. The diaspora – the strengthening position of the Iraqi Kurds fol- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar has played a very important role in developing lowing the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime Kurdish nationalism since the end of the nine- teenth century. It is a melting pot which unifiesKurds from various regions. Ideas of modern Kur- On the other hand, Kurdish guerrilla forces will dish national identity have had the liberty to de- not regain the position they used to enjoy in the velop in exile thanks to the wider scope of free- 1990s because the Turkish army has inflicted too dom and the opportunities to use Western ideas.
heavy losses on them. The membership of the PKK Currently, Europe is the main place where books has significantly decreased. The organisation has and magazines in Kurdish are published. Nume- become internally divided following Öcalan's rous Kurdish radio and television stations, asso- arrest, and the PKK can no longer count on Syria's ciations and parties operate in EU countries. Some and Iran's assistance. Currently, the support for of them have connections with the PKK, which armed struggle is much smaller among Turkish gathers funds in Europe, including by means of Kurds than it was ten years ago. Any further re- duction of PKK's combat capacity in the present 4. Human rights (torture geopolitical situation depends on Ankara's co-ope- and ill-treatment, freedom ration with the Iraqi Kurds, who could success- of speech, freedom of religion fully cut off the organisation's supply routes. How-ever, the Iraqi Kurds will co-operate with Ankara and the position of women) against the PKK only if further pro-Kurdish re-forms are implemented in Turkey56. Internal pres- The question of improving human rights in Tur- sure on the Turkish government will intensify key is linked to the country's pre-accession efforts because the population growth rate is higher for the following reasons: among Turkish Kurds than among Turks.
– political criteria are of key significance and aregiven priority over economic ones when the EUdecides on a candidate country's status;– Turkey has greater problems in this area thanall previous candidate members have had; 's path to the European Union – any clear worsening of the human rights situa- tion in Turkey will cause negotiations with the EU to be broken off.
a) The impact of pro-EU reforms riers in T on the human rights situation and the development of civil society Dozens of constitution amendments, new lawsand codes to significantly expand the scope offreedoms of speech, peaceful assembly & associa-tions, to combat the usage of tortures and to limitthe possibilities for delegalising political partieswere passed in Turkey between 2001 and 2006.
The process of implementing the new regulationsto be used in practice has lasted since 2004. Thisis being done in a difficult situation, consideringthe military conflict with Kurdish separatists,which has been ongoing uninterruptedly for over20 years now.
The government launched the policy of ‘zero tole-rance of torture' in 2004. In effect, some police-men have been accused of and sentenced for The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar using tortures and ill-treating inmates, which hashappened on such a scale for the first time in Tur-key's history. Although the number of lawsuitsagainst policemen on charges of abusing powershas increased, the great majority of the trials stillend in collapse or with suspended sentences be-ing imposed. According to the leading TurkishHuman Rights Association (IHD), the most brutalforms of tortures have been almost totally elimi-nated. Pursuant to the European Commission'sreports for 2004 and 2005 and the Council of Eu-rope's report for 2006, the usage of torture is notsystematic and is in decline57. Turkish humanrights organisations believe that torture and the Table 3. Data from the Human Rights Association (Insan Haklar Dernegi)58
Type of human rights violation
Murder committed by unidentified perpetrators Demonstrators killed by law enforcement agencies during riots Individuals killed during interrogation Cases of law enforcement agencies using tortures and ill-treatment Publications banned and confiscated (posters, tapes, books, newspapers, magazines) Radio & TV stations and programmes punished by the Radio and Television Board with a temporary broadcasting ban Delegalised social organisations, political nearly 150 (2001) 's path to the European Union parties, cultural centres and publishing houses People sentenced for expressing their views People sentenced under the demonstrations and assemblies act61 riers in T Source: Insan Haklar Dernegi, http://www.ihd.org.tr
ill-treatment of prisoners do have a systematic na- one of the most serious EU demands made with ture, since most perpetrators go unpunished.
regard to Turkey in 2006. As a consequence of theescalating conflict with the PKK and the serious In 2006, the positive tendencies slowed down, riots in spring 2006, a new antiterrorist law was and the human rights situation worsened. The passed. The law, which extends the definition of main reasons for this were the escalation of the terrorism and the powers of security forces to use conflict between the army and the PKK and the arms during antiterrorist operations, and intro- large-scale riots in spring 200662. Between 2005 duces regulations which provide for the possi- and 2006, most of those sentenced for expressing bility of limiting the rights of detainees and for their views were Kurds, who were charged mainly punishing publications accused of supporting, with praising or supporting the PKK and spread- spreading and praising terrorism, may be condu- ing separatist propaganda63. Regarding the other cive to human rights violations66. President Ahmet sentences, charges of slandering the army and Sezer appealed against the articles regarding the (in fewer cases) other state institutions, influenc- freedom of the press to the Constitutional Court.
ing court proceedings and propagating radical re- Trials which violate human rights do not only hap- ligious views prevailed.
pen because of the excessive rigorousness of the The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar The problems with respecting human rights in lawanother reason is the strict interpretation of Turkey arise from the fact that the Turkish legisla- the law by the judiciary system, which represents tion, regardless of reforms, fails to meet EU stan- authoritarian and nationalist views67.
dards. The new criminal code which came into Developing civil society has been the main prac- force in July 2005 was described by the European tical effect of passing reforms to expand the fun- Commission as adopting ‘modern European stan- damental freedoms. Between 2004 and 2005, the dards in line with criminal law in many European participation of Turks in non-governmental orga- countries'64. However, some of the code's articles nisations grew by 45%, to 7 million (10% of socie- met with reservations from the EU as posing ty)68. Regardless of these positive trends, however, a threat to the freedom of speech. The most con- civil society in Turkey is much weaker in compa- troversial is article 301, which concerns insulting rison with Western Europe69.
‘Turkishness', the republic and state institutions65.
The removal or amendment of article 301 was b) Freedom of religion and conscience nisations in summer 2006. Nevertheless, the cen-tral government and the AKP-controlled local Turkey is a secular state where the activity of reli- governments do not want to recognise cemevi gious structures is regulated by the Presidency of as places of religious worship.
Religious Affairs (Diyanet)70. No reservations a- Nearly 200,000 followers of religions other than gainst this system have been made in the Euro- Islam (mainly members of the Armenian Church, pean Commission's reports; the most criticised Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Jews) live in issues include the situation of religious minorities, Turkey. There are also groups of Protestants. Ge- religious culture and ethics as an obligatory school nerally, the situation of non-Muslims in Turkey is subject (which in fact teaches religion71), and the much better than that in many Muslim states, space for entering religion in identity cards.
yet it is still worse than that of religious minori- Turkey has over 10 million Alevis (nearly 15% of ties in western Europe. Armenians, Jews and Or- the country's population), who are followers of thodox Greeks enjoy the best legal situation. The a strand of Islam which is more liberal than Sun- state recognises their right to religious and cul- 's path to the European Union nism and has numerous common theological ele- tural education75. Foundations of religious com- ments with Shi'ism72. For centuries Alevis had munities, which represent the vast majority of been treated as second-class subjects in the Otto- religions, report to the state General Directorate man Empire, which was based on the primacy of of Foundations, which includes a Foundation Sunni orthodoxy. In effect, they became staunch Board. The nature of the foundations is not reli- riers in T supporters of left-wing politics, including radical gious; they play an administrative role (manag- left, and Kemalism in the twentieth century. Their ing the real estate of religious communities). Turk- social liberalism and their tradition of concealing ish law does not permit the founding of associa- their religious identity arouse prejudice among tions which have openly stated religious goals76.
many Sunnis. Many Alevis were killed in the mas- The lack of any legal identity and of possibilities sacres in 1978 and 1993 in central Turkey. In 1995, to educate priests in Turkey are the greatest prob- bloody clashes between Alevis and the police broke lems which non-Muslim religious communities out in Istanbul. Alevis have are different ways of have77. Ankara does not recognise the ecumenical defining their own identity; some of them perceive nature of the Orthodox Patriarchy of Constanti- it only in cultural terms, and others believe that nople. Local authorities often cause problems in they constitute a religious minority and as such building and repairing non-Muslim places of wor- should be entitled to certain rights. The religious ship. Prosecution authorities also (though rarely) Alevis are dissatisfied with the fact that the state launch proceedings against those who celebrate does not treat them as a separate community.
religious ceremonies outside their places of wor- Alevis have a very sparse representation at the Pre- ship. In 2005, missionaries were verbally attacked sidency of Religious Affairs. Their places of worship by public institutions78. Several incidents target- (cemevi) are not treated as temples, and receive ed against non-Muslims happen every year. These much smaller money from the Ministry of Culture are mainly acts of vandalism and threats, some- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar instead of state subsidies from the Diyanet73. As of times beatings. The attacks on Istanbul synago- 2006, the principles of Alevism have been present- gues in 2003, in which mainly Muslims were ed in the classes of religious culture and ethics.
killed, the murder of a Catholic priest in Trabzon However, Alevis do not like the way their religion is in February 2006, and the deaths of three Ger- presented in textbooks for this subject74.
man Protestant missionaries in Malatya in April The AKP represents only the Sunni electorate (and 2007 have so far been the most serious assaults to a great extent their more conservative part), and so this government cannot be reasonably ex- The problems encountered by non-Muslims result pected to significantly improve the status of the from the strong prejudices of the Turkish authori- Alevi community. Admittedly, the Education Mi- ties and society against followers of other reli- nistry in July 2006 promised that it would intro- gions than Islam, and their dislike of Christian duce classes on Alevism in the religious culture proselytisation79. These prejudices originate from and ethics syllabus, and government representa- numerous wars against Christians, the Israeli-Pa- tives took part in ceremonies held by Alevi orga- lestinian conflict and the bad relations modern Turkey has with countries linked to some of its The level of women's education, albeit consistent- non-Muslim minorities (e.g. Armenia). The prob- ly improving, is much lower than in the EU84. Just lems of non-Muslims in Turkey are also connect- over 25% of women in Turkey are legally employ- ed with the rigorous interpretations of the prin- ed. They are clearly overrepresented among peo- ciple of separating religion from the state and of ple working in the underground economy, which sovereignty employed by the authorities.
is significantly larger in Turkey than in the EU85.
However, pro-EU reforms have contributed to the On the other hand, women in Turkey have a rela- improvement in the situation for non-Muslims tively good representation in prestigious profes- in Turkey. In October 2002, the parliament voted sions in comparison with some EU member sta- for amendments to the act on religious founda- tes86. Women make up less than 5% of members tions, enabling them to buy real estate80. They of the Turkish parliament, and their representa- were deprived of this right in 1974 during the in- tion is even worse at the local government level87.
tervention in Cyprus. In November 2006, the However, the situation is much better in the state Turkish parliament accepted amendments to the administration and the judiciary system88.
foundations act, which gave the following guar- The usage of violence against women, which oc- 's path to the European Union antees to religious communities: (1) the right to
curs on a much larger scale than in EU countries, regain previously nationalised real estate, (2) pro-
is the most radical manifestation of the poor so- tection against arbitrary interference by the state cial position of women in Turkey. Another serious administration with the foundation's internal af- problem is the fact that a large minority of the fairs and against nationalisation, (3) autonomy in
population, including women, accepts home vio- riers in T managing their real estates, (4) representation on
lence89. Murders of and suicide by women happen the Foundation Board, and (5) facilitations in set-
much more frequently in Turkey than in the EU.
ting up foundations81. The law has not yet come Many of them are considered as honour killings; into effect, since some of its articles have been these are committed against women accused of vetoed by the president.
‘promiscuous' behaviour (which may include sim- A law introducing new identity cards in which the ple flirting) and blemishing the honour of the fa- entry indicating the holder's religion can be re- mily90. Murders and violence against ‘immoral' moved at the holder's request came into force in women are linked to the fact that the society em- April 2006 as part of legislation adjustments to ploys double standards to the erotic lives of males satisfy EU requirements regarding the freedom of (acceptance of premarital sex) and females91.
religion. An Alevi who did not want his child to Numerous adjustments to Turkish law aimed at attend the obligatory religion and ethics classes improving the legal status of women have been won a lawsuit to that effect in November 2006. If adopted since 2001 as part of pro-EU reforms. The the award is deemed final and binding by a court amendments to the civil code introduced in late of higher instance, it will set a judicial precedent.
2001 and the new criminal code adopted in mid-2005 were especially important92. In autumn 2006, c) Women's rights the government prepared legislation to improvethe legal protection of female victims of domestic The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Improving the situation of women in comparison violence and imposing stricter penalties on per- to other EU human rights requirements poses petrators of home violence. According to Turkish a special challenge to Turkey. In this case, adjust- women's organisations, these reforms are insuf- ment to EU standards requires serious changes ficient and their implementation has encounter- in the mentality of Turkish society. A woman's ed numerous problems93. Women's organisations role in the family is perceived by the great majo- have been demanding further legal changes, such rity of Turkish society in a traditional way82. Most as introducing quotas (guaranteeing places) for residents of Turkey identify family honour with women in public life and in the labour market, the good reputation of the wife, sister or daugh- and adopting a wider definition of honour kil- ter (the cult of premarital virginity and marital lings94. The AKP, which is a conservative party, fidelity)83. The attitude to the role of women is one treats such demands with a reserve, and is rather of the foundations of conservatism in Turkey unlikely to embark on a very active policy to which makes it different from EU countries.
5. The position of the army supported by a significant part of the society. This and relations between secular special position of the army, which is of coursea non-democratic institution, has become one of & conservative religious circles the main reasons for the inherent weakness ofthe Turkish democracy, a key sign of which is the The role of the army in Turkish political life and lack of complete civilian control over the army.
the relations between the secular establishment, The army was granted powers to monitor the po- which is mainly based on military officers, and litical situation under the 1961 constitution as conservative religious circles are significant for a consequence of establishing the National Secu- the prospects of Ankara's integration with the rity Council (MGK), most of whose directors and EU for the following reasons: members were military officers. The government – civilian control over the army is one of the key was obligated to pay due respect to its opinions conditions for Turkey's accession, and the army under the 1983 constitution96. Since 2001, the po- in Turkey has always had the exceptional position litical role of the army has been reduced as part 's path to the European Union of being the guarantor of the political system's of the process of Turkey's adjusting to European stability, a situation which the generals do not standards, and the powers of MGK have been sig- nificantly reduced. Officially, civilians have gain- – the secular establishment is in dispute with con- ed the leading position in the Council97. Civilian servative circles over the form of separation of re- control of army expenses was introduced in Sep- riers in T ligion and the state; these tensions distract the tember 200698. The number of press articles and main political forces' attention from the process publications of reports criticising the views and of integration with the EU, antagonise them and activities of military officers and appealing for fur- put any consensus on accession at risk; ther reforms has increased in the last period99.
– the support of the governing AKP party for EU The generals perceive Turkey's membership in the membership is to a great extent connected with EU as the crowning achievement of the country's their hope of lessening the influence of the army Westernisation. However, at the same time they on public life, and liberalising the rigorous rules fear any limitation of sovereignty, and are con- of separating religion and the state.
vinced that the integration process is contribut-ing to the increasing popularity of Kurdish sepa- a) The status of the army ratism and Islamic fundamentalism. In effect, they in the political system are much less ready for the concessions requiredby the EU. According to Hans-Jörg Kretschmer, the The significance of the army in Turkey's modern EU's ambassador to Turkey from 2002 to 2006, not socio-political life originates from the important one of the lowest-ranking Turkish generals and role the institution played in the process of moder- admirals had ever responded to his numerous in- nising the Ottoman Empire and building the mo- vitations for meetings. The fact that a moderate dern Republic of Turkey. The republic founding and pro-European General, Hilimi Özkok, was no- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar fathers, including Kemal Atatürk himself, were minated chief of staff in August 2002 contribut- either retired or active generals. Until 1989, all the ed to the process of reducing the role of the army.
presidents of Turkey, with the exception of Celal Özkok maintained correct relations with the go- Bayar, had been former military officers. The army vernment and, despite some reservations, sup- perceives itself as the main receptacle of Atatürk's ported the process of Turkey's integration with legacy and the guarantor of the exclusively Turk- the EU. His support was very important for the ish and secular nature of the state. Since the es- government's conciliatory policy on the issue of tablishment of political pluralism in Turkey in 1946, the army has staged four coups (in 1960, Regardless of the changes, the position of the ar- 1971, 1980 and 1997). Each time, following inter- my in Turkey's political system still significantly vention, democratically legitimate civilian autho- differs from solutions used to that end in the EU.
rity has been restored. The army is an institution The general chief of staff reports directly to the which enjoys the highest public confidence, and prime minister The specific position of the Turkish its exceptional position in the political system is Military Forces is connected with the Supreme Military Council's (YAS) legal status. The members terms (see Appendix 2). The determination of the of the council are the prime minister, the minister Kemalists to preserve the status quo substantiates of national defence, the chief of general staff, force the existence of the fundamentalist religious mi- commanders, the commander of the armed forces, nority, which includes groups of extremists who the general commander of the gendarmerie, the resort to violence100.
commander of the navy, the generals and admi-rals of the armed forces. In additions to its legal Box 4. Relations between religious duties, the YAS decides on promotion, retirement and secular circles between 1923 and disciplinary measures regarding armed forces personnel. Decisions in the YAS are made by sim-ple majority vote. In consequence, the YAS – The government of Kemal Atatürk (1923–1938), which is constitutionally under the government's who removed religion from public life by force authority – can take disciplinary measures against (instituting very limited religious education at prime minister's vote. However, its decisions university level, removing lessons on religion should obtain the confirmation of the president.
's path to the European Union from school curricula and banning the wearing The army has also strong influence on the prepa- of headscarves in public institutions), had ration of the National Security Policy Document.
a great impact on the shape of the separation of This document, which formulates national secu- religion from the state. However, the establish- rity strategy is determined by the Council of Mi- ment of democracy after World War II made nisters within the views put forth by the MGK.
riers in T the state depart to a certain extent from the ori- Practical issues are also important. Turkish gene- ginal Kemalist version of secularism. Firstly, rals often comment on the political situation, in public religious middle and secondary schools compliance with the broad definition of national (imam hatip), which used the programmes of security. Officially, the budget of the armed for- secular schools extended by religious curricula, ces is prepared by the parliament, which has the were established. Their intention was to pre- right to make amendments. According to the EU, pare future candidates for theological studies.
however, the Turkish parliament is not engaged However, the number of imam hatips soon ra- in any serious debate on the army's budget.
dically exceeded the Religion Ministry's per-sonnel demand, and continued to grow until b) Relations between the secular 1997101. Girls also started attending imam ha- establishment and conservative tips, although women did not have right to per- religious circles form the duties of an imam until 2004. Extra-curricular religion classes were introduced to Reforms limiting the powers of the army have schools in 1949. Courses of Koranic study start- been carried out by the government led by the ed developing. The softening of the state's ap- Justice and Development Party (AKP), which (con- proach was manifested in 1970 through the sidering its Islamic roots) is most interested in les- emergence of the first Islamic party, which sup- sening the influence of the military on politics, ported introducing some elements of sharia The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar and is the most independent of all the parties into the Turkish legal system, opposed the pro- from the generals' influence. On the other hand, cess of Turkey's integration with the EEC, and the roots of the AKP make the generals especially proposed an alliance with Muslim states as an suspicious of its efforts to introduce civilian con- alternative. Its ideology was named Milli Gorus trol over the army. The army is the key element of (the National Vision). This Islamic party has the secular establishment, which includes a ma- been banned four times. In the 1990s, at the jor part of the judiciary, bureaucracy, academics, peak of its popularity, it operated under the media and the intelligentsia. The establishment names of Refah (Welfare) and Fazilet (Virtue).
supports maintaining the status quo of separating The presence of religion in public life reached religion from the state. Their opinion on this issue its apogee after the 1980 coup, when the differs from that shared by most of the society, government and the army decided that Islam which is conservative and religious and supports had to be treated as an important element of a separation of religion and the state on different Turkish national identity. The policy was inten- The AKP differs from the secular establishment ded to neutralise Kurdish nationalism, radical in the way it perceives separation of religion and left- and right-wing tendencies and Islamic fun- the state. Its priorities include lifting the ban on damentalism. As part of it, obligatory religion wearing headscarves at universities, removing and morality classes were introduced, and the the barriers at university examinations for imam number of imam hatip schools and Koranic hatip graduates who want to enrol at other de- courses was significantly increased. These poli- partments than theology, and removing limita- cies, the general increase in popularity of reli- tions on opening Koran courses102. These issues, gious integrationism in the Muslim world, the especially the ban on headscarves, are of great difficult financial conditions of millions of Tur- symbolic significance for both secular and conser- key's residents caused by the lack of economic vative circles, and constitute the basis of their stability and mass migrations from villages to respective political identities. The headscarf issue cities, disillusionment with corrupt and ineffi- is in a way linked to the prospect of Turkey's in- cient politicians and the intensifying feeling of tegration with the EU. The AKP supported Tur- 's path to the European Union not belonging to the Turkish state which many key's EU accession among other reasons because Kurds shared during the armed conflict be- it counted on the Union's support for revising tween the army and PKK, have all contributed the rigorous separation of religion and the state.
to the increasing popularity of Islamist circles, The European Union supported the secular es- who are seen as the only trustworthy alterna- tablishment in the dispute over headscarves, riers in T tive anti-system opposition. Refah won the par- because the European Court in Strasbourg de- liamentary election in 1995, gaining over 20% clared in 2004 and 2005 that the ban on wearing of the votes. The party's leader Necmettin Er- headscarves at universities in Turkey did not vio- bakan headed the government coalition as the late human rights. Many observers claim that first Islamist prime minister in the history of these awards have made EU membership less at- the Turkish republic. This was unacceptable to tractive to the elite of the AKP, which is the strong- the army, who forced the dismissal of the go- est and most pro-EU party in Turkey.
vernment on 28 February 1997. The new cabi- Being unable to implement its main three objec- net the liquidated imam hatip middle schools, tives, the AKP has been trying to find some ‘sub- imposed scoring rules at university entry exa- stitute' topics such as the penalisation of adul- minations, which made it very difficult for gra- tery and limiting the sale and consumption of al- duates of imam hatip secondary schools to en- cohol103. It cannot change the status quo mainly rol on other courses than theology, and set because of the firm stance which the judiciary more restrictive rules for opening Koranic cour- has taken. Court awards have blocked the laws ses. As an effect, the number of course partici- passed by the AKP regarding imam hatip schools, pants and imam hatip pupils sharply decreas- headscarves and Koranic courses. The present ed. The army's intervention sharpened the pre- composition of the most senior judicial institu- viously existing conflict between the moderate tions (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar and conservative factions inside Refah, which and the State Council) will change significantly effectively split into two parties, Saadet (Felici- for the next decade at least104.
ty) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Tension between the secular establishment and The latter set Turkey's accession to the EU as the conservative religious circles clearly increas- the main goal of its foreign policy, and discon- ed in May 2006 as a consequence of the murder tinued efforts to introduce elements of sharia of a judge of the State Council (Danistay) and the into Turkish law. The AKP, unlike Saadet, sup- wounding of several others by a religious fanatic.
ports the free market, an alliance with the USA The judges had approved a judgement forbidding and correct relations with Israel together with a teacher who wore a headscarf in her private life simultaneous rapprochement with the Islamic outside of school to practice her profession. Mass world. The AKP ideology was named Muhafa- demonstrations in support of the secular nature zakar Demokrasi (Conservative Democracy).
of the state were held in response. The demon-strators were led by generals, opposition lead-ers, judges and professors. The government, wish- ing to avoid an open confrontation with the army, 6. The Armenian issue refrained from any disputes. As a result, the situa-tion calmed down. General Yasar Büyükanit, who The ‘Armenian issue' refers to the dispute be- is said to be a staunch supporter of maintaining tween Turkey and some EU member states over the status quo of the secular state, was nominated the matter of recognising the deportations and as the new general chief of staff in August 2006.
massacres of Armenians committed by the Young In turn, the AKP is likely to win the parliamenta- Turks regime during World War I as genocide, and ry election in 2007 and will rule the country for the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey another five years. This composition of forces will and Armenia. It has affected Ankara's EU acces- uphold the tension between the conservative re- sion-related efforts for the following reasons: ligious circles and the secular establishment, a ten- – the demand made by many European politi- sion which may periodically increase.
cians that the Turkish government should refer A significant cooling of the dispute over values to the deportations and massacres as genocide.
is unlikely in the longer term. Social conservatism The uncritical acceptance of the Armenian inter- will maintain its influence because of the higher pretation of those events by many European me- 's path to the European Union population growth rate among the more tradi- dia provide reasons for growing nationalist and tional and religious part of the society. Their con- Eurosceptic sentiments in Turkey, and strength- servatism will however be moderated by the ris- en the conviction that EU elites are employing ing education level and the improving economic double standards; – it is highly likely that some EU countries will riers in T make Turkey's accession conditional on Ankara'srecognising the events as genocide, a condition that neither Turkish society nor its elites willaccept;– the demand to acknowledge genocide is oftenlinked to claims made by many Armenian circlesto territorial compensation, which in effect meansthat when the EU raises this issue, Turkey's ‘S¯v-res syndrome' is strengthened;– the guarantee of an open debate on the depor-tations and massacres on Turkish territory is animportant condition stipulated by the EU;– one of the EU's membership prerequisites isthat the candidate should have correct relationswith its neighbours.
a) The Armenian issue in Turkey'srelations with EU countries The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar and as an internal affair The issue of referring to the Armenian deporta-tions as genocide arose for the first time in Tur-key's relations with the EEC/EU soon after Turkeyapplied for candidate status in 1987. In June ofthat year, the European Parliament determinedthat the deportations and massacres of Armenianshad been genocide, and that Turkey's failure toadmit that was ìan impediment to considering thepossibility of Turkey's accession to the Commu-nity.' In September 2005, the European Parliamentadopted a resolution by a clear majority of votes stating that recognising the deportations and of the Armenian massacres has been discussed massacres of Armenians as genocide was one of in Turkey on a hitherto unprecedented scale. More the prerequisites for Turkey's accession to the EU.
than ten books and hundreds of articles and in- The European Parliament's resolutions are not terviews challenging the official version of events binding, and neither the European Commission have been published in Turkey since 2001108. Some nor the European Council has set such a require- of them have been written by Armenian histo- ment for Turkey. However, the recognition issue rians. Foreign historians have found it much easier severely affects Turkey's relations with some EU to gain access to the state archives, although they countries. The Armenian deportations and mas- still encounter some problems. A scientific con- sacres have been recognised as a case of genocide ference on the situation of Armenians during in various declarations by the parliaments of nine World War I, which was organised by three pres- EU member states (Belgium, Cyprus105, France, tigious Istanbul universities, was held in late Sep- Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and tember 2005. Over 40 researchers, representing Italy). Six of the declarations were adopted after a critical approach to the official version of the 's path to the European Union Turkey was granted EU candidate status in 1999106.
Turkish historiography on those events, took part Turkey's refusal to recognise the Armenian geno- in the conference109.
cide affects the country's relations with France In 2003, the prestigious foundation Tarih Vakfi, especially strongly, as one of the most numerous whose members include hundreds of historians and most influential Armenian diasporas in the and a group of liberal intellectuals, prepared a pe- riers in T world is found there. Turkey's negative response tition in protest against the negative stereotypes to the demand to refer to the deportations as ge- of Armenians presented in Turkish history school nocide significantly increases the probability that textbooks. Discussions on the deportations and French society will reject Turkey's EU accession in massacres have been approved by most of the so- any referendum. In October 2006, the lower house ciety, although a smaller part of the Turkish public of the French parliament adopted a law which (nearly 30%) are against it110. However, the vast provided for penalisation of the view that the majority of the Turkish population does not accept Armenian deportations and massacres were not that their country's accession to the EU depends a case of genocide. The law is unlikely to take on the recognition of Armenian genocide by their effect because it would have to pass through the government. A regulation according to which re- Senate and be approved by the president, while ferring to the deportations and massacres as ge- both the government coalition and the president nocide was an example of a crime against the oppose it. However, it has caused great dissatis- fundamental interests of the state was removed faction among the Turkish elites and public.
from the new criminal code in July 2005111.
The demands by some European political elites Although opportunities for discussing the depor- that the Turkish government should acknowledge tations have significantly increased, nationalist the Armenian deportations and massacres as circles use the regulations of the criminal code a case of genocide are perceived in Turkey as hypo- (specifically article 301) on the protection of na- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar crisy and double standards. Both Turkish elites tional dignity to bring suits against intellectuals and the society at large believe that the same who criticise the official version of the country's should be demanded from other candidate and history during World War I. So far, one such suit member states in the cases of other crimes107.
ended in sentencing the defendant to imprison- A free discussion on the Armenian deportations ment (which was replaced with a fine), and the and massacres was impossible for many years in others have been discontinued112. Nevertheless, Turkey due to strict legal regulations, a situation an open discussion on Armenian massacres still which was criticised by the European Union. The encounters serious hurdles in Turkey, a glaring first publications by Turkish and Western histo- example of which was the January 2007 murder rians which challenged the official version of of Hrant Dink, a Turkish journalist of Armenian those events, which were published in Turkey in origin who was accused by radical right-wing the mid-1990s, encountered many legal problems.
circles of denigrating national values.
As a result of expanding the freedom of speechas part of the pro-EU reforms after 2001, the issue b) Turkey's relations with Armenia would undoubtedly bring a solution to the con- and the Armenian diaspora flict between Azerbaijan and Armenia closer. How-ever, it is almost impossible that Armenia could Turkey keeps correct relations with all its neigh- give up its demands that Turkey recognise the ge- bours, with the exception of Armenia. The two nocide, just as Turkey is unlikely to accept the countries recognise one another, although Tur- key does not have a diplomatic representation inArmenia and vice versa. Turkey has maintaineda blockade of the Armenian border since 1993113.
The main reasons for that is the Armenian occu-pation of nearly 14% of the territory of Azerbai-jan114, which is officially recognised by Turkey asthe second state of the Turkish nation, as well asthe demands by the Armenian government anddiaspora115 that Turkey should recognise the cri- 's path to the European Union mes committed against Armenians as genocide.
According to Armenia, modern Turkey is respon- sible for the Armenian genocide116. Some Arme-nian elites and a clear majority of the Armenianpublic insist that the recognition of the genocide riers in T by Turkey should automatically entail territorialcompensations. However, the Armenian govern- ment has been avoiding any unambiguous decla-ration that it would waive the claims117. Yerevanis ready to establish diplomatic relations with Tur-key without any preconditions. Agreement is addi-tionally impeded by influential and uncompromi-sing nationalist circles in both countries. The Ar-menian diaspora, which provides Yerevan withsignificant financial support, has a great influenceon the country's policy on Turkey. Nationalism isstronger among the diaspora than in Armeniansociety. On the Turkish side, anti-Armenian atti-tudes are represented by adherents of Pan-Tur-kism, nationalists living in Eastern Turkey (whichhad previously been inhabited by Armenians), anddescendants of emigrants from the Caucasus118.
The standpoints presented respectively in Turkish The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar and Armenian historiographies (the latter con-cerning both Armenia proper and its diaspora)completely differ in their evaluations of the Arme-nian deportations and massacres. In Armenianhistoriography, discussion of the dark sides of theirown history is more poorly developed than in Tur-key. Political tensions and the living memory ofthe harm translate into the mutual prejudices ofArmenians and Turks, which are stronger on theArmenian side119. Regardless of the lack of formaldiplomatic relations, however, trade exchangesand economic migration from Armenia to Turkeydevelop120. Improving Turkish-Armenian relations 7. Cyprus and relations inhabited by communities of Greeks (nearly three-quarters of the residents) and Turks (near-ly a fifth of the residents)125. This has been the A settlement of the conflict between Greek and greatest problem in Greco-Turkish relations un- Turkish Cypriots, establishing Turkish-Cypriot til today. The Greek population of Cyprus want- trade relations, recognition of Cyprus and set- ed unification with Greece, to which Turkish tling the territorial disputes between Greece and Cypriots responded by dividing the island126.
Turkey are vital for Ankara's relations with the The United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey con- Union. This is for the following reasons: cluded a treaty in London in 1960, pursuant to – Greece and Cyprus have been members of the which Cyprus gained independence as a bina- European Union, since 1981 and 2004 respective- tional state, having no right to unite with ly, and their consent is necessary to open and close Greece or to divide the island. The signatories every chapter of negotiations; reserved the right of military intervention in – the fact that Greece and Cyprus are EU member case of a gross breach of the constitution. The 's path to the European Union states makes it difficult for Brussels to play the political system was based on the very exten- role of an unbiased and efficient mediator in re- sive veto powers granted to the Turkish com- solving the problems; munity. The veto right was the main source the – Turkey's accession to the EU will be impossible Greek community's dissatisfaction; they pro- unless the aforementioned problems are resolved; posed changing the system to transform Cyp- riers in T – the issue of Cyprus and the EU's stance towards rus into a Greek national state and grant mino- it are major sources of nationalism and Euroscep- rity status to the Turks. The Turkish Cypriots ticism in Turkey122; feared that unification of the island with Greece – since 1974, Turkey has not recognised Cyprus would be the next step. This led to ethnic and has impeded its membership in internation- clashes recurring at intervals of several years127.
al organisations; such a situation has not taken Radical Greek nationalists took over power in place so far in relations between any EU candi- a coup in 1974 and promised unification with date state and EU member state.
Greece. They also committed a massacre againstthe Turkish population. As a result Turkey, us- Box 5. An outline of relations ing the powers granted under the London between Greece and Turkey Treaty, carried out a military intervention128.
and the Cyprus issue This ended in the Turkish army's occupationof nearly 37% of the island129. The internatio- Modern Greece and Turkey have defined them- nal community recognised Turkey's invasion selves through mutual opposition, trying to of the northern part of Cyprus as an act of occu- marginalise any of the common cultural ele- pation. Soon after the invasion, the Turkish Fe- ments which have arisen from a nearly mil- derated State of Cyprus was set up, which in lennium-long period of mutual relations123.
1983 proclaimed independence as the Turkish The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Four Greco-Ottoman wars were fought from Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), which was the beginning of the nineteenth century (1821– unrecognised by any state with the exception –1829, 1897, 1912–1913, 1917–1918 and 1919– of Turkey130. Numerous efforts by the interna- –1922). Greek rebellions supported by Athens tional community to find a compromise be- (such as the Cretan rising)124 also happened in tween the conflicting communities has failed the Ottoman Empire. These conflicts were ac- to produce a solution.
companied by massacres, ethnic cleansings andforced displacements. However, temporary im- As a consequence of the Turkish invasion of Cy- provements of Greco-Turkish relations were prus, relations between Turkey and Greece were also a fact. The longest period over which rela- very bad for the subsequent 25 years. In the tions between Turkey and Greece were good 1980s and 1990s, Athens maintained close ties lasted from 1930 to 1955. They worsened due with countries which were Ankara perceived as to the issue of Cyprus, a former British colony enemies or rivals (such as the USSR to 1991, communist Bulgaria, Armenia, Syria and Rus- Annan following the EU Copenhagen summit in sia). The process of improving Turkish-Greek re- 2003, was the most significant consequence of the lations started in spring 1999. Its symbolic be- improvement in Turkish-Greek relations.
ginning was marked with a meeting of the fo-reign ministers of Turkey and Greece, the first in Box 6. The Annan Plan forty years. The main reasons for changing therelations between Athens and Ankara were the The plan provided for establishing a United Re- public of Cyprus as a loose confederation of two – the clear rapprochement of Turkey and the component states, the Turkish Cypriot State (the USA, and a simultaneous weakening of the in- former KKTC) and the Greek Cypriot State (the ternational position of Greece as a consequence former Republic of Cyprus). The main common of the negative stance taken by Athens on the institutions were to be the bicameral parlia- NATO intervention in Kosovo and its giving ment (including the Senate, in which both re- shelter to the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in publics would have equal representations), 's path to the European Union the Greek embassy in Kenya; which would elect the Presidential Council – the prospect of Greece entering the euro zone (4 Greeks and 2 Turks) which would elect the (1 January 2000) and the related conviction by president and the vice president by rotation, as the Greek government of the need to cut its de- well as the Supreme Court, the panel of which fence expenses in order to adjust the macro- was to consist of equal numbers of both com- riers in T economic indexes to meet the euro zone re- munities' representatives as well as three for- eign judges. The constitution could be amended – Ankara's strengthening position in the EU only by a majority of votes cast by representati- upon the electoral victory of socio-democrats in ves of both component states. The federal au- Germany, who support Turkey's EU accession; thorities' tasks were to cover foreign, fiscal and – the appointment of Ismail Cem, a supporter customs policies and communications. The of improving relations with Greece, to the post Greek part would be increased in three years by of Foreign Minister of Turkey in 1999; 8% of the island's territory controlled by the – mutual aid offered after the earthquakes (Au- KKTC and over 1% of the British sovereign base gust – September 1999); areas. The border in the central part of the is- – the upcoming EU Helsinki summit in 1999, land would significantly reduce the territory of at which time a decision on the possible grant- its Turkish part. Both component states were ing of candidate status to Turkey was expected given the right to impose limitations on the per- to be taken. Ankara wanted to improve its manent residence of citizens of the other ethnic relations with Athens because this would add origin in case their number reached 18% of their strength to its position131.
respective populations within the period of 19years, or until Turkey's accession to the EU. Thissolution was especially important for the small- a) An outline of relations er Turkish community. Refugees were offered The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar between Greece and Turkey the right to regain one-third of the value of lost and the Cyprus issue property, and to compensation for the remain-ing two-thirds within a period of three to five Greece supported granting Turkey candidate sta- years. The plan also provided for granting Cy- tus at the Helsinki summit in December 1999.
priot citizenship to a majority of settlers from Since that time, all serious political forces in Greece Turkey within four years. The military contin- have supported Turkey's accession to the EU. This gents of Turkey and Greece were to be reduced support is based on the conviction that having by 2011 (to 6,000 personnel each), by 2018 or Turkey as a democratic, stable EU member state is until Turkey's accession to the EU (3,000 per- in Greece's long-term interest132. The support of- sonnel each) and after that date (650 personnel fered for the first time by both states to the most in the Turkish contingent and 950 in the Greek serious plan to resolve the Cyprus problem, which was devised by the UN Secretary General Kofi During that summit, Turkey's support for the set- of 2007 is provided for under the Accession Part- tlement of the issue of Cyprus was determined nership signed by Turkey and the EU. In January as one of the key conditions for setting the date 2006, Turkey presented a plan to simultaneously to open negotiations with Ankara and for hold- lift the trade embargo imposed on the KKTC and ing a referendum on this issue133. This was held open Turkish sea and air ports to Cypriot ships on 24 April 2004134. Nearly two-thirds of Turkish and planes. This plan met with a cold reception Cypriots and less than 25% of Greek Cypriots from Greece and Cyprus. In September 2006, voted in favour of the plan135. Soon after the refe- Finland (which held the EU presidency at the rendum, the European Council (without Cyprus time) suggested lifting the trade isolation of the at that time) declared it was determined to lift KKTC by opening the port of Famagusta under the isolation of the KKTC and obliged the Euro- UN supervision and bringing the small town of pean Commission to prepare a concrete propos- Varosha, located in the Turkish part of the is- al. In July 2004, the European Commission came land, under UN control. Turkey was to open seve- up with the proposal to offer 259 million euro in ral ports to Cypriot ships in exchange for that.
's path to the European Union aid to the KKTC for the period between 2004 and However, the Turkish-Cypriot talks ended in fail- August 2006, and to open the EU market on prefe- ure. As a consequence, the European Union decid- rential conditions for exports from the KKTC, ed in December 2006 to exclude 8 chapters from which was to be the first step towards lifting the negotiations until Turkey extended the customs international embargo. The EU accepted the trans- union to Cyprus.
riers in T fer of 200 million euro to the KKTC as late asOctober 2006,although the Union has still not b) Disputable issues agreed to open its market to goods from the in the Aegean Sea region KKTC as of today136. This situation is principallya result of the stances taken by Greece and Cyp- The issue of borders in the Aegean Sea is a source rus. Their behaviour may be motivated by the fear of a serious dispute in Greco-Turkish relations. In that ending the economic isolation of the Turkish June 1995, Greece signed the United Nations Con- part of Cyprus will lead to an improvement in its vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (not rati- economic situation, in effect strengthening its fied by Turkey), which set 12 nautical miles as negotiating position. Their stances found favour- a top limit of territorial waters. 148 states and the able conditions in the situation of a lack of defi- EU ratified UNCLOS by 20 September 2005139. Tur- nite support for Turkey's accession from EU mem- key did not because it opposed the expanding of ber states. In July 2005, the Turkish government Greek territorial waters from 6 miles, a zone res- signed a document to extend the customs union pected by Athens since 1936, to 12 miles. Accord- to Cyprus137. However, the protocol on extending ing to Ankara, this regulation increased the area the customs union has to be ratified by the Turk- of Greek territorial waters in the Aegean Sea from ish parliament. At the same time, it made a decla- 44% to 71%, and reduced the scope of interna- ration stating that signing the protocol did not tional waters from nearly 49% to less than 20%.
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar mean the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. On 21 Soon after Greece's ratification of the convention, September 2005, the EU responded with a coun- the Turkish parliament adopted a resolution, ac- ter-declaration, which rejected the Turkish go- cording to which Greece's expansion of the bor- vernment's declaration and stated that in 2006 ders of its territorial waters to 12 miles was a ca- Ankara should bring the customs union into effect sus belli. Since the intervention in Cyprus (1974), with regard to all EU member states, that is, Turkey has also started challenging the 10-mile opening Turkish air and sea ports to Cypriot pla- distance, which was determined by Greece as the nes and ships. Pursuant to the European Union's scope of Greek air space in 1931. This means that declaration, Turkey's failure to carry out this de- incidents between both countries' military aircraft mand will adversely affect the negotiating pro- often happen in the disputed zone. In the 1990s, cess, and Turkey must recognise Cyprus before Turkey and Greece twice found themselves on the joining the Union138. This declaration is not bind- brink of war over the ownership of tiny islands in ing on Turkey. Nevertheless, the condition of ex- the Dodecanese archipelago140. More than 30 Gre- tending the customs union to Cyprus by the end co-Turkish meetings have been held since 2002 to discuss the territorial disputes linked to the Aege- kely to be significantly prolonged and even tem- an Sea, and still no solution has been found. A po- porarily withheld. The possibility that the nego- sitive event was the establishing of a government tiations will finally be broken off is also real.
telephone ‘hot line' in June 2006 between Ankara Currently, opening Turkish sea and air ports to Cy- and Athens to alleviate tensions in case of inci- priot ships and planes is the key issue in Turkey's dents in the disputed zone. Joint manoeuvres by relations with the European Union. Pursuant to the Turkish and Greek navies were held in early the Accession Partnership, the Turkish parliament October 2006 for the first time in history.
has to ratify an additional protocol to extend the The status of minorities is also a source of misun- customs union to Cyprus and provide Cypriot derstandings in Turkish-Greek relations. Nearly ships and planes with access to all its ports and 5,000 Greeks live in Turkey, while the population airports by early 2008. Turkey has made the ratifi- of Greece includes between 100,000 and 120,000 cation dependent on a total removal of the trade Turks. Both parties, pursuant to the Lausanne isolation of the KKTC. The Turkish parliament will Treaty of 1923 which marked the end of the Turk- certainly not vote for the customs union unless ish-Greek war, recognise them not as ethnic but the EU simultaneously lifts its isolation of the 's path to the European Union religious minorities. However, neither Athens nor KKTC. Reaching an agreement with the EU on this Ankara fully respects the treaty's provisions re- point will not mean that the Cyprus issue will stop garding the two minorities' cultural and religious being one of the biggest problems in Turkish-EU relations. The issues of Turkey's refusal to recog- Problems in bilateral relations between Greece nise Cyprus and the unification of the island will riers in T and Turkey are of secondary importance in com- remain unresolved. Cyprus will continue making parison with the issue of Cyprus. If the latter was its consent to open or close a subsequent chapter resolved, compromise on other Greco-Turkish dis- on the recognition of its statehood by Ankara, putes would become significantly easier. The EU which in turn will not make such a decision un- had little chance of success at linking Cyprus' ac- less the island is unified. Nicosia will probably de- cession with the regulation of Greco-Turkish rela- mand unification of the island on more favourable tions on the island because of the firm resistance conditions than those provided for under the An- to such moves by Greece, which has been a mem- nan Plan. Ankara is very unlikely to make any sig- ber of the EEC/EU since 1981. As an EU member nificant concessions regarding this issue. There- state, Greece could veto any EU decision. Another fore, the stance of the key EU members and the reason why European integration could not be USA on the unification of Cyprus will be of key im- used as a tool in the process of regulating Greco- portance in this case.
Turkish relations in Cyprus was the lack of any A crisis in Turkish-EU relations may be provoked clear support by European elites to Turkey's mem- at the beginning of 2008 by a possible insufficient bership in the EU. As a result, Brussels conferred implementation of the Accession Partnership by candidate status on Cyprus (1997), conducted Ankara. The main impediment to its implemen- membership negotiations with it (1998–2002), tation will be the conflict with the Kurdish guer- and then accepted its membership (2004) with- rilla forces. The situation may be additionally com- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar out trying to reunite the island before that.
plicated by the possible disintegration of Iraq andthe emergence of an independent Kurdish state c) Conclusions and forecasts in its northern territories. Strong nationalist andEurosceptic sentiments will have a detrimental The prospect of EU membership, which has been effect on the government's readiness to satisfy the the main driving force for initiating democratic European Union's requirements. In 2007, the go- reforms in Turkey, cannot effectively and durably vernment's determination to do so will also be re- stabilise the internal situation. The country has to duced due to upcoming elections141 as well as pos- cope with more serious problems, both internal sible tensions between the new general chief of and external, in its relations with the EU and the staff and the prime minister over the definition of Union's individual member states than any other the secular state. The parliament's election of previous candidate has had to. As a consequence, a new president will be a very sensitive issue. The negotiations between Ankara and Brussels are li- secular establishment does not want a politician whose wife will wear a headscarf to be nomina- – growing tension between the army and the AKP; ted to the post. The prime minister, whose wife – a smaller chance for any peaceful solution to the wears a headscarf, did not initially rule out run- Kurdish conflict; ning for the post, although it now appears that – intensifying anti-Western sentiments among the his most likely replacement, the former foreign Turkish society and elites, which will accordingly minister, is also married to a woman who wears affect foreign policy; a headscarf.
– impediments to political and economic co-ope- US intervention in Iran, which would lead to Tur- ration between Ankara and the EU countries; key's greater engagement in Middle Eastern af- – problems with integrating the Turkish minority fairs at the expenses of European issues, and to in the EU (the Turkish government's support for an intensification of anti-Western sentiments (the anti-integration tendencies in the diaspora); conflict will be perceived in religious terms), can- – worsening relations between Turkey and Greece; not be ruled out in the immediate future.
Reforms will not be put on a faster track after the – Turkey's rapprochement with Russia and Mus- 's path to the European Union elections, if nationalism and Euroscepticism re- lim countries.
main popular ideas in Turkey. Ending the military On the other hand, the scale of economic and po- conflict with Kurdish guerrilla forces and impro- litical ties existing between Turkey and EU coun- ving the EU's attitude to Turkey's candidacy could tries makes it highly unlikely that Turkey will contribute to reducing public support for them.
adopt a radically anti-Western foreign policy.
riers in T However, to achieve success in the fight against Adam Balcer Kurdish guerrillas, apart from military actions, it is necessary to take brave and difficult political de-cisions (such as declaring an amnesty for Kurdishprisoners). Radical changes in Ankara's policy to-wards the Kurds are highly unlikely, as the pros-pect of EU membership has become less real. Inturn, the possibility of accession will not becomemore real unless the support of European societiesand political elites for Turkey's membership rises.
Existing tensions between the West and Muslims,economic, political and social problems in indivi-dual EU member states, and problems with defi-ning the political system of the Union itself anda possible lack of improvement of Turkey's inter-nal situation142 all lessen the probability of rever-sing Europeans' negative attitude to Turkey's can-didacy. Even if the perception of Turkey's acces- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar sion improves in the EU and the negotiations endin success, its membership will be uncertain untilthe last moment because Turkey's accession hasto be accepted by all member states. In turn, somemember states and communities in the EU pre-sent a sceptical or very sceptical attitude to Tur-key's possible membership of the EU.
If the European Union decides to suspend nego-tiations, because of Cyprus or a negative evalua-tion of the tempo of Turkish reforms, this will giverise to a crisis in relations between Turkey andthe Union. Its probable consequences will include:– a regression of the democratisation process inTurkey; which countries should relations be given high- Public opinion poll results er priority by Turkey?': nearly 32% answered withthe EU, 23% with the Turkish republics, 21% withMuslim countries, 15% with neighbours and 3% 1. Attitudes to the West and Europe with the USA.
The fact that Turkish society treats EU member- In the survey entitled NATO and Turkish Foreign ship as a matter of priority was proven by the sur- Policy, conducted in June 2004 by Pollmark re- vey conducted by Pollmark company in 2004 be- search centre, 47% of Turks declared that Turkey fore the EU summit in December, when the deci- was a Western country and 36% stated it was an sion to open negotiations with Turkey was expect- Eastern country (Asia), 54% had a positive atti- ed to be taken. 56% of Turks answered that if tude to the West and 29% had a negative attitude.
a date was not set, Turkey should continue its ef- The proportions of the answers to the questions forts to attain EU membership. 37% were of the whether Turkey should be a Western state were opposite opinion. At the present moment, the ma- almost identical.
jority of those supporting a continuation of the 's path to the European Union According to the survey Euroscepticism in Turkey membership-related efforts would probably be conducted in late 2003 by Hakan Yilmaz, 52% of Turks believed that Turkey was historically a part According to Eurobarometer, 60% of Turks had of Europe. In Eurobarometer no. 63 (spring 2005), a positive attitude to the EU and 20% had a nega- 58% of Turks declared that Turkey was to some tive attitude in autumn 2005. In mid-2006, Euro- riers in T extent a part of Europe in historical terms. 29% barometer (no. 65) showed that 43% of respon- were of the opposite opinion, including 16% who dents presented a positive attitude and 26% a ne- were radically opposite.
gative attitude to the European Union. The 2004 At the end of 2003, 48% of Turks were proud of Transatlantic Trends survey revealed that 70% of being Europeans, and 24% were somewhat proud Turks believed that EU membership was a good of that. At the end of 2004, the number of Turks thing, and less than 10% thought it was a bad who defined themselves as somewhat proud fell thing. According to the same survey carried out to 15%. In Eurobarometer for candidate countries in 2006, 54% of Turks were of the opinion that no. 2003.4 (autumn 2003), 41% of Turks declared Turkey's EU membership would be a good thing they felt dedicated or very dedicated to the no- and over 20% thought it would be bad. The Euro- tion of ‘Europe', 26% felt slightly dedicated and barometer survey at the end of 2005 showed that 31% were not dedicated at all. In spring 2005, the 35% of Turks distrusted the EU and more than first group reduced to 30%, and the proportion half trusted it. The same survey in 2006 showed of respondents who declared a slight dedication the reverse proportion.
to Europe had risen to 36%. A lack of dedication According to the A&G centre's survey in autumn was declared by 29% of Turks.
2004, 67% of Turks believed that Turkey's EU mem- There are no more up-to-date surveys, although bership was a necessity. 9% were of the opinion identifications with being Europeans, Europe and that Turkey should not join the EU. In autumn The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar the West have probably lessened due to the EU's 2006, the former opinion was supported by 32% reducing support for Turkey's membership.
of respondents and the latter by 25%. The mostnumerous group presented neutral views.
2. Attitude to the European Union 3. Attitude to democracy In the survey Türk Dis Siyaseti Arastirmasi carriedout in late 2003 by Pollmark, to the question of Surveys conducted by World Value Survey, Gallup which countries Turkey should co-operate with in International, the Pew Research Centre and Turk- the long term, over 50% of respondents chose ish public opinion research centres have shown the EU, 23% the Turkish republics, 13% the Middle that a vast majority of Turks perceive democracy East and 6% the USA. In the poll conducted by as the best system. According to the survey enti- ANAR centre in November 2006, the following tled Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, answers were given to the question of ‘With Bati conducted by Hakan Yilmaz in 2006, nearly 75% of respondents declared that tortures and atlantic Trends 2005 survey, 42% stated (includ- censorship could not be used in any situation.
ing 24% firmly) that the EU was a Christian club, On the other hand, in the public opinion poll car- where no place for Turkey could be found. 52% ried out by Ali Çarkoslu and Ersin Kalayicoglu were of the opposite opinion.
Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi in 2006,more than a half of respondents stated that dis- 5. Attitude to sovereignty respect of human rights was permissible in a si-tuation of serious threat to state security and that, Eurobarometer surveys carried out between 2003 if necessary, a strong leader should be able to rule and 2005 showed Turkish society as being very unrestricted by any legal limitations.
sceptical about the possibility of subordinating A great part of Turkish society is sceptical about the Turkish armed forces to a hypothetical Euro- the possibility of building democracy in Turkey. In pean defence ministry. On the other hand, the the Pew Research Centre survey conducted in Turkish public supported a common European de- summer 2006, nearly 40% of Turks stated that de- fence and foreign policy, often more readily than 's path to the European Union mocracy could not operate in Turkey as a purely people in some EU countries. Due to worsening Western invention.
relations between Turkey and the EU, in 2006 the number of respondents who did not have an opi- 4. The feeling of cultural difference nion on the issue significantly increased, whilethe number of supporters of such policies de- riers in T In the Gallup poll in 2001, 45% of Turks said that creased. The Transatlantic Trends 2005 poll show- the West had a bad influence on Turkish culture.
ed that readiness to use force to defend the inte- Sexual permissiveness, pornography and drug rests of their state was quite widespread in Tur- abuse were the most frequently mentioned exam- key; it is stronger than in Europe and similar to ples of negative Western influence on Turkey. On that in the USA. However, Turkish society's devo- the other hand, 73% of Turks admitted that the tion to their state's sovereignty does not mean West made good films and music. In that survey, that Turks totally reject any compromises in for- Turks stood out among other polled Muslim socie- eign policy; this was best illustrated by their views ties (such as Indonesia and Pakistan) as they em- on the plan for the unification of Cyprus in April phasised democracy and human rights and not 2004. In a poll conducted at that time in Turkey technological development as the advantages of by Pollmark centre, 47% of respondents support- ed the plan and 38% were against it.
In Eurobarometer no. 63 (spring 2005), 57% ofTurks (33% of whom were totally in favour) agreed 6. Fears of threats posed by the West with the opinion that the cultural differences be- and Europe to the country's integrity tween Turkey and Europe were so great that theywould prevent Turkey's accession to the EU. Ac- The Euroscepticism in Turkey survey conducted cording to the survey Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – by Hakan Yilmaz in 2003 showed that 36% of The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati, conducted by a team led by Turks feared that Turkey's EU membership would Professor Hakan Yilmaz at the end of 2005, be- cause their country to split up along ethnic lines.
tween 35% and 40% of respondents believed that According to Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, Din, Turkish society should rely only on its own tradi- Devlet, Bati poll led by Hakan Yilmaz in the begin- tions in the field of culture, between 30% and 35% ning of 2006, between 65% and 70% of Turks supported limited Westernisation in this area, and were convinced that European countries support- between 20% and 25% firmly supported copying ed Kurdish separatists and wanted to divide Tur- Western cultural models. In the same survey, res- key. In the same poll, over 45% of respondents pondents stated that Turkey's EU membership stated that the conditions imposed by the EU on would have a detrimental effect on religious val- Turkey reminded them of the provisions of the ues (63%), young people's morality (61%) and the Treaty of S¯vres signed in 1920, pursuant to which family structure (52%). In comparison to the 2003 Turkey had lost most of its territories and sove- Euroscepticism in Turkey survey, these fears had reignty. In 2003, this opinion was supported by increased by 5% to 10%. According to the Trans- 36% of respondents. In the case of both surveys a significant part of the respondents did not have half felt uncomfortable at the sight of ‘scantily' an opinion on this issue. In the survey Türkiye'de dressed women and nearly two-thirds felt uncom- milliyet˜ilik carried out in spring 2006, 50% of fortable about unmarried couples. On the other respondents claimed that the EU wanted to divide hand, nearly 40% of Turks felt uncomfortable at Turkey, and one-third stated that the European the sight of women wearing charshafs (black ro- Union's requirements were no different from the bes covering all the body) and of bearded men provisions of the Treaty of Sevres.
wearing religious headgear. In the survey WhatThe World Thinks in 2003 (Pew Research Centre), 7. Conservatism and views 25% of Turks fully agreed and 12% partly agreed on the secular state with the opinion that limitations on commonwork of women and men should be imposed. Ac- According to the survey What the World Thinks in cording to the survey Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve 2003 conducted by Pew Research Centre, 73% of Siyasette Kadin carried out in 2004 by Binnaz To- Turks fully supported the separation of religion prak and Ersin Kalaycioglu, over 20% of respon- and the state, and 15% supported it to a great dents believed that common work of men and 's path to the European Union extent. Similar results were shown by Ali Çarko- women was improper.
glu and Binaz Topak in their survey Degisen Tür- kiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset carried out in 2006, in 8. Views on the social position which over 76% of Turks opposed introducing sharia law in Turkey and 8% supported the idea.
riers in T Surveys in 1999 showed over 20% support for According to the survey Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik introducing sharia. In the survey Türkiye'de Din, – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati carried out in 2006, near- Toplum ve Siyaset in 1999, nearly 15% of respon- ly 90% of Turks believed that women should dents supported introducing into Turkish law have absolutely equal rights as men in all areas new rules regarding divorce, marriage (polygamy) of life. At the same time, two-thirds agreed with and inheritance which were based on sharia and the opinion that if a woman could not combine discriminated against women. In the same poll, her professional work with her home duties, she over two-thirds of Turks declared that publish- should give up work because taking care of her ing books which denied the existence of God and home and husband was her natural duty.
selling alcohol during the holy month of Rama- Additionally, in a special Eurobarometer entitled dan had to be banned. In the same poll, 7% of Social Values, Science and Technology (conducted in respondents stated that marital infidelity should early 2005), 58% of Turks stated that men were be punished by execution, 1.5% would impose the generally better political leaders than women.
lash, 17% imprisonment and nearly 16% would This was the highest coefficient among all the EU impose a more lenient penalty (such as a fine). In member and candidate states. 51% presented this the Pollmark survey in 2004, in a debate on the view in the survey Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siya- penalisation of marital infidelity, 37% of respon- sette Kadin held in 2004. 36% of men would not dents supported introducing a regulation to pe- agree to their wives' involvement in political acti- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar nalise adultery in the criminal code, even if that vity. On the other hand, the same survey showed would cause breaking off relations with the EU.
that 78% of Turks did not mind having a woman In the survey Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastir- as president. 74% supported guaranteeing wo- masi conducted in 2006, over 30% of Turks de- men places on lists of candidates in general elec- clared that boys and girls should be educated se- tions. According to the survey conducted in 2006 by the United Nations Development Programme According to the poll Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – (UNDP), over three-quarters of respondents sup- Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati carried out in 2006, over 40% ported the guaranteeing of a certain number of of respondents claimed that a woman who de- parliament seats to women.
clared herself a Muslim should cover her head.
According to various surveys, between 30% and 25% admitted they felt uncomfortable seeing 45% of Turks agree with the statements that uni- a woman without a headscarf, while 35% claim- versity education is more important for boys than ed they did not fast during Ramadan. More than girls. On the other hand, in the poll Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin, 83% of respondents young people adhere to religious rules to a less- admitted that the lower level of women's educa- er extent. Public opinion polls indicate that over tion has inhibited Turkey's development. In turn, 60% of residents of Turkey support lifting the ban 64% declared a readiness to accept additional tax- on wearing headscarves by students and (to es for the benefit of women's education.
a slightly smaller degree) by public servants. More In the poll on the sexual life of Turks carried out than half of Turks also support changing the uni- for Hürriyet newspaper in summer 2005 by versity examination rules, which pose a serious TNS–Pinar, nearly half of the respondents were barrier to imam hatip secondary school gradu- fully convinced that men should marry virgins.
ates who want to enrol at departments other than More than a half claimed that a daughter's vir- theology. On the other hand, a clear majority of ginity was a token of her husband's or father's the society do not consider the existence of these honour. A small minority of parents declared per- restrictions as discrimination against religious mission for their daughters to engage in prema- people. On the other hand, although the ban on rital sex (the percentage was much higher in the wearing headscarves is believed to be discrimi- 's path to the European Union case of sons). A significant minority accepted pre- natory, this issue is not a serious problem for most marital erotic experiences which did not cause Turks. The conviction that religion is important loss of virginity. Young people were more liberal in their lives has strengthened among Turks over on these issues.
recent years. In the survey carried out by Ali Çar- In the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey koglu and Binnaz Toprak in 1999, 25% of respon- riers in T carried out regularly for decades by the Hacet- dents declared to be religious and 6% identified tepe University Institute of Population Studies, themselves as very religious. In 2006, the propor- nearly 40% of Turkish women stated that their tions were 46% and 13% respectively. In 1999, 36% husbands had the right to hit them in certain si- of respondents identified themselves as Muslims tuations. Nearly a quarter of respondents agreed first, and in 2006 the percentage grew to 45%.
with this opinion in the survey Türkiye'de Muha-zakarlik – Aile, Din, Devlet, Bati.
Turkish society is less religious than most Mus-lim societies. Still, Turks are much more religiousthan residents of the West. According to surveyscarried out in 2006 by Ali Çarkoglu and BinnazToprak, 64% of women in Turkey wore headscar-ves (some of them were compelled to do so bytheir families); the number of women wearingheadscarves had decreased by almost 10% since The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar 1999. According to the survey by A&G in 2003,32% of Turks prayed regularly five times a day,39% quite often, 5% only on important holidaysand 20% never. In another survey, conducted bythe Pew Research Centre in 2002, 33% declaredthey did not pray at all or prayed only on impor-tant holidays. According to Ali Çarkoglu's surveyin 2003, 43% of Turks went to mosques at leastonce a week. A survey carried out at the end ofRamadan in 2003 by Pollmark showed that 65%of Turks had fasted regularly during the whole ofRamadan, 15% on some days of Ramadan and20% had not fasted at all. All the polls prove theexistence of differences between the generations; ted by the Ottoman army spurred on the activi- Armenian deportations and ty of Armenian guerrilla forces. Thousands of Ar-menians deserted from the Ottoman army to join massacres during World War I the guerrilla troops or the Tsar's army. In winter1915, those Armenian conscripts who had remain- According to Turkish school textbooks, a great re- ed were discharged from military service and bellion broke out during World War I among the transferred to labour battalions. Many of them Armenians, who were collaborating with Russia died of hunger, diseases and fatigue. In spring against the Ottoman Empire, and the state was and summer 1915, they were executed.
forced to deport them as a result. Reportedly, To sum up, a large group of Ottoman Armenians 300,000 Armenians (nearly a quarter of the popu- did join the struggle against the empire. However, lation) died. Most of them were killed by disease, this group was clearly a minority of the Arme- hunger and exhaustion. At the time of the depor- nian population. Armenian military activity, con- tation, massacres were also committed by Kurdish trary to the official Turkish thesis, did not take tribes, recalcitrant army units and paramilitary the form of a mass uprising. Nevertheless, it was 's path to the European Union troops. Armenians committed numerous crimes not a marginal issue, as the Armenian side would against the Muslim populations. There were more like it to be seen.
Muslim victims in absolute numbers, yet propor- The deportations began at the time when the Ot- tionately they were less numerous than the Ar- toman Empire found itself in a very difficult mili- tary situation. The Ottoman army had suffered riers in T According to Armenian history textbooks, the ge- heavy defeats on all fronts, especially in the Cau- nocide claimed the lives of one and a half million casus. In spring 1915, the Russian army and Ar- Armenians (nearly three-quarters of the popula- menian rebels occupied the strategic city of Van, tion). Armenians were defenceless victims of the and the Entente forces landed in Gallipoli, close Ottoman government's policy, which was aimed to the capital city of Istanbul, as well as in Kuwait, at the physical eradication of the entire nation.
and were also marching towards Baghdad. The Armenian historians often compare the Armenian deportations, which had began in the east, ex- genocide to the Holocaust against the Jews in tended over several months to Central and West- World War II. They even claim it was a paradigm ern Anatolia. A minority of those Armenians who for all the genocides committed in the twentieth did not leave the empire's territory between 1915 century, and call it the first genocide of the cen- and 1918 survived the deportations. (Some Arme- tury. Some believe that the genocide was planned nians performed public functions over the entire before the outbreak of the war. Both versions raise war period.) Tens of thousands fled in 1915 from the east of the country to the Russian-controlled The Tsar's army already included volunteer units Caucasus and Iran, where many of them died of consisting of Ottoman Armenians before the war.
hunger and diseases in subsequent years. Accord- Caucasian Armenians, including senior military ing to some moderate Armenian historians (such personnel, constituted a significant part of the as Ronald G. Suny) and Turkish historians who The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Tsar's troops who fought against the Ottoman recognise the deportations as genocide (Taner Empire. Over the period which lasted between the Ak˜am and Halil Berktay), over 800,000 Ottoman Ottoman Empire joining the war (autumn 1914) Armenians (nearly a half of the population) died and the deportations (spring 1915), the following during the war.
interlinked processes were taking place in Eastern The deportations took different forms in the East- Anatolia: a regular Ottoman-Russian war was be- ern and Western areas of Anatolia, as well as in ing fought, Armenian guerrilla activity was deve- individual regions. In Eastern Anatolia, the Otto- loping behind the lines, Ottoman troops were pa- man army, paramilitary troops and Kurdish tribes cifying Armenian villages and slaughtering the ci- on one side were fighting against Armenian vilian populations, who were considered as a Rus- guerrilla forces and the Tsar's army on the other sian ‘fifth column', and Armenian guerrillas com- during the deportations. No railway network mitted crimes against the Muslim population, existed. In effect, Armenians from Eastern Ana- albeit on a smaller scale. The massacres commit- tolia were forced to walk long distances in un- favourable climate and geographical conditions.
man army. Some of them believe that the repres- Most of them died (due to diseases, hunger, thirst sions against Armenians were clearly dispropor- and fatigue) or were killed by Kurdish highland- tional to the threat posed by them to the empire.
ers, Ottoman soldiers and members of paramili- The Ottoman war casualties would have been tary troops.
much smaller if the deportation had not been Armenians from Western Anatolia were deport- carried out. The number of Armenian victims kill- ed by rail, avoiding massacres and long marches.
ed by Muslims during the war exceeded the num- All deportees were forced to settle in Syria, main- ber of Turks and Kurds killed by Armenians by ly in camps situated in the desert. The climate conditions, food and water shortages and diseas- The term ‘genocide' has a very wide scope. It is es killed thousands of them. Several months later, used in international law to define very different subsequent massacres were committed in east- crimes, ranging from the Holocaust of the Jews ern Syrian camps, in which thousands of Arme- through to the Srebrenica massacre committed nians were killed. At the same time, the Tsar's by Bosnian Serb forces during the Bosnian War 's path to the European Union army – supported by Armenian volunteers – oc- (1992–1995). In the opinion of most historians, re- cupied Eastern Anatolia, which was followed by searchers of Armenian affairs and experts on ge- retaliatory massacres of the Muslim population nocide (including the author of the term, R. Lem- and by many Muslims fleeing to Central Anatolia.
kin), the Armenian deportations and massacres The course of the deportations and the fate of the do in fact meet the definition of genocide. Many riers in T deportees at the local level depended on the be- experts on the history of the Ottoman Empire haviour of the Ottoman personnel. Tens of middle- are of the opposite opinion.
and high-ranking officers and officials treated Ar-menians in a humanitarian way or resisted thedeportations.
These deportations were based on the principle ofcollective responsibility. The authorities deport-ed a clear majority of Armenians, including fromthose regions where no military activity had beenconducted. The deportation decree passed by thegovernment gave the army the right to crush re-sistance by any means necessary. Women, chil-dren and old people were noticeably overrepre-sented among the deportees. The deportation wasaccompanied by a confiscation of Armenian pro-perty. Special regulations imposed very seriousrestrictions on regaining property and compen-sations. The authorities settled Muslims, mainly The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar refugees, in place of the deported Armenians.
Many thousands of Armenians were forced to con-vert to Islam. Most crimes against Armenianswere committed by units which were linked,either directly or indirectly, to the state. The stateimposed very lenient penalties on some of thosewho were guilty of the crimes, and it often usedrepressions against those officials and officerswho had treated Armenians humanely or resistedtheir deportations. Even historians who do not re-cognise the deportations as genocide admit thatthe state treated Armenians during the war muchworse (regarding such matters as supplies andprotection) than Muslim refugees and the Otto- 1 The Empire had also conquered Northern Africa and the the obligation to attend religion classes), and establishing Middle East, yet its centres were located in the Balkans and conditions for the functioning of all religious communities, Western Anatolia. An Economic and Social History of the in line with the practice of member states. This includes legal Ottoman Empire 1300–1914, ed. D. Quataert, H. Inalcik, and judicial protection (inter alia through access to legal per- Cambridge 1994.
sonality) of the communities, their members and their assets, 2 In the course of the negotiations, the Turkish side fruit- the teaching, appointing and training of clergy, and the en- lessly tried to include a provision that would specify the date joyment of property rights; implementing legislation relat- on which Turkey would be accepted into the EEC, provided ing to women's rights, pursuing measures against all forms that it had satisfied the required conditions. The Community of violence against women, including crimes committed in did not want to agree to that, and as a result, article 28 was the name of honour, establishing shelters for women at risk added to the agreement, which provided that if adequate of violence in all larger municipalities, in line with current conditions for Turkey's joining the EEC appeared, then both legislation, further promotion of the role of women in society, parties should consider the issue of Turkey's membership.
including their education and participation in the labour mar- 3 At the same time, Morocco's application was rejected, be- ket and in political and social life, and supporting the deve- cause the Commission deemed it a non-European state.
lopment of women's organisations to fulfil these goals; en- 4 The European Parliament insisted it would ratify the union suring effective access to radio/TV broadcasting in langua- on condition that Turkey amended its constitution to expand ges other than Turkish, adopting appropriate measures to 's path to the European Union the freedom of associations and trade unions, amended anti- support the teaching of languages other than Turkish; abo- terrorist legal regulations and released Kurdish party MPs lishing the village guard system in the south-east; improv- from detention. In response to the requirement, the Turkish ing the economic situation in south-eastern Turkey; pursu- parliament passed 12 amendments, which convinced Euro- ing measures to facilitate the return of internally displaced MPs to ratify the customs union. Its scope is broader than persons to their original settlements, ensuring that those that of a typical customs union.
who have suffered loss and damage as a result of the secu- riers in T 5 As a result of the amendments, the death penalty was abo- rity situation in the southeast are fairly and speedily com- lished, the scope of the freedom of speech, gathering and as- pensated; implementing fully the Protocol adapting the An- sociations was significantly enhanced, the possibility of edu- kara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new EU member cation and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was states including Cyprus; continuation of the efforts to re- introduced, the legal status of women was improved and the solve any outstanding border disputes in conformity with position of the army in the political system was diminished.
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and unequi- 6 Negotiating Framework, October 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/ vocally committing to good neighbourly relations, and ad- dressing any sources of friction with neighbours.
Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles and con- 7 On the other hand, it has to be admitted that all negotia- ditions contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, tions are implicitly governed by such a rule.
8 Negotiating Framework, ibid. 9 Vienna claimed it would agree to start negotiations with Turkey on condition that an equivalent decision was taken 12 In some countries, the results of surveys conducted at a si- with regard to Croatia, and insisted that a provision on pri- milar time differed significantly. The results probably varied vileged partnership (special relations) as an alternative to depending on whether the question regarded only Turkey or Turkey's membership in the EU should be included in the all candidates and countries aspiring to the candidate status.
The countries which have joined most recently or will soon 10 This condition was for the first time explicitly stated in the become EU members (Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) pre- Negotiating Framework. Nevertheless, it was one of the Co- sented a positive attitude towards Turkey's accession.
penhagen criteria, adopted in 1993, which set the rules of EU 13 In the Transatlantic Trends 2005 survey conducted by the The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar German Marshall Fund, in nine countries, the total popula- 11 The key requirements under the Accession Partnership tion of which constituted a majority of EU residents, 35% of include guarantee of civilian control over the armed forces, respondents said that Turkey as a Muslim country could not related expenditure and the process of developing the secu- become a member of the EU. In the Eurobarometer 63 sur- rity policy; adopting a ‘zero tolerance' policy regarding tor- vey conducted in spring 2005, 54% of EU residents declared ture and ill-treatment; ensuring the exercise of the freedom that the cultural differences between Turkey and Europe were of expression, including freedom of the press; implementa- too significant to enable Turkey's integration with the EU.
tion of all reforms covering the freedom of associations and 33% were of a different opinion. However, 42% of respon- of peaceful assembly; adopting a law which comprehensively dents believed that to a certain extent, Turkey was in histo- addresses all the difficulties faced by non-Muslim religious rical terms a part of Europe; the same percentage of respon- minorities and communities in line with the relevant Euro- dents shared the opposite view. Eurobarometer 63, spring pean standards; adopting and implementing provisions con- 2005, pp. 366 and 369.
cerning the exercise of freedom of thought, conscience and 14 Over 4 million people originating from Turkey (Turks and religion by all individuals and religious communities (remo- Kurds) currently live in the EU. The most numerous Turkish ving the category ‘religion' from identity cards and removing communities live in Germany, Holland, Belgium, France and Austria. Higher population growth, migration and the ac- The proofs of the strong position of the family include the cession of Bulgaria, where 750,000 Turks live, will contribute proportionally smaller number of divorces, unmarried cou- to increasing the number of the Turkish diaspora in the EU.
ples living together, persons living alone, nursing homes, Members of the Turkish community in the EU predominant- children's homes and kindergartens, as compared to the EU.
ly come from poorer, less modernised (with low levels of edu- The family has maintained its great role in social life mainly cation) and more conservative regions of Turkey. Over deca- because of the inefficiency of the state, the high rate of reli- des, the Turkish diaspora has undergone profound transfor- gious practice and the specific social structure (a high share mations; for example, it has become more liberal than the of the population living in villages and small towns).
society in Turkey proper. However, the Turkish community 21 In surveys conducted in 2002 by Ali Çarkoglu and Kemal is still more poorly educated, financially poorer and more Kirisci, over 40% of respondents either declared that Turkey conservative than European societies. The most serious pro- did not have a best-friend state in the international arena, blem the Turkish diaspora faces is the high unemployment or were unable to indicate such a country. Ali Çarkoglu and level, which results from the fact that it is a young and worse- Kemal Kirisci, ‘The View from Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks educated community. On the other hand, according to the and Greek-Turkish Rapprochement by the Turkish Public', in OECD, the education systems in many EU member states do Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente, ed. Ali Çarkoglu not provide sufficient educational opportunities for students and Barry Rubin, London 2005, p. 125.
's path to the European Union who come from blue-collar workers' families.
22 Using double standards by Brussels does not consist in 15 The Turks' attitude to the EU has been shown by surveys treating Turkey in an especially strict manner, but in exces- regularly conducted by the Turkish research centre Pollmark.
sive leniency in dealing with other countries, which usual- ly fail to satisfy EU standards to a lesser extent than Turkey.
16 Some cold calculation can also be noticed in Turks' atti- Examples of such an approach by the EU: tude towards the EU. In public opinion polls conducted in – very lenient criticism of Greece, which rejects any cultural riers in T autumn 2004 in the four largest cities by the Turkish Inter- rights to Macedonians, Roms, Vlachs and Albanians (who do national Strategic Research Organisation, 35% of respondents not come from new emigration), and discriminates against (the largest group) indicated EU member states, especially religions other than Orthodox Christianity. Ill-treatment and Germany, as ones which Turkey could rely on in case of an torture are not rare in Greece, and the perpetrators usually emergency (e.g. an earthquake or war). The United States was mentioned in the second place (over 25%). International – failure to require from any member or candidate state to Strategic Research Organisation, ISRO 2. Foreign Policy Per- determine certain crimes as genocide (e.g. the extermination of between 5 million and 10 million of people at the turn of 17 Paradoxically, some respondents who supported this view- the twentieth century in the Congo, which was governed at point declared at the same time a readiness to vote for Tur- the time by the Belgian King Leopold, and the killings of near- key's accession to the EU in a hypothetical referendum.
ly 300,000 Serbs, Jews and Roms in the fascist Independent 18 The negative perception of Christians, rooted in the legacy State of Croatia, a satellite of Nazi Germany), while at the of numerous wars, has strengthened over recent years. In same time demanding that Turkey call the Armenian mas- the 1990s, several wars were fought between Muslims and sacres committed during World War I genocide; Christians in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Muslims, being – Turkey's different treatment compared to other countries the weaker side, sustained much heavier losses. These re- which started negotiations before Ankara; the situation does gions have historical ties with Turkey, and a significant part not concern Turkey alone (referendum on every new enlarge- of Turks come from there.
ment in France and the text of the Negotiating Framework); Recently, the main reasons for this include the US interven- – proportionally much smaller financial aid from the EU for tion in Iraq in 2003, growing tension in Europe between Turkey in comparison to that offered to the Central European Muslims and other Europeans after September 11, and ten- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar sions in relations between Turkey and the EU. In the Pollmark – the EU's failure to fulfil some promises (such as the failure and Pew Research Centre surveys conducted between 2004 to end the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cy- and 2006, the share of respondents' negative opinion on prus in exchange for support to the Annan Plan, which many Christians ranged from over 50% to nearly 70%. Pew Global EU politicians had promised before the referendum was Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/reports/ held in April 2004).
19 The conservatism of Turkish society is especially strongly 23 Between 2002 and 2004, the CHP voted in favour of most manifested through patriarchal family and community beha- pro-EU reforms. However, it firmly opposed the government's viour, moral rigour (especially regarding the sexual life of wo- conciliatory policy on the key issue of Cyprus. In September men), a lack of acceptance of any criticism of fundamental 2006, the CHP declared it would not support any further religious truths, and the arrangement of marriages. A signifi- amendments to Turkish laws as required by Brussels.
cant part of marriages in Turkey are still arranged, although 24 Three religious minorities, Jews, Orthodox Christians and these are in a minority now, in contrast to previous genera- Armenians, were treated as an exception.
25 Erik-Jan Zürcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turk- 20 The pivotal role of the family in Turkish society's system ish nationalists: identity politics 1908–1938', in Ottoman of values was proven by the Türkiye'de Muhazakarlik – Aile, past and today's Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat, Leiden 2000, Din, Devlet, Bati surveys conducted in early 2006.
Ahmet Yildiz, ‘Ne Mutlu Türkum Diyebilene' Türk Ulusal ed by Turkish firms. Pipelines from oilfields in northern Iraq Kimligi'nin Etno-Sekuler Sinirlari (1919–1938), Istanbul 2004.
run through Turkish territories. There is no other country 26 The most vivid example is the leader of the Kurdish sepa- with which Iraqi Kurdistan has such extensive economic ties.
ratist movement, Abdullah Öcalan, whose native language Turkey's stance on the political system of Iraq (centralisa- is Turkish. It is used, along with Kurdish, by the media which tion), which had been uncompromising at the beginning, sympathise with the separatists.
has been revised. In 2005, Turkey accepted the federal sys- 27 In 2000, every woman living in south-eastern Turkey, tem of Iraq and established intensive diplomatic relations where Kurds are in the great majority, had 5 children on ave- with Iraqi Kurds. The status of Kirkuk, where rich oilfields rage; the national average was 2.5. Türkiye Istatistik Kuru- are situated and Turkmen supported by Ankara live, is still mu, Bölgesel Istatistikler http://www.tuik.gov.tr a disputed issue. According to Turkey, Kirkuk should not be 28 In the Türkiye'de milliyet˜ilik survey in spring 2006, nearly made part of the Kurdish autonomous area. Turkey is afraid 7% of respondents stated they felt they were Kurds first of that control over them will make Iraqi Kurds more indepen- all. The respondents in the survey were only legally mature dent of Ankara. According to the Iraqi constitution, a refe- people, while Kurdish identity is stronger among young rendum on the status of Kirkuk has to be held by the end of people. In surveys conducted at the same time among peo- 2007. The lack of precise voting rules (constituency borders ple who could vote for the first time, the support for the Kur- and rights to vote) may create tension between Turkey and dish party was higher by 70% as compared to general sur- the Kurds. In the future, Ankara will have to face the chal- 's path to the European Union veys. Public opinion polls show that a definite majority of lenge of the possible establishment of an independent Kur- the Turkish society identify themselves first as Muslims and distan in the Northern Iraq, which may secede if the civil citizens of the Republic of Turkey.
war in the central part of the country intensifies. Probable ‘Terörün sonu milliyet˜ilik', Radikal, 6 April 2006, http://www.
support from the USA and Israel for an independent Kurdi- stan in northern Iraq, the self-rule of Iraqi Kurds (who are riers in T Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the major ideologist of the Turkish aware of the negative attitude to Kurdish separatism present- national philosophy, was of Kurdish origin. Three Turkish ed by such stronger countries as Iran, Syria and Turkey), An- presidents have had Kurdish ancestors. Currently, Kurds are kara's need to unite efforts together with Iraqi Kurds against present in all state institutions. They are also represented the PKK and the economic dependence of northern Iraq on among intellectual elites and business circles.
Turkey may result in good relations being established be- 29 These were fights in defence of autonomy and against se- tween Turkey and Kurdistan.
cularisation rather than national uprisings.
International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq: Allaying Turkey's Fears Over 30 Kemal Kirisci, Gareth Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Kurdish Ambitions', Middle East Report N°35, 26 January Turkey: an Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, London, 31 These relations were brought to light in 1996, when a po- lice officer and a local crime boss who had links with the International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq and the Kurds: The Brewing Grey Wolves ultranationalist organisation were killed in a car Battle over Kirkuk', Middle East Report N°56, 18 July 2006, accident in Susurluk. Their companion, a Kurdish member of a right-wing party, who was the head of one of the mili- tias, survived. The investigation and trials failed to convict the main suspects.
37 The Kurdish population is more patriarchal, conservative, 32 Such factors as the trans-border nature of the Kurdish religiously active and fundamentalist than Turks. Kurds are territories, which are located along the main heroin smug- clearly overrepresented in the Islamic terrorist organisations gling route running from Afghanistan to Europe, the fami- (which are incomparably weaker than the PKK) which were ly structure and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe contribute responsible inter alia for the Istanbul attacks in November to the development of Kurdish organised crime.
2003. On the other hand, proportionally more Kurds then The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar 33 Theoretically, Kurdish nationalist candidates could enter Turks are Alevis, these being a more liberal branch of Mus- the parliament if they sought election as independent can- lims than Sunnis. Violence against women (including mur- ders) is more common among Kurds than among Turks. The 34 It is worth emphasising that information on fights is cur- illiteracy rate is higher, and the professional activity of Kur- rently much more available to public opinion, considering dish women is very low. Compulsory marriages happen more the improvement of the freedom of speech, than it was in frequently among Kurds than among Turks. They commit in- comparably more honour killings. Failure to send girls to 35 Kurdish members of the governing AKP party were espe- school is practiced almost exclusively by Kurds. According cially against this. Some of them voted against the agreement to the government's estimates, 25% of girls did not start in religious solidarity with the Sunnis, and some in ethnic education in south-eastern Turkey in 2004.
identification with the Kurds in northern Iraq.
38 South-eastern Turkey follows the Shafii legal school of 36 Trade exchange has been developing on a mass scale (main- thought, which is more rigorous than the Hanafi school ly exports from Turkey) between Turkey and Kurdish north- found in the rest of the country.
ern Iraq since 2003. Turkish investments have also been grow- 39 South-eastern Anatolia is a limited to external influence ing. Numerous construction contracts have been implement- by its geographical nature, where mountains and desert predominate, and its unfavourable climate. It has been a pe- people. A non-Turkish language could not be the language ripheral region of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey for cen- of instruction.
44 The main reasons for the closures were rigorous regula- 40 Examples of rotten compromises between the state and tions on opening courses, high prices, illiteracy, many Kurds' the pre-modern social structure include alliances with Kur- assimilation into Turkish culture, and the lack of support by dish tribes in fights against rebels, i.e. village militias, and Kurdish nationalists, who believed the courses were an in- the co-operation of political parties with the tribal aristoc- sufficient concession by the government.
racy (either whole tribes vote for a candidate indicated by 45 More roads were built in south-eastern Turkey over a pe- the sheik, or the sheik himself is engaged in politics), and riod of two and a half years (2003–2005) than in the entire the lack of agricultural reform. David MacDowall, A Modern period between 1923 and 2002.
History of the Kurds, Oxford 2004, pp. 395–401.
46 216,000 applications were submitted by September 2006.
41 South-eastern Anatolia was much poorer than the West- The authorities responded positively to 33,000 of them.
ern part of the country even under the Ottoman Empire, European Commission, Turkey 2006 Progress Report, p. 21.
and the disparity widened in the twentieth century. Be- 47 In August 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stat- tween 1914 and 1928, with some breaks, south-eastern Tur- ed during his visit to the south-east that the Kurdish prob- key was the scene of very bitter clashes between the Otto- lem did exist, it had to be resolved through further democ- 's path to the European Union man and Russian armies, between the Kemalists, the French ratisation, and that the state had made numerous mistakes and the British supported by Armenian and Assyrian guer- with regard to the Kurds. In his subsequent speeches, Prime rilla forces, and then between Turkish troops and Kurdish Minister Erdogan said that Turkey was an ethnic mosaic insurgents. These battles brought death, displacements and and proposed America as a model to be followed. According migrations of millions of people, and vast economic losses to the prime minister, residents of Turkey shared a ‘higher' on a scale incomparable to the other regions of Turkey.
political identity (as citizens of the republic), as part of which riers in T D. MacDowall, ibid., pp. 21–109.
various ‘lower' value-related and ethnic identities operated, Nowadays, poverty is a consequence of the large role played including the two major ones, Turkish and Kurdish. In res- by backward agricultural practices and shepherding in the ponse to allegations that he was pushing Turkey closer to- regional economy, the family-based and feudal structure of wards a Yugoslavian scenario, Prime Minister Erdogan replied land ownership (currently, nearly 10% of landowners own that the residents of Turkey shared a common religion, which almost half of the land), the high rate of population growth, was the strongest substance cementing the ethnic mosaic the war against the PKK, which has lasted for more than 20 together. Erdogan was again criticised for emphasising the years and scared away private investors, and insufficient pu- role of religion. These declarations by Prime Minister Er- blic investments due to the centralisation of the adminis- dogan have failed to produce constitutional changes. Erhan trative system. Between 1990 and 2001, public investments Selen, ‘Kürt sorunu benim sorunum', Yeni Safak, 13 August in this region, which is inhabited by nearly 10% of the country's population, accounted for 7% of the state budget.
Between 1994 and 2004, Ankara allocated slightly more 48 In a survey conducted by the Turkish public opinion poll- than 3% and less than 5% respectively of the public funds ing centre Pollmark at the end of 2003, 58% of respondents designated for investment in those sectors to education declared they were against using Kurdish as the language and healthcare in this part of the country. It must be added of instruction at schools (31% were for). The percentage of that such unequal distribution of public spending also af- respondents opposing Kurdish-language courses was only fects regions of the country inhabited by ethnic Turks. On slightly smaller. Nearly 50% of respondents displayed a ne- the other hand, the economic disparities inside Turkish so- gative attitude (40% were in favour) towards Kurdish broad- ciety have been reduced over the whole country during the casts in the media. The polls showed very clear differences last decade. Özsel Beleli, ‘Regional policy and EU accession: of opinion between Turks and Kurds (who showed great sup- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar Learning from the GAP experience', Turkish Policy Quarterly, port). In a survey conducted in mid-2004, over 46% of resi- Vol.4, no.3 2005, pp 7–8. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_ dents of Turkey declared a positive attitude to programmes in Kurdish broadcast by public television. However, nearly 42 The Radio and Television Board imposed time limitations 45%, including a majority of ethnic Turks, were of the on information, political commentary and educational pro- opposite opinion. Pollmark, http://www.pollmark.com.tr/ grammes, and an obligation to use Turkish subtitles in the other programmes. Kurds mainly watch Kurdish channels 49 In the Pollmark survey conducted in mid-2004, over 60% broadcasting from Europe and Northern Iraq. Turkish autho- of Turks declared they did not think Kurdish TV program- rities have made attempts to block broadcasting by stations mes posed a threat to the state integrity, and nearly 30% of linked to the PKK.
respondents claimed the reverse. In spring 2005, following 43 Zihni Erdem, ‘Kürtce yayinda sinirlar kalkiyor', Radikal, the riots during Nevruz, which is the most important holi- 16 June 2006, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haber- day for Kurds, over 30% of respondents stated the riots had been sparked due to excessive democratisation, while a ma- Courses could be held only on weekends. Age limitations jority of respondents were of the opposite opinion.
were imposed in order to exclude a significant part of young Pollmark, Ibid. On the other hand, in the survey conducted by he KONDA 54 Apart from the DTP, which maintains contacts with the centre in October 2006, 80% of respondents stated that com- PKK, other Kurdish political forces are weak and are often bating terrorism was the only way to resolve the Kurdish intimidated by radicals (by means of assassinations).
issue. Two-thirds did not agree with the opinion that treating 55 The de facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq is Kurds differently from other citizens was a cause of the con- used as a model by Turkish Kurds and as a base for the PKK.
flict with the PKK, and 75% believed that the war in the Its existence adversely affects the readiness of the Turkish south-east was an effect of the Kurds' desire to set up their side to conduct reforms for fear of escalating Kurdish de- ‘Kürt sorunu yabanci kiskirtmasi', Milliyet, 24 March 2006.
56 The declaration of halt military actions was made by the PKK on 1 October 2006 under pressure from the USA and the 50 Martin van Bruinessen, Transnational aspects of the Kur- Iraqi Kurds. The latter probably see this move as an encou- dish question, 2000, http://www.let.uu.nl/ martin.vanbru- ragement for Turkey to accept a referendum on the status 51 The maximum imaginable concessions by Turkish authori- 57 According to IHD statistical data, in 2003 not a single case ties, to be implemented against the will of most of society of ill-treatment and tortures was reported in nearly 65% of and realised over a certain time span – extracurricular Kur- the administration units (il). The remaining 35% cover big dish lessons at schools, liberalising the rules of broadcasting cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Konya and Istanbul) and 's path to the European Union Kurdish information and educational programmes, lowering the south-eastern part of the country. The great majority of the election threshold to the level of 5%, and amnesty for the victims were individuals of Kurdish origin. Insan Haklar all excluding the PKK's leaders – may still be insufficient for Dernegi (IHD), http://www.ihd.org.tr Kurdish nationalists, who want Kurdish to be recognised as 58 Turkish human rights organisations present different the second official language, to be used to the same extent data on the violation of these rights.
as Turkish in the media, schools & offices, and who demand 59 In 2003, over a third of the cases were beatings. IHD, ibid. riers in T deep decentralisation. Another problem is the support ex- 60 Obviously, not all cases of using tortures and ill-treatment pressed by many DTP leaders and junior party members for are registered by human rights organisations. However, they amnesty for Öcalan and for recognising the PKK, as the IRA admit that the number of victims who have asked them for was in Britain, as a partner in negotiations covering the help has significantly increased.
status of Kurds. Ihsan D. Dagi, ‘Kürtler ne istiyor?', Zaman, 61 Some of those sentenced were punished just for partici- 31 March 2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/?hn=271416&bl pating in demonstrations, and some for assaults against policemen and acts of vandalism.
52 Many PKK fighters, who have been engaged in military 62 Hundreds were detained after the riots. Many of them activity for years, do not recognise any other methods than were tortured and ill-treated.
violence. The Kurdish terrorist organisation called the Kur- 63 In some cases similar sentences, considering the tightening distan Freedom Falcons (TAK), which chooses uncompromis- of antiterrorist laws in Europe, could also have been im- ing struggle using any possible means, has been operating posed by courts in some EU member states.
for more than two years now. A part of the army, which is 64 European Commission, Turkey, 2005 Progress Report, No- interested in preserving the status quo and continuing the vember 2005, p.15.
hard-line approach on Kurds, are ready to fight them using 65 The prime minister declared in autumn 2006 that this ar- terrorist methods. In early November 2005 a bombing hap- ticle could be amended. However, AKP politicians are afraid pened in the town of Semdinli. The bombers appeared to be that this decision could lead to a drop in support from the officers of the military gendarmerie wearing civilian clothes.
nationalist part of their electorate.
They were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in Ju- 66 The law authorises the police to use arms without hesi- ne 2006. According to many commentators, those who had tation during an antiterrorist operation in the situation ordered the bombing remained unpunished because they when the person pursued does not react to the request for The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar had higher positions in the hierarchy. ‘Susurluk Semdinli'de', surrender and is ready to use a weapon. Public prosecutors Radikal, 11 November 2005, http://www.radikal.com.tr/ have been given the right to notify only the closest family of the person suspected of terrorism of their detention. Accor- 53 Regardless of the PKK's defeat in 1999, the ethnically Kur- ding to the law, the suspect detained on charges of terror- dish party is today much more popular than it was ten years ism can have only one defence counsel. The court may im- ago. In the 1990s, Kurdish nationalism became stronger, pose a 24-hour ban on the detainee's contacts with the law- especially among young people. Judging from previous his- yer. However, the police and prosecution authorities cannot torical developments, further urbanisation, the change of interrogate the suspect over the duration of the ban. ‘Mah- the status of Kurds in Iraq and progress in education will kemeye gidecek: Terör yasasina ‘serhli' onay', Radikal, 18 July reinforce Kurdish identity in Turkey. The development of Kurdish nationalism does not necessarily mean only nega- 67 Provisions under article 301 provide for a less rigorous in- tive consequences for Turkey, since its secular nature con- terpretation. Clause 3 states that if the goal of the statement tributes to the emancipation of women and the weakening is criticism, such a statement shall not be punished. The of social conservatism.
surveys Türkiye'de Insan Haklari ve Ifade Özgürlügü con- ducted by Metin Toprak and Ihsan Dagi in late 2002 showed that judges were less liberal regarding human rights and ception of Roman Catholicism and some branches of the tend to notice fewer human rights violations than the rest of Protestant Church, must have Turkish citizenship. Although society. Baskin Oran, ‘Bu kafayla AB ger˜ekten zor', Radikal, Turkish law allows missionaries to conduct their activity, 2 July 2003, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno they still encounter many administrational problems. Cur- rently, over 1,100 missionaries operate in Turkey. US Depart- Hukuk˜u Birligi (the Union of Lawyers), led by Kemal Kerin˜- ment of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report 2005, siz, is an organisation which very often brings suits ‘in defence of Turkishness'.
78 In spring 2005, Diyanet prepared an exhortation for imams 68 ‘7 milyon Türk dernek üyesi', Radikal, 26 October 2006.
which attacked missionaries for their alleged connections with foreign powers and their desire to ‘take possession of 69 The opinion that the key weaknesses of the non-govern- young Turks' souls', and published a book which stated that mental organisations in Turkey are their fragmentation, he- Christian missionaries (unlike Muslims, who limit themsel- terogeneity and elitism stated by C. Rumford in 2002 is still ves to explaining the principles of Islam) use all possible relevant. C. Rumford, ‘Placing Democratisation within the methods, including violence, in their proselytising activity.
Global Frame: Sociological Approaches to Universalism and US Department of State, ibid.
Democratic Contestation in Contemporary Turkey', Sociolo- 79 Public opinion polls indicate that most of society shares 's path to the European Union gical Review, vol. 50, no. 2, 2002, p. 273.
a negative opinion on non-Muslims, although they accept 70 This model subordinating religious structures to secular their right to religious practice. However, they are in favour authorities originates from the Byzantine and Ottoman tra- of curtailing proselytising activity (see in Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalayicoglu, Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi).
71 In the survey conducted by Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalayi- Pinar Aktas, ‘Türkiye saga kaydi', Milliyet, 14 June 2006.
coglu Türkiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi in June 2006, riers in T more than half of Turks supported replacing the obligatory Public dislike of missionaries has historical roots. Many nine- religion lessons with extracurricular classes. Pinar Aktas, teenth-century missionaries represented the interests of fo- ‘Türkiye saga kaydi', Milliyet, 14 June 2006. http://www.
reign powers and minorities.
80 In January 2004, the Minorities Subcommittee, which mo- 72 In Turkey also live several hundred thousand Shia Twel- nitored minorities' activity, was liquidated. The state has le- vers and followers of the other non-Sunni varieties of Islam galised several Protestant associations and temples over re- (such as the Alawi), whose status is identical to that of the cent years. In 2004, the authorities accepted nominations of Greek citizens to the council of patriarchs supervised by 73 In June 2006, the local government in a district of Istan- the Patriarch of Constantinople. Until then, Turkish authori- bul for the first time recognised the cemevi as a place of re- ties had not agreed to foreigners performing religious func- ligious worship, and granted land for building the temple tions, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church and to a local association of Alevis.
religious communities linked to diplomatic agencies. In mid- 74 Before 2006, Alevis brought suits against the state to the 2005, non-Muslim places of worship received the same rights Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, accusing the govern- as mosques regarding the usage of water, power supplies, etc.
ment of violating human rights through the obligatory 81 Foundations will be able to open branches abroad. Foreign- classes in ‘religious culture and ethics', which did not pre- ers will be allowed to establish foundations and hold execu- sent the rules of Alevism. Some suits have been brought by tive posts in them. Foundations will have right to receive secular circles, who generally oppose the obligatory nature foreign aid. Religious minorities are dissatisfied with the of this school subject.
imposition of the 18-month deadline for submitting appli- 75 The authorities claim that these privileges are based on cations to regain real property, and with the failure to un- the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923. However, Turkey has ambiguously determine the status of real estate which has The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar failed to meet its provisions because the treaty provides for been bought from the state by third parties.
guaranteeing cultural and religious rights to all non-Muslims.
82 In the survey conducted in 2002 by E&G, nearly 67% of Otmar Oehring, ‘Human Rights in Turkey-Secularism = Re- respondents stated that the person whose opinion was most ligious Freedom', important at home was the husband, 27% both spouses, and less than 6% that of the wife. The poll also revealed signi- ficant regional differences between the Western part of the 76 Roman Catholics and members of Protestant churches do country and the more patriarchal East. ‘Ege erkegi light, Ka- not have their own religious community foundations; they radeniz ma˜o', Radikal, 11 September 2002. http://www.
have only private foundations.
77 Non-Muslim clergymen have been deprived of the possi- 83 On the other hand, the declared conservative perception bility of religious education in Turkey since 1971. The Turk- of women's sexuality differs from the social reality, which is ish government emphasises that it is necessary to find a so- proven by the fact that the average age of female sexual ini- lution that will include the possible education of priests in tiation is lower than the average age of marriage.
the general system of higher education, so as to avoid setting 84 In 2000, 19% of women and 6% of men were illiterate. In the precedent of separate religious educational institutions.
the 2003–2004 school year, girls accounted for 43% of sec- Pursuant to Turkish law, priests of all religions, with the ex- ondary-school pupils and nearly 42% of university students.
In 1990, the number of female secondary-school pupils cor- countries) among the 41 states surveyed. The vast majority responded to 65% of male pupils, and in 2003 the propor- of them were men. At the same time, a great majority of tion rose to 74%. In 1990, the number of female university Turks condemn marital infidelity, and a significant part of students was equal to 53% of males; in 2003 it was 74%.
them support its penalisation.
The most extreme difference between the EU countries and 92 The amendments to the civil code adopted in November Turkey is that every year nearly 10% of girls are not sent to 2001 abolished the provisions which stated that the man school by their parents, almost exclusively in the south-east- was the head of the family and consequently its legal rep- ern part of Turkey, which is inhabited by Kurds. Toplumsal resentative, which gave him the right to decide the place of cinsiyet göstergeleri, pp. 18–20; http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/ residence, among other matters, and required that both spou- ses had to grant mutual consent in case one of them sought 85 In the surveys conducted in 2004 by Binnaz Toprak and employment. The new code also determined that the un- Ersin Kalayicoglu Is Yasami, Üst Yönetim ve Siyasette Kadin, paid housework done by women constituted their financial nearly 20% of non-working women stated they did not contribution to the family budget, and in effect granted work because their husbands did not allow them to.
women equal rights to property acquired after marriage, 86 According to data from the Turkish State Institute of Sta- the ownership title to which was held by one of the spouses.
tistics (DIE), in 2000 women constituted 32% of economists, In the previous code, individual ownership title had been 28% of legal sector workers and 27% of financial consul- given priority.
's path to the European Union tants and accountants, over 25% of professors and nearly In July 2004, the parliament voted for a law which imposed a third of PhDs. Toplumsal cinsiyet gˆstergeleri, p. 8.
an obligation on each municipality with a population exceed- ing 50,000 to establish a shelter for women exposed to do- 87 Women constitute only 0.5% of mayors and 2.4% of coun- mestic violence.
cillors at the community (il˜e) level, and 1.8% at the pro- The new criminal code imposed penalisation of rape in mar- vince (il) level.
riers in T riage, imprisonment for holding medical virginity tests with- 88 In 2001, women constituted 18% of judges and public out a court's consent and penalties for sexual harassment prosecutors. In 2002, they accounted for nearly 21% of me- at work. It abolished regulations discriminating against un- dium- and higher-level state administration officials, includ- married women and the article which made avoiding a pe- ing 5% of undersecretaries, 17% of heads of government nalty for rape possible if the rapist and the victim got mar- agendas, 7% of directors general and 13% of deputy direc- ried. The code also abolished the general rule of applying tors general. Ibid., pp. 9–11. It must be added that women's mitigating circumstances in the case of murders committed representation has been slowly, albeit consistently, growing in the name of honour against women who were accused in the parliament and local governments.
by their families of bringing disgrace on them (although it 89 According to the survey conducted in March 2003 by the provided for the possibility of making exceptions from this Human Rights Centre of Bilgi University, over 30% of wo- rule by imposing the obligation on the court to consider men stated their husbands had used physical violence against the individual context of each murder), and included a new them. ‘Dayak kadinin alin yazisidir', NTV, 8 March 2003, provision that murders ‘in the name of custom' should be http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/207773.asp. It is worth ad- punished by stricter penalties than ordinary murders.
ding that the survey has demonstrated a link between vio- Women for Women's Human Rights, http:// www.wwhr.org lence against women and low education level.
93 For example, although the number of shelters for female 90 According to statistical data from the Human Rights Asso- victims of home violence grew between 2004 and 2006, ciation (IHD), 44 women were victims of honour killings their quantity is still much lower than necessary.
and 116 women were killed by a family member in 2005.
94 In autumn 2005, a division of the Supreme Court applied There were 30 suicides by women, often committed under the definition of murder ‘in the name of custom' only to family pressure. Imposing stricter penalties for honour kill- murders decided by family councils. According to the court, ings has caused a significant increase in the number of sui- in the case of a murder of a woman by a man it is possible The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar cides by women forced by their families. 79 suicides by wo- to apply the principle of mitigating circumstances (a crime men, 38 honour killings and 126 murders committed by fa- of passion). On the other hand, strict sentences imposed in mily members were reported in 2006. http://www.ihd.org.tr cases of honour killings in 2006 prove that judges have ceas- The number of suicides committed in Turkey is much lower ed treating the defence of honour as a mitigating circum- than the European mean. On the other hand, the number of male suicides in Turkey is slightly smaller than that of fe- 95 The AKP, proportionally, has half as many female MPs than male suicides, whereas in Europe women commit suicides the opposition left-wing CHP. In the internal AKP elections much more rarely than men do.
held in March 2006, contrary to the prime minister's pres- 91 Such double standards mean that marital infidelity is fre- sure to guarantee 30% of representation by women, only quent in Turkish families (this mainly concerns husbands), 10% of places in the decision-making structures of the which indirectly contradicts the desire to maintain the sta- party at the level of municipalities were won by female can- tus of the family as the most important social institution.
didates. As few as 5 women are among the 850 party heads In the Global Sex Survey 2005, nearly 60% of Turks (women at the municipality level.
and men) stated they had had extramarital sex. This was the ‘AKP'de kadinlar liste disi kaldi', Milliyet, 28 March 2006, highest result (much higher than in ‘libertarian' Western 96 The position of the army in the Turkish political system kiye'de Sosyal Tercihler Arastirmasi, published in June 2006, is sometimes overrated. Turkish politicians are often said to almost half of Turks stated they had considered sending be totally subordinated to military officers. However, strong their child to an imam hatip.
politicians have been able to successfully implement poli- 102 In June 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sug- cies against the wishes of the army. The late President Tur- gested a compromise solution offering private universities gut Özal pushed through his nomination of a candidate to the right to decide on whether their female students could the position of the chief of staff, although he resigned some wear headscarves. University teachers, supported by the time later in protest against the president's foreign policy.
army, responded negatively to the proposal.
97 In October 2001, as part of the ‘National Programme', the In December 2003, the AKP government suggested intro- Turkish parliament adopted amendments which introduc- ducing regulations to facilitate the opening of Koran courses.
ed an equal number of civilians and military officers onto The government gave up this idea under pressure from the the National Security Council, and abolished the provisions army. However, the authorities extended the duration of the which had determined opinions presented by the Council courses from three to five days a week. In February 2005, the as binding. In 2003, representatives of the council were re- State Council deemed that regulation illegal, and applied to moved from other public institutions. In July 2003, the power the Constitutional Court for the possibility to eliminate hold- to choose the secretary was taken from the general chief of ing summer and weekend Koran courses for younger pupils 's path to the European Union staff and granted to the prime minister (proposing a candi- as being contrary to the constitution. The application was date) and the president (approval). In August 2004, the coun- granted by the Constitutional Court.
cil was chaired by a civilian. In October 2006, the parliament In May 2004, the AKP voted for abolishing the scoring sys- adopted amendments to the act on military courts, which tem used in university entry examinations, which seriously deprived them of the possibility to try civilians.
reduced the chance of imam hatip graduates' enrolling to David Greenwood, ‘Turkish Civil-Military Relations and the other departments than theology. The amendments were riers in T EU: Preparation for Continuing Convergence', November 2005, vetoed by President Ahmet Sezer. The government decided Centre for European Security Studies, Istanbul Policy Centre, it would not repeat the vote on them. In December 2005, the education ministry passed a decree which enabled transfers of pupils from vocational secondary schools, including imam 98 In May 2004, one of the amendments to the constitution hatips, to general education secondary schools, and in effect removed the provision which excluded defence expenses omitting the high thresholds at university examinations for from control of the Audit Court. It came into force in Septem- graduates of vocational secondary schools. Facilitations for ber 2006. A public finance law was introduced in December imam hatip secondary school pupils were especially favour- 2003 which included the Foundation of Turkish Armed For- able. However, the State Council deemed that decree uncon- ces and the Arms Industry Support Fund in the defence mi- stitutional in February 2006. Ahmet T. Kuru, ‘Reinterpretation nister's budget. The law came into force in January 2005.
of Secularism in Turkey', in The Emergence of a New Turkey, Both institutions are to be liquidated by 31 December 2007.
ed. Hakan Yavuz, Salt Lake City 2006, pp. 136–159.
103 After the AKP came to power, the prices of alcoholic beve- 99 The most important report is Almanak Türkiye, Güvenlik rages, rose, especially of wine. In November 2005, the AKP Sektoru ve Demokratik Gözetim, published in summer 2006 government adopted a decree which enabled local govern- by the TESEV foundation. http://www.tesev.org.tr. It was ments to limit alcohol consumption through setting special sharply criticised by the generals.
zones for holders of licences to sell alcohol. The State Coun- 100 The main Islamic terrorist organisations are Hizbullah and cil deemed the decree illegal in April 2006.
the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (IBDA-C). They are In September 2004, as part of work on the new criminal responsible for tens of deaths. Numerous detentions have code, the government suggested amending the articles on very seriously undermined their combat capacity. According the penalisation of adultery, which had not been applied The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar to surveys conducted by the Pew Research Centre between under Constitutional Court awards as of 1996 and 1998. The 2002 and 2006, between 20% and 25% Turks believed that old code provided for the possibility of prosecuting adultery in certain situations, killing civilians in defence of Islam was ex officio. The amendment only authorised spouses to bring justified (such as suicide attacks), and nearly 10% said it was such charges. The government, under pressure from the se- justified only in exceptional situations. The same surveys cular establishment and the EU, gave up the introduction of indicated that confidence in Osama bin Laden was at the very this amendment to the new code.
low level. Pew Global Attitudes Project, http://pewglobal.org/ Many commentators believed that the arrest of the president reports/ Another survey, Degisen Turkiye'de Din Toplum va of Van University in April 2005 on charges of heading a cri- Sigaset, conducted in 2006, showed that less than 10% of minal group responsible for corruption and embezzlements Turks supported suicide attacks against civilians.
was a kind of revenge by the government on secular circles.
101 14 imam hatip schools with less than 900 pupils existed The matter was discontinued following the lengthy deten- in 1952. Over 1,200 such schools, attended by over 500,000 tion of the university president.
pupils, i.e. nearly 10% of all middle and secondary school 104 The constitution of Turkey gives the president the right pupils in Turkey, were operating in 1996. Hakan Yavuz, Isla- to nominate judges to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme mic Political Identity in Turkey, Oxford 2003, pp. 122–129. In Court and the State Council. The AKP has been interested in the survey by Ali Çarkoglu and Ersin Kalayicoglu, Tür- amending the constitution so that it would authorise the parliament to nominate a part of judges to the most impor- 113 Turkey closed the border in response to Armenia's enga- tant Constitutional Court. However, to do that, the AKP would gement in the conflict between Azeri citizens of Armenia have to get support from two-thirds of MPs (including the and Azerbaijan.
opposition) and also convince the generals to accept the 114 The occupation is a consequence of the armed secession of Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian autonomous region which 105 The parliament of Cyprus adopted the resolution on the is an enclave inside Azerbaijan. The secession would not genocide in 1982, 22 years before the country joined the EU.
have been possible without the strong support offered by 106 All the declarations are very brief and fail to take into Armenia, the Armenian diaspora and Russia. The demand account Muslim victims. The statements of reasons for the to make Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia, which arose declarations often uncritically present the Armenian out- in 1987-8, was not made in response to any threat by Azer- look on the course of events during World War I.
baijan to limit the province's autonomy. During the war, 107 One example of the inconsistency of the votes by parlia- which was fought between 1991 and 1994, Armenians oc- ments of European countries which Turkey has mentioned cupied 7% of Azerbaijan's territory located outside the pro- is the failure to recognise as genocide the ruthless exploita- vince's borders. 11,000 Azeris and 6,000 Armenians were tion of Congo (Kinshasa) by the administration of the Belgian killed in the war. 750,000 Azeris and 350,000 Armenians King Leopold at the turn of the twentieth century, which was have been displaced. Officially, Armenia does not recognise accompanied by large-scale massacres. The policy claimed the the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it is in fact 's path to the European Union lives of between 5 and 10 million victims. Turkey also re- a part of Armenia and is bound by strong political, military proaches the West for failing to adopt resolutions to recog- and economic ties with it. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: nise the massacres and ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, New York Caucasus by Tsarist Russia in the second half of the nine- teenth century as genocide.
115 The Armenian diaspora is proportionally the second larg- riers in T 108 A classic publication as part of the ‘anti-official' trend is est in the world, after that of the Jewish people. As a con- the book by Taner Ak˜am, Türk Ulusal Kimligi ve Ermeni So- sequence of its economic position, it has strong influence in runu, Istanbul 2001.
some countries (e.g. USA, France and Russia).
109 Since that time more conferences have been held in Tur- 116 The continuity between the Young Turks regime and the key where researchers, including Armenians, who believe Republic of Turkey is a complex issue. On the one hand, Ke- that the 1915 events were a case of genocidehave been able mal Atatürk represented a different ideology than the Young to present their point of view. However, most of the speak- Turks, and believed that the state founded by him was a to- ers have supported the official version promulgated by the tally new entity; he was even ready to recognise the crimes Turkish government. One of the faults of the September 2005 committed against Armenians. On the other hand, Kema- conference was that researchers representing the opposite lism did to a certain extent originate from the Young Turks point of view were not invited. It is worth adding that some movement, and some of the activists responsible for the differences of views on the course of those events and of the Armenian massacres were offered high positions in Turkey.
putative Turkish responsibility for the crimes, can be noticed This issue has been investigated into by the Turkish histo- among Turkish researchers who do not recognise the depor- rian Taner Ak˜am, who recognises the deportations as ge- tations and massacres as genocide.
nocide. See T. Ak˜am, ‘Sevr ve Lozan'nin Baska Tarihi', Tür- 110 Turkiye Gündemi Arastirmasi, March 2005, p. 96.
kiye'de Etnik Catisma, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher, Istanbul 2005, pp. 51–88.
117 Turkey wants Armenia to officially recognise the Kars 111 The fact that the book by G. Levy, The Armenian Massac- Treaty, which was concluded by Turkey and Soviet Russia in res in Ottoman Turkey, has won awards and has been pro- 1921. The treaty delimited the present border between moted by Turkish embassies, proves that the Turkish official Turkey and Armenia. The Armenian government answers standpoint has evolved somewhat. The author does not re- that the present Armenian state, being a successor to So- The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar cognise the deportations and massacres as genocide in terms viet Armenia, recognises all the treaties concluded by its of international law. Instead, he declares a readiness to use predecessor, and there is no need to make a special decla- the word in the moral meaning (as a slaughter, a massacre) ration. Ruzanna Khachatrian, a journalist in the Armenian He also believes, in contrast to the official standpoint, that section of Radio Free Europe, has stated that ‘at the same the Turkish repressions against Armenians were unjustified.
time, Armenian authorities regularly reject Turkish demands He rejects the arguments of the civil war and the similar res- to declare that Armenia will never make any territorial claims ponsibility of both sides for the crimes. According to Levy, regarding areas currently located in eastern Turkey.' Arme- nearly 650,000 Armenians were killed during the war, twice nia's president Robert Kocharian has stated, ‘the issue of as many as claimed in Turkish textbooks.
genocide recognition is on our agenda today. Any ensuing 112 The trial of the Turkish journalist (of Armenian origin) legal consequences of such recognition will be a task for fu- Hrant Dink, who received a suspended sentence of impris- ture presidents and politicians.' Some Armenian politicians onment for spreading an opinion on Turkish-Armenian rela- emphasise that the Kars Treaty was dictated to Armenia tions which was not directly linked to the genocide issue, against the country's will, which challenges its legal status.
was an exception.
Ruzanna Khachatrian, ‘Dashnaks Insists on Territorial Claims to Turkey', 27 January 2006, http://www.armenialiberty.org/ caused major changes in the ethnic and religious structures of these regions as a consequence of Turkish colonisation, Emil Danielyan, ‘Turks Renew calls for Armenian Genocide Islamisation, and the assimilation of the Greek population Study', 13 April 2006, a4d65118d462.asp into the Turkish language and migrations. In the Islamic 118 Nationalist circles prevented an agreement which the state, Christian Greeks became second-class subjects (they moderate presidents, Turgut Özal of Turkey and Levon Ter- were forced to pay higher tax rates, banned from having -Petrosian of Armenia, had wanted to sign in the 1990s.
guns (with numerous exceptions), banned from proselytis- 119 The common survey conducted in 2005 by the Turkish ing to Muslims, treated unequally by the law, and subject foundation TESEV and the Armenian centre HASA showed to restrictions concerning building churches and their way that 45% of Armenians did not want to have a Turk as of dressing, among other measures). On the other hand, the a neighbour, and almost the same number would not like to ‘infidels' in the Ottoman Empire were treated much better work with a Turk. 67% would refuse medical care provided than those in Western Europe before the Enlightenment.
by a Turkish doctor, and 93% would not like their son to The Orthodox Church received a guarantee of its legal sta- marry a Turkish woman. Analogous answers from Turkish tus (extensive fiscal and administrative powers). Numerous respondents on Armenians showed results at the level of Greek islands and highland regions were given autonomy 25% in the first two categories and 63% in the latter cate- or other privileges. Greeks had a dominant position in the 's path to the European Union gory. Ferhat Kentel, Gevorg Poghosyan, Ermenistan ve Turki- Empire's economy and held important posts in the state ad- ye Vatandaslari Karsilikli Algilama ve Diyalog Rapor, ministration (diplomacy and finance). (Before the early se- Istanbul 2005, p. 37, http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/Turk_ venteenth century, a significant part of the Ottoman army consisted of Christian soldiers, including Greeks.) Until the In a Pollmark survey held in spring 2005, 30% of Turks de- end of the seventeenth century, the security level in the Ot- clared themselves opponents of Armenians. Pollmark, http:// toman Empire's lands (which then covered more of the Bal- riers in T kans than Anatolia) was much higher than in the pre-Otto- 120 According to official statistical data, trade exchange be- man period, or in then Western Europe. Moreover, the so- tween Turkey and Armenia in 2004 reached the level of near- cial and property status of peasants significantly improved ly US$47 million (over 2% of Armenia's trade exchange).
after the Ottoman conquest, and was better than in many Unofficially, the trade balance is close to US$100 million, regions of Europe. The population of the Balkans and Ana- considering exchange via third countries. The local govern- tolia grew as a result. The Empire's internal problems, which ments of South-Eastern Turkey support opening up the bor- had been deepening from the late seventeenth century, caus- der with Armenia, as they are interested in developing ed a worsening of Greeks' situation (abuses by the local ad- trade. Nearly 37,000 Armenians visited Turkey in 2005. It is ministrations, growing taxes, strengthening control of Mus- estimated that approximately 40,000 Armenians (nearly 1% lim nobles over peasants and the activity of robber gangs).
of the population of Armenia) work, mostly illegally, in Tur- As a consequence, uprisings had become more frequent key. The estimated number of their families is 30,000. Turk- among the Greek population, who sought foreign support.
ish Airlines has operated a link between Yerevan and Istan- Modern Greece emerged as an outcome of the largest anti- bul since autumn 2004, with frequent flights available.
Ottoman uprising (1821–1829). Until the 1920s, the main Foreign Trade of The Republic of Armenia 2004, http://www.
goal of the Greek policy was the Megali Idea (Great Idea), i.e.
the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire by expanding 121 In March 2005, Turkey suggested establishing a Turkish- their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, inclu- Armenian historical commission to investigate the sequence ding areas which at that time were predominantly inhabited of events of the Armenian deportations. The prime minis- by Muslims. J. Dalegre, Grecs et Ottomans 1453–1923. Paris ter declared his readiness to accept all its findings. Armenia rejected the proposal, and suggested that an intergovern- 124 R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge 2002.
The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar mental commission should be created instead to resolve cur- 125 Cyprus has been inhabited predominantly by Greek peo- rent issues. Turkish and Armenian historians are highly un- ple from antiquity to modern times. In 1571, when Cyprus likely to reach an agreement on the evaluation of the crimes was conquered by the Ottoman Empire, the process of Turk- committed against Armenians during World War I. Attempts ish immigration and Islamisation, and consequently the to develop a common standpoint by the Turkish-Armenian assimilation of part of the Greek population to the Turkish Reconciliation Commission, which operated between 2001 ethnicity began. Before the British took control of the island & 2004 and consisted of political scientists and ex-diplo- in 1978, the Muslim population was more numerous than it mats, ended in failure.
122 In Turkey, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 is 126 The Turkish population used to live scattered around the seen as an act of self-defence in the process of Muslim mas- whole island. There were larger Turkish enclaves in some sacres and displacements from territories of the Ottoman Empire which were conquested by Christians since the end 127 Violence was used much more frequently against Turks.
of the 17th century.
30,000 Turks were driven out or escaped from ethnically mix- 123 During the centuries-long Turkish expansion in Anatolia ed regions to more homogenous ones. In effect, a system of and the Balkans, military actions, hunger and diseases claim- de facto autonomous Turkish enclaves emerged. Tensions in ed the lives of many thousands of Greeks. Ottoman rule the island caused tens of thousands of Greeks to leave Turkey (such as the pogrom in Istanbul) and thousands of protocol to the Ankara Agreement (1970) to extend the cus- Turks left Greece after 1955. In effect, the Greek minority in toms union to all EU member states.
Turkey was radically reduced, and the size of the Turkish Mehmet Ugur, ‘Müzakerelerden Üyelige: AB-Türkiye Gün- minority in Greece decreased significantly.
demindeki Sorunlar', Istanbul 2005, pp.163–169.
H. Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus Ethnic Political Counterpoints, 138 ‘EU Enlargement: Turkey – Declaration by European Lanhem 2004, pp. 8–15.
Community and Member States' (21 September 2005: Brus- W. Mallinson, A Modern History of Cyprus, London 2005, pp. 26–27., pp. 39–41.
139 For example, UNCLOS was not ratified by the United States.
128 The Turkish intervention caused the collapse of the natio- 140 The archipelago belonged to Italy between 1912 and 1947.
nalist regime and led to Cypriot-Turkish talks on the political Turkey, indicating the lack of ratification of the 1932 agree- system of the state. Turkey set forth an ultimatum requir- ment regulating the ownership of small islands in this re- ing the creation of either a federation or 6 Turkish cantons gion with Italy, claims that some of them belong to it. Tur- (either of which was to cover 34% of the island's territory).
key's standpoint on this issue is contrary to the provisions The new Cyprus government failed to provide an answer of the Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, which states be- by the set deadline, which was very short, and the Turkish yond doubt that the territorial waters of Turkey are limited army resumed the offensive. N. Tocci, T. Kovziridze, Cyprus, to a distance of three nautical miles. On the other hand, Greece has created a military infrastructure in some islands 's path to the European Union 129 Over 160,000 Greeks were driven out, escaped or emigrat- of the archipelago, although under the Paris Peace Treaty of ed from the north, and 70,000 Turks did so from the south 1947, the Dodecanese was to remain a demilitarised area.
during the fighting and over the next few years. Migration 141 According to poll results, the AKP will win the election and which was not forced by direct pressure happened more fre- the CHP will take the second place. However, the MHP will quently in the case of Turks than among Greeks.
probably also manage to enter parliament, and DYP is not riers in T 130 Serious demographical changes have taken place in the without hope either. In such a case, there may be a problem KKTC over the period of more than 30 years since the Turk- with forming a government coalition. Generally, the future ish invasion. Tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots have left of Turkey's pro-European policy will depend on the exis- Cyprus, and a more numerous group of settlers from Turkey tence of a stable pro-European majority.
has come in their place. Ahmet An, ‘Günümüze Kibris Türk 142 This is a kind of a vicious circle, because an improving Toplumu', in Kibris Dün ve Bügün, ed. Masis Kürkcügil, Istan- situation in Turkey depends on the EU's attitude to Turkey's bul 2003, pp. 341–372.
membership. Turkey's chances will clearly lessen if the 2007 131 A. Evin, ‘Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: An As- presidential election in France is won by Nicolas Sarkozy, sessment of the Post-Earthquake Rapprochement', in Greek- who is a staunch opponent of Turkish accession.
Turkish Relations in an Era of D¯tente, ed. A. Çarkoglu, B. Ru- bin, New York 2005, pp. 4–20.
132 Panayotis J. Tsakonas, Thansos P. Dokos, ‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-First Century: A View from Athens', in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, Cambridge Massachusetts 2004, pp. 101–126.
133 In the case of Turkey, the decisive events were the estab- lishment in 2002 of a government led by the pragmatic Is- lamic-democratic Justice and Development Party (AKP) and support for the plan from the chief of staff of the Turkish 134 The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, The hurdle race. The greatest political and social bar 135 According to Greek Cypriots, the main faults of the plan were the regulations which provided for too slow a with- drawal by the military, the continuation of the system of guarantees given in 1960, too broad powers being offered to the Turkish component state, and excessive restrictions on the regaining of property and return of refugees.
136 ‘Turkey disappointed by EU aid deal on northern Cyp- 137 The government was bitterly criticised for accepting this condition at the EU summit in December 2004 by the Turk- ish opposition, who ‘forgot' that regardless of the member- ship negotiations, Turkey was obligated under a separate 1. From the end of World War II, Turkey and the
United States formed a close partnership – albeit
with some periodical tensions arising – which
was cemented by the threat posed by the Soviet
Union. After Communism collapsed, their partner-
ship was based on Turkey's strategic location, of
bordering on instable regions (the Middle East,
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans), some
of which had rich deposits of oil and gas (Central
Asia and the Middle East).
2. The most serious crisis in Turkish-US relations
happened in 2003, which was directly caused by
the US intervention in Iraq and Turkey's negative
The cold alliance.
stance towards it. Turkey did not agree to theopening of a northern front from its territory.
Turkish-US political 3. The greatest problems in Turkish-US relations
include the following questions: (a) the alliance
relations after 2003 between the USA and Iraqi Kurds and Washing-ton's ensuing passive approach to the existence in Northern Iraq of bases of Kurdish guerrilla for- urkish-US political relations af ces, which fight against the Turkish army, (b) the
emerging possibility of the creation or declaration
of an independent Kurdistan in Northern Iraq as
a result of a large-scale civil war in Iraq and the
possible disintegration of the country, (c) the hard
line adopted by the US in its Middle Eastern poli-
cy on Iran and Syria, while Turkey's relations with
The cold alliance. T the two countries have improved, and those with
Israel, the US' closest partner in the region, have
worsened, and (d) the mutual crisis in trust since
2003 (the high level of anti-American sentiments
among the Turkish public and elites, and dislike
for the Turkish government among the US elites).
4. Turkey's strong sense of sovereignty and the
improvement of its relations with Russia clash
with American attempts to significantly increase
US military presence in the Black Sea region.
5. Regardless of these significant disagreements,
the US-Turkish partnership is still based upon so-
lid foundations. The two countries also have some
common interests, such as the long-term stabili-
sation of the regions neighbouring on Turkey (thus
combating Islamic terrorism and preventing arm-
ed conflicts), support for Turkish accession to the
European Union, and military & energy security 1. Brief description of the development of Turkish-US relations after World War II 6. The future shape of US-Turkish relations great-
ly depends on the way the situation in the Middle
East develops. The region is unlikely to stabilise
a) The Cold War period soon. Therefore, the current cooling of relationswill probably last for quite some time.
Turkish-US relations after World War II were shap-ed to a great extent by the bipolar geopoliticalorder which had come to exist at that time. Fromthe point of view of Washington's interests, Tur-key was a major player in the policy of ‘contain-ing Soviet expansion, which was the major rea-son for US engagement in developing relations with Ankara. Turkey was important because ofits geopolitical location in the Black Sea region,in the area between the Soviet Union, the MiddleEast and the Balkans. It directly bordered on theSoviet Union in Caucasus. For Turkey, close co-operation with the USA was an essential ele-ment of its foreign and security policy, one of thekey objectives of which was to counteract and prevent the serious threat posed by the USSR,which for its part was making territorial claimsagainst Ankara1.
urkish-US political relations af There were better and worse periods in the Turk-ish-US relations during the ‘Cold War'. Mutualrelations developed without any problems in theimmediate aftermath of World War II. Startingwith 1946, Americans openly supported Ankaraand, inter alia, assigned as part of the Truman The cold alliance. T Doctrine a sum of US$400 million annually tosupport the military development of Turkey andGreece2. In 1948, Washington started transfer-ring economic aid to Ankara as part of the Mar-shall Plan. Close co-operation was strengthenedas Turkey sent its troops to fight in the Korean War(1950–1953), and above all when it joined theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in19523. The Soviet threat invariably made the se-curity issue the main area of Turkish-Americanrelations, as a result of which the Turkish armedforces began playing a major part in relations be-tween the two countries.
Relations nevertheless cooled in the 1960s. Thefirst element to increase tension in mutual rela-tions was the withdrawal in 1962 of the Jupiterintermediate-range ballistic missiles by Americansfrom Turkey without consulting Ankara; this hap-pened after the end of the Cuban missile crisis and the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba4.
key) on the US politics6. For Americans, the al- Yet the key factor in the worsening of relations liance with Turkey acquired more significance was the issue of Cyprus. In 1964, during the con- after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 flict between the Cypriot Greeks and Turks, in and after the Islamic revolution in Iran in the same which Turkey supported its compatriots, the US year7. Military co-operation, especially US mili- President Lyndon B. Johnson wrote a letter con- tary aid to Turkey, was crucial. It took various demning the actions taken by Ankara. He stated forms, such as financial aid, privileged credits, free that the Turkish intervention would pose a threat supplies of weapons, contracts to sell military of the Soviet Union becoming engaged in the equipment and training Turkish soldiers. The conflict, and warned that in such a case the USA amount of financial aid granted by the United and other NATO allies would not be able to offer States to Turkey for military purposes between help to Turkey. The letter gave rise to resent- 1980 and 1998 totalled US$6.064 billion8. In ad- ment and upset Ankara's confidence in its NATO dition to that, Americans trained over 3,000 Turk- ally5. A subsequent crisis in mutual relations was ish officers between 1983 and 2000, which cost provoked by the Turkish military intervention in more than US$40 million9. Since Washington had Cyprus in 1974, to which the US reacted by im- placed so much emphasis on the security issue, posing an embargo on arms sales to Turkey in it criticised Turkey much more leniently for the 1975, which was lifted in 1978. Ankara reacted by violations of human rights which resulted from suspending the Common Defence Agreement Ankara's conflict with the separatist Kurdistan During that period, additional tensions in Turk- Workers Party (PKK) in the 1980s and 1990s than ish-US relations were also caused by the problem the EEC and later the EU did.
of large-scale poppy cultivation in Turkey whichwas used for heroin production. The principles of b) The 1990s: new security challenges operation of the US military bases in Turkey were urkish-US political relations af another disputed issue. This crisis in relations The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the with the USA gave to the development of a ‘multi- USSR marked the beginning of a new era in bilate- directional' approach in Turkish policy in the ral relations. The bipolar geopolitical structure 1970s. Turkey started taking a balance between and the threat from the Soviet Union, which had Moscow and Washington, and when relations stimulated co-operation between the two coun- with the US had worsened, it established closer tries, no longer existed. At the same time, new se- contacts with the USSR.
curity threats appeared, first the Iraqi invasion The cold alliance. T Relations improved markedly following the 1980 of Kuwait in 1990, the emergence of new states military coup in Turkey. The Turkish army was in the post-Soviet area, and the conflicts in the Bal- traditionally more willing to co-operate with the kans and Caucasus. These events meant that Tur- American partner than the civilian political elite key, considering its geopolitical location, remain- had been. The USA supported the coup leaders.
ed an important partner – from the perspective The election of the staunchly pro-American Turk- of American interests – and the security issue re- ish Prime Minister, Turgut Özal (who was after- mained the most significant area of co-operation.
wards elected president), together with the factthat Ankara gave up the ‘multidirectional' ap- Turkey firmly supported the United States during proach to its foreign policy, greatly contributed the first intervention in Iraq in 1991, both politi- to improving mutual relations also.
cally and militarily. Ankara made its air space and Turkish-American relations improved despite air force bases available to the US and British ar- some differences in interests and standpoints, mies and deployed nearly 100,000 of its troops such as the US offering more funds in financial along the Iraqi border, which tied Iraqi troops aid to Greece than to Turkey, the US imposing im- down in Kurdistan10. Moreover, Turkey joined the port quotas on Turkish goods, the opinion shared economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad, even by the majority of American elites that the depor- though it sustained serious economic losses itself, tations and massacres of Armenians should be re- principally from the cutting Iraqi oil supplies. The ferred to as a genocide, and the influence of Ar- person who played a crucial role in Turkey's tak- menian and Greek lobbies (unfavourably for Tur- ing such a definitely pro-American stance, against the opinion of most of the society and of the gen- diplomatic efforts helped Turkey obtain this sta- erals, was then-President Turgut Özal. He was tus at the EU Helsinki summit in 1999. The US- convinced that such a policy would help his Turkish relations reached their peak in 1999, when country to win EEC candidate status because Turkish intelligence services, assisted by the CIA Western European countries, in addition to the and under US diplomatic pressure, arrested Ab- USA, were key members of the anti-Iraqi in- dullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). His detention seriously undermined The Gulf War of 1990–1991 left many Turks dis- the activity of Kurdish separatists. To emphasise illusioned with US foreign policy. This feeling was the special nature of Turkish-US relations at that caused by the financial losses Turkey sustained as time, they were named as a ‘strategic partnership' a result of the international sanctions imposed in September 199912. In early 2001, the United on Iraq since 1991 and by the estalishment (with States played a major part in convincing the In- Washington's consent) of the exclusion zone in ternational Monetary Fund to help Turkey during Northern Iraq, which was controlled by Kurds and an economic crisis. The IMF then granted an un- was independent of Baghdad. The establishment usually large loan of US$39.5 billion13. In 2001, of Kurdish-American co-operation was regarded soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, with great anxiety by Turkey since the Kurdish Turkey definitely supported Washington in the issue was of the utmost importance for Ankara, ‘war on terror' declared by the latter. It actively both in internal and in regional terms11. The con- helped the Americans, offering them political and flicts of interests regarding the Kurdish issue military support. This included sending its troops which then came into existencere-emerged dur- to Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led operation ing the Second Gulf War, and caused the worst ISAF, taking command of the mission twice. Du- crisis in bilateral relations in 2003.
ring the US-led actions in Afghanistan, it agreed Differences in the policies of the two countries to- to the use of the US military base in the Turkish wards Iraq under Saddam Hussein appeared in town of Incirlik. Additionally, it provided Ameri- urkish-US political relations af the 1990s. Ankara supported the policy of con- cans with intelligence assistance and engaged in tainment and control of Iraq's developing military support for the Pakistani leader, General Pervez forces; however it made some objections against Musharraf, who co-operated with the USA in the American and British air raids attacking Iraqi tar- war against the Taliban regime14. The Turkish go- gets (in 1998, 1999 and 2001). In the face of strong vernment supported the US intervention in Afgha- objections from Washington, Turkey intensified nistan, although public opinion in Turkey was The cold alliance. T its trade exchange with Iraq. It also resumed clearly against it15.
flights to Iraq in 2000, following a nine-year break.
In January 2001, it established full diplomatic re-lations with Baghdad and opened a second bordercrossing point. This policy was based on the be-lief that excessively weakening Hussein's regimewould enfeeble the territorial integrity of Iraq andthus strengthen the position of the Iraqi Kurds.
In the 1990s, regardless of discrepancies betweenWashington and Ankara over Iraq, Turkey tight-ened its relations with Israel, the US' most impor-tant ally in the Middle East. It also supportedNATO enlargement (although it attempted to usethe issue as a bargaining chip in its relations withthe EU) and the American policy in the Balkans,which was demonstrated by the full engagementof Turkish forces in the operations in Bosnia (1995)and Kosovo (1999). In turn, the United States ac-tively supported Turkey's attempts to be givencandidate status for EU membership. American 2. The 2003 crisis been sentenced by a court. This meant that untilMarch 2003 the AKP was focused on forming a new The most significant event in American-Turkish government. At the same time, negotiations on relations, which has essentially determined the the unification of Cyprus, which were very im- present shape thereof, was the 2003 US interven- portant for Turkey, were being conducted under tion in Iraq and the Turkish parliament's refusal UN auspices. Regardless of those problems, the to provide US troops with access to Turkish ter- talks with the US ended in an agreement, which ritory for that operation.
was approved by the government on 25 February The ‘war on terrorism' declared by the USA after 2003 and supported by Erdogan. However while September 11 offered the Turkish government an negotiating, the AKP leaders failed to make efforts opportunity to internationalise the problem of to convince their society that supporting the US Kurdish separatism and its fight against PKK guer- was in Turkey's interest17. They did not do so be- rilla forces, which had existed since the early cause of the extreme unpopularity of the invasion 1980s. Moreover, Islamic terrorism was also a pro- of Iraq among the Turkish public. Many AKP mem- blem for the Turkish authorities. Although Turk- bers were also strongly opposed to the attack ish organisations of Islamic radicals (such as Hiz- against Iraq. According to many observers, Erdo- bullah and the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' gan chose not to exert too much pressure on his Front (IBDA-C)) had had rather limited potential, party's MPs because he was afraid of a split. 264 subsequent attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, AKP MPs (70%) voted were in favour, 250 MPs in which over 60 people were killed, proved that (some of the AKP and the entire opposition Repu- due to their connections with Al-Qaeda they were blican People's Party, the CHP) were against the capable of plotting large-scale operations that move. 19 AKP members abstained from voting.
could put Turkey's security at risk. However, from The agreement was nevertheless rejected as it had the very beginning of the ‘war on terrorism' the not received the necessary support from half of urkish-US political relations af Turkish government had raised serious objections to any military operation in the Middle East, es- Those AKP members who voted against or ab- pecially in Iraq. They were anxious about the stained from the voting mainly came from the threat of destabilisation of the region on which Kurdish south-eastern part of Turkey. Their stance Turkey bordered, and about the possible disinte- could have been motivated either ethnically (MPs gration of Iraq and the establishment of an inde- of Kurdish origin opposed the entry of Turkish pendent Kurdish state in the northern part of the troops into Iraqi Kurdistan) or religiously (object- The cold alliance. T ing against the US invasion of a Muslim state).
The breakthrough happened on 1 March 2003, The opposition CHP, which imposed a party whip when the Turkish parliament refused US troops during the voting, mobilised as many of its MPs access to Turkish territory, which they wanted to as it could. The nationalist CHP was definitely use for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and did not agree against letting foreign troops onto the country's to the establishment on its territory of a northern territory. Moreover, the party leaders hoped that front to attack Iraq in exchange for admitting a rejection of the bill would cause relations be- Turkish troops into Northern Iraq16. The resolu- tween the AKP government and Washington to tion fell only four votes short of approval.
Talks on the US troops' attack against Iraq from The army's stance on the US opening a northern Turkish territory started in December 2002 and front was also unclear. The supreme command lasted until the end of February 2003. During that was in favour of Turkey's participation in the Iraq period, the government changed in Turkey; the operation. However, they met with internal resis- democratic-Islamic Justice and Development Party tance from some military circles who were against (AKP) won the elections in November 2002. The letting foreign troops into their country, and fear- government was temporarily headed by Abdullah ed that the Iraqi Kurds could become stronger Gül, since the party's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdo- and that Iraq might disintegrate. Some analysts gan, had to wait until the parliament had voted highlighted the differences of opinions inside the for an amendment to cancel a ban prohibiting supreme command, regarding the extent to which participation in political life for people who had their troops should engage in co-operation with Americans18. The military were trying to play heads were covered) and were accused of at- a political game, as a result of which the parlia- tempting to murder the Kurdish governor of the ment would be held responsible for taking a deci- province. Information on that event was leaked sion that would be very unpopular among the to the press by Turkey, although the most senior public. Therefore, the army adopted a very pas- state authorities do not seem to have had any- sive approach in the public discussion on making thing in common with the leak21. To many Turks Turkish territory available to US troops, and did this incident proved that the Americans were treat- not exert any pressure on either the AKP's or the ing their NATO ally Turkey unfairly, and were clear- CHP's politicians. On 1 March 2003, shortly before ly discriminating in favour of the Iraqi Kurds22.
the vote in the parliament, consent to the agree-ment with the USA was rejected at the meetingof the National Security Council (MGK), membersof which included the highest-ranked comman-ders of the armed forces, the president and the prime minister.
Turkey tried to mitigate the negative consequen-ces which the vote of 1 March 2003 had had onits relations with the USA. On 8 March, the Turkishparliament voted for a resolution permitting theUS air forces to use Turkish bases and air space.
American-Turkish talks to send Turkish forces tocentral Iraq started in summer 2003. An initial agreement on granting an US$8.5 billion loan toTurkey was even signed in September 200319. On7 October 2003, the parliament in Ankara agreed urkish-US political relations af to send 10,000 Turkish troops to act as peace-keeping forces in central Iraq. However, the deci-sion was taken too early, before an agreement de-fining the rules of the Turkish troops' presencewas achieved with the Americans, and the movemet with determined resistance from all political The cold alliance. T forces in Iraq. In effect, the USA and Iraq chosenot to accept the Turkish offer. The decision by theTurkish parliament was motivated less by an at-tention to good relations with the United Statesthan by attempts to prevent the emergence of anindependent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
Attempts to improve Turkish-US relations wereunsuccessful due to the deep crisis of mutualtrust. The negative result of the 1 March vote toallow US access to Turkish territory was sharplycriticised by representatives of the US adminis-tration, who saw it as a sign of their ally's dis-loyalty20. In turn, Turks' trust in Americans wasundermined due to the detention of Turkish in-telligence officers by US forces in Suleymaniyahin Northern Iraq on 4 July 2003. At that time near-ly 100 American soldiers carried out an operationas a result of which 11 Turkish intelligence offi-cers were captured. They were treated as terror-ists (they were disarmed, handcuffed and their 3. Discrepancies in bilateral es its attacks from there against targets in Tur- relations in the Middle East key. The US, fearing that a war could break outbetween Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, has not agreed to Turkish military expeditions entering deeperinto Northern Iraq; the Turkish army used to do Ankara is in favour of ending the conflict Iraq, so, thus causing very serious losses to Kurdish setting up a stable state and preserving its terri- separatists during Saddam Hussein's rule. The torial integrity. For this reason it can be believed former PKK has benefited from this situation, that the Turkish government is interested in the and has been able to partly rebuild its potential.
success of the American mission in Iraq. However, American passivity towards the PKK and the lack Turkey has very serious objections against the of permission for any Turkish intervention in Iraq methods used by the USA. These concern Wa- are the most serious complaints made by Turks shington's alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, whose against the USA, and are the key causes of the position has been significantly strengthened since high level of anti-American sentiments among 2003; thousands of casualties among Muslim civi- the Turkish population. For over a year now Wa- lians caused by American actions; and the emer- shington has been trying to adjust its policy to- ging threat of a massive civil war in Iraq, the dis- wards the PKK by intensifying its co-operation integration of the country and the possible ap- with Turkish intelligence services. Washington pearance of an independent Kurdistan23. There- has also supported Turkey's efforts to delegalise fore, any improvement of Turkish-American rela- media and associations which support the PKK, as tions depends to a great extent on stabilising well as its financial bases in European countries.
the situation in Iraq itself and on the US inter- In summer 2006, according to the Turkish press, vention succeeding.
American intelligence materials were used for two The USA entered into its alliance with Iraqi Kurds successful operations conducted by Turkish secu- urkish-US political relations af as a result of the Turkish parliament's refusal to rity forces against Kurdish separatists24. In April open a northern front on 1 March 2003. Iraqi 2006, during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's Kurds, together with Israel, are currently the most visit to Turkey, Ankara put pressure on Washing- pro-American nation in the Middle East. Military ton by deploying nearly 200,000 soldiers along and political co-operation with Americans has the Turkish-Iraqi border.
definitely reinforced the position of Iraqi Kurds In late August 2006, Washington appointed Ge- in the international arena, Iraq and the region at neral Joseph Ralston as coordinator for countering The cold alliance. T large. Thanks to this, the area under their con- the PKK. His task is to intensify intelligence and trol has been significantly expanded. Washington military co-operation between Turkey and the is currently playing the role of their protector.
USA on this issue. A change in the US' approach Never before in their modern history have Iraqi to Turkey's fight against the PKK has also been Kurds been as powerful as they are today. In ex- confirmed by Kurdish media reports of bombard- change, their alliance with the Iraqi Kurds has ments of Northern Iraq by Turkish artillery and given the Americans a guarantee of peace in a lar- air forces25. On 20 September 2006, the Iraqi go- ge part of Northern Iraq, where US bases may be vernment banned the activity of the PKK on its set up in the future. The north of Iraq is strategi- territory26. On 1 October 2006, the Kurdish Work- cally important for Washington, considering the ers Party announced a cessation of armed opera- proximity of Syria and Iran, which the USA per- tions. However, the main problems (American pas- ceives as its most serious regional opponents, as sivity towards the PKK and the lack of permis- well as the large deposits of oil and gas located sion for Turkish intervention in Iraq) remain un- there. As a consequence of their common inte- rests and the US' serious military engagements Turkish elites are particularly anxious about the in other parts of Iraq, American troops have not potential disintegration of Iraq and the possible undertaken any active military operations against emergence of an independent Kurdistan. Many Turkish Kurd units. The former PKK party, which Turkish politicians and generals see such a sce- is considered a terrorist organisation by the USA, nario as a beginning of the process of secession has its bases on Iraqi Kurd territories and launch- of Turkish Kurds and the building of a ‘Greater Kurdistan'. For this reason Turkey has long oppo- flict by building a Palestinian state; preventing sed the US-supported idea of transforming Iraq the proliferation of nuclear weapons; the develop- into a federation.Ankara finally accepted the fede- ment of regional co-operation) in similar ways, ral system of Iraq in 2005. However, it has main- there are still significant differences in the levels tained its negative stance on including Kirkuk in of implementation thereof29. Turkey prefers the the Kurdish region. Large oil and gas deposits may policy of persuasion and dialogue with the autho- be found around the city. Turkey fears that if Kir- ritarian elites, while the United States has chosen kuk is made a part of the Kurdish region, this will the policy of pressure. In effect, the stances and increase the Kurds' independence from both An- the actions taken by the two countries with re- kara and Baghdad.
gard to the region are often different and mutu- Turkey's concern about the possible disintegra- ally contradictory. Such differences are most clear- tion of Iraq is additionally strengthened by the ly apparent in the respective approaches the coun- number of casualties in the clashes between Sunni tries take towards Syria and Israel, and to a certain Arabs and Shiites, which has been growing ra- extent towards Iran.
pidly since early 2006, thus increasing the risk of As recently as 1998, Ankara very seriously threa- a massive civil war. Many Turkish politicians and tened Syria with a military intervention because military officers believe that mistakes made by of the support offered by Hafez Assad's regime to Americans after the intervention in Iraq (such as PKK guerrillas. Also, relations with Iran were quite the failure to dissolve religious militias) have con- tense for several reasons: (1) Iran's support for
tributed to the situation. To prevent war, Turkey Armenia in the latter's conflict with Azerbaijan, has been trying to include Sunnis in the govern- which in turn was supported by Ankara, (2) Turk-
ish criticism of the position of the Azeri minority Moreover, Turkey has reservations against the US' in northern Iran, (3) Iran's support for the PKK
giving permission for Kurdish people to settle in and Islamic radical circles in Turkey, and (4) Tur-
cities inhabited by the Turkish-speaking Turkmen, key's close co-operation with the USA and Israel.
urkish-US political relations af which is happening simultaneously with the ex- Since 2003, these relations have improved for both pansion of the Kurdish region in Northern Iraq27.
internal and external reasons, the most signifi- The problem especially concerns the city of Kir- cant of which are the strengthening position of kuk, which is surrounded by oilfields.
the Kurds as a result of the US intervention in Iraq, Turkish-American relations have also been adver- and the electoral victory of the Justice and Deve- sely affected by the deaths of many thousands of lopment Party (AKP) in 2002, which sees Islam as The cold alliance. T Muslim civilians caused by US activities. This has an important point of reference and supports been very sharply criticised by many Turkish po- closer relations with the Islamic world30.
liticians. Especially severe criticism has been di- Ahmet Davutoglu, international policy advisor to rected against the bombardments of towns sup- Prime Minister Erdogan, can be recognised as the porting the insurgents, in which many civilians initiator of the new Turkish policy towards the had been killed, and against US forces using tor- Middle Eastern neighbours. In his book named ture against people suspected of involvement in Stratejik Derinlik (A Strategic Depth) he presents the insurgence. Such criticism has often taken a concept for strengthening Ankara's internatio- very harsh forms (one AKP MP called the assault nal position by improving and developing com- on Fallujah an act of genocide; Americans in Iraq prehensive co-operation with all the regions bor- have also been compared to Nazis). The Turkish dering on Turkey. As can be expected, this would public, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, make Turkey a more attractive candidate for the feel more sympathy for Sunni Arabs, who are the EU and could help Ankara become a better part- main opponents of the American army there28.
ner in relations with Washington. On the otherhand, in the case of any problems in relations b) Iran, Israel and Syria with the EU or the USA, close ties with regionalpartners could provide an alternative to a pro- Although the USA and Turkey define their long- Western line of Turkish foreign policy31. Cooling term strategic goals regarding the Middle East (de- relations with the United States and tensions in mocratisation; ending the Israeli-Palestinian con- contacts with the European Union have led to voices urging Turkish foreign policy to reset its Trade exchange between Turkey, Syria and Iran long-term priorities now by rapprochement with has also significantly grown over recent years35.
Russia, Muslim states and China32. However, such Nevertheless, its level is rather limited in compa- opinions currently have no place in Turkey's main- rison with Turkey's economic relations with EU stream foreign policy.
member states and the USA. Co-operation on ener- The emergence of the common platform of inte- gy issues with Iran, the development of which rests as a result of the change in the balance of has met with Washington's discontent, is impor- forces in the region following the US interven- tant for Turkey. Thanks to gas supplies from Iran, tion in Iraq has been of key significance for Tur- Turkey has been able to reduce its dependence key's rapprochement with Iran and Syria, which on Russian gas and renegotiate the disadvanta- has also been supported by Turkish public opi- geous gas contract with Gazprom in 2004. How- nion. The common platform principally covered ever, energy co-operation between Turkey and regional security and economic co-operation. The Iran has not been developing well, and many Turkish parliament's decision on 1 March 2003 not problems still exist in this area. Turkey criticises only caused a caesura in Ankara's contacts with Iran for its unreasonable cuts to gas supplies and Washington but also affected Turkey's relations its habit of breaching contracts, and wants to re- with its Muslim neighbours. Turkey, Iran and Syria negotiate them since it has overestimated its de- were critical of the US intervention in Iraq, since mand for gas.
they shared a common anxiety about the possible The clear improvement in Turkey's relations with emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.
Iran and Syria led to sharp criticism from Wa- Turkey's stance on Iran and Syria has been great- shington in 200536. However, regarding Turkey's ly affected by the change in those countries' ap- policy on Syria, Washington has recently modi- proach to the PKK. Their governments, under so- fied its stance, and has started to treat Turkey as me pressure from Ankara, have taken active mea- an intermediary in communicating with Bashar urkish-US political relations af sures against PKK guerrillas. Syrian and Iranian Assad's regime37.
security forces have contributed to the liquidation The United States wants to bring about the com- of PKK bases on their territories, a step which has plete isolation of those countries which it has been welcomed by Turkey. In late 2003, Syria also branded as ‘rogue states'. Iran was also classified helped Ankara capture the co-planners of the ter- as part of the ‘axis of evil' in the strategy for the rorist attacks on Istanbul. According to media re- war on terror which George W. Bush announced ports, Turkish and Iranian armed forces have been in January 2002. In turn, Syria was accused by The cold alliance. T sporadically engaging in tactical co-operation Washington of sheltering members of Saddam against the PKK33.
Hussein's regime, and supporting Iraqi insurgents Numerous diplomatic visits, during which many and terrorists who destabilised the situation in treaties and agreements were signed, have prov- Iraq. The Syrian regime was also sharply criticis- ed that Turkey's bilateral relations with Iran and ed by the Bush administration for interfering in Syria are improving34. Syria has given up its terri- the internal affairs of Lebanon (supporting Hez- torial claims on Turkey (the Hatay region) and no bollah) and its bad relations with Israel.
longer criticises the building of a dam on the Eu- The USA perceives Iran as the most serious threat phrates and Tigris rivers, which is also a token of to the region, and America itself, because of Iran's warming relations with Ankara. The Turkish go- officially stated desire to destroy Israel, support- vernment has appealed to the Syrian regime for ing anti-American radical Shiite groups in Leba- democratisation, co-operation with the UN dur- non (Hezbollah) and Iraq, and in particular be- ing the investigation into the murder of the Le- cause of its nuclear programme, which Washing- banese prime minister and the withdrawal of ton believes to be aimed at building a nuclear troops from Lebanon, which was done under in- bomb. Turkey and the USA would not like Iran to ternational pressure in 2005. However, Ankara has have nuclear weapons. Currently, the United States categorically refused to take a tough line on Da- and Turkey have given top priority to negotia- mascus (such as sanctions or the threat of a mili- tions conducted by countries which belong to tary intervention).
the UN Security Council plus Germany. Ankara hasdeclared its readiness to support possible inter- national sanctions that could be imposed by the vate visit to Turkey. During the visit, the Turkish UN on Iran, even though they would have an ad- government appealed to Hamas to recognise the verse effect on the Turkish economy. However, state of Israel and renounce the use of terror.
Ankara is definitely against any military inter- The visit was very strongly criticised by both vention in Iran, which the present US adminis- Israel and Washington. In turn, the Israeli inter- tration has not ruled out. This sceptical approach ventions in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip in June by the Turkish government to a possible US attack and July 2006 were opposed by Prime Minister on Iran results from its fear of Iranian counter- Erdogan, who claimed they were not a justified action (large-scale terrorist activity) which could reaction. Many Turkish MPs left the Turkish-Is- destabilise the regions that border Turkey. De- raeli friendship group. Some of them suggested finite support for US actions by Ankara has been that Israel's actions reminded them of Nazi poli- ruled out due to the strong anti-Americanism of cy. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül criticised the the Turkish public and elites, as well as fear that USA for its unconditional support to Israel which, Iran could support Kurdish and Islamic terrorism according to Ankara, made settling conflicts be- tween Israel and its neighbours more difficult.
In turn, the modification of approaches in the Ankara, in contrast to Washington, supported Turkish policy of warming relations with Muslim France in its appeal to reach a truce as soon as states has caused a cooling in Ankara's relations possible. Regardless of these tensions, Turkey is with Israel. This has been negatively received by still the country with which Israel has the best Washington, which is a close ally of Tel Aviv.
relations in the region. This has been proven by Good Turkish-Israeli relations had been based on Israel's support for the participation of Turkish military co-operation, the respective alliances of troops in the UN-led operation in Lebanon, which the two countries with the USA, common inter- Tel Aviv has not granted to any other Muslim ests in the region (including conflicts and dis- putes with Syria and Iran) and dynamic econom- urkish-US political relations af ic co-operation38. However, the AKP government, c) Turkish anti-Americanism which relied on an Islamic electorate, has starteddistancing itself from Israel in its policy, a change One of the underlying reasons for the change in which was welcomed by a majority of Turkish Turkish policy towards the United States is the society. Turkey's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian intensifying anti-American sentiments among conflict under the AKP government became more the Turkish society, including the political elites.
The cold alliance. T favourable to the Palestinian side. In spring 2004, This concerns not only Islamic circles, who are tra- following the Israeli attacks on Rafah, Prime Mini- ditionally believed to be anti-American, but also ster Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of using a much broader group of nationalists, Kemalists ‘state terrorism', withdrew Turkey's ambassador and secular liberals42. Furthermore, the impact from Israel for consultations, and raised the rank of public opinion on foreign policy has grown in of the Turkish diplomatic agency in the Palesti- connection with Turkey's ongoing democratisa- nian Autonomy to that of an embassy. Informa- tion as part of its adjustment to EU requirements.
tion in June 2004 that Israeli intelligence had Turkish anti-Americanism has caused Americans been training Kurdish troops in Iraq certainly con- to perceive Turkey in a less favourable way. Soon tributed to the worsening relations between Tur- after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, key and Israel39. The Israeli government denied Turkey was presented by the USA as a model Mus- the information, although a BBC report broadcast lim state, whose political system was based on in September 2006 showed that former Israeli secularism. At that time, the AKP was praised as secret service officers employed by private com- an Islamic democratic party. However, as of 2003, panies had in fact worked as military instructors the US administration has definitely ceased pro- in northern Iraq40.
moting Turkey and the AKP as models to be fol- From the point of view of Turkey, which takes lowed by the Muslim world. Representatives of a strong stance the Kurdish issue, these events neo-conservatives, such as Michael Rubin and Da- undermined its confidence in its Israeli partner41.
niel Pipes, who provide the ideological base for In February 2006, leaders of Hamas made a pri- the present administration, have started accus- ing the AKP of Islamising the country in their same firm at the end of 2004 indicated that the United States was perceived by nearly 85% ofTurks as a country which posed a threat to glob- Turkish anti-Americanism consists of a critical al peace (the highest result of all the survey-co- perception of the US foreign policy43 as threaten- vered countries, including Russia and Iran, and ing the interests of the Turkish state, is unilater- giving a significant lead for the USA over other al and does not take into account the interests of countries) and by over 30% as the country that Turkey or other countries, and is in general defi- posed the greatest threat48.
nitely anti-Muslim. Public opinion polls have The negative approach of Turkish society to US shown that Turks clearly differentiate their sen- policy has also indirectly influenced the activities timents on the United States, Americans and Pre- of the Turkish government. Out of respect for pub- sident George W. Bush. For example, polls con- lic opinion, the governing AKP party and its lead- ducted in June 2005 by the ARI Haraket institute er Recep Tayyip Erdogan will not take any ac- showed that 27% of respondents had a very nega- tions that could adversely affect public support tive attitude towards Americans, 49% towards the for his party. On the other hand, US politicians United States and 71% towards George W. Bush44.
have reacted negatively to this passivity on the Answers given by Turkish respondents concern- part of Turkish authorities in overcoming anti- ing the reasons for and consequences of US poli- American stereotypes and opinions among the cy in the Middle East are similar to the opinions Turkish population.
of the French or German publics, as has been in-dicated by polls conducted by Pew Research Centre between 2002 and 2005. However, Turks'dislike of Americans is much stronger than thatfelt by Western European societies45. This is con- urkish-US political relations af nected with a feeling of religious solidarity and,above all, with a negative opinion on Americans'relations with Iraqi Kurds and tolerating PKK bas-es in Iraq. However, the general dislike of Ame-ricans does not translate into hatred of indivi-dual Americans, which happens in some Arabcommunities46.
The cold alliance. T In the late 1990s, a definite majority of Turks hada positive opinion of the USA and Americans.
America's image among Turkish society startedworsening due to the operation in Afghanistan,strong US support for Israel and the eruption ofthe second intifada. However, a turning pointcame with the US intervention in Iraq and pre-parations for it. In spring 2003, the amount ofpositive opinions on the USA reached its lowestlevel of 12% (at the end of 2002 it had been ashigh as 30%) and rose slightly thereafter47. Sur-veys for Foreign Policy Perception, which havebeen conducted regularly since 2003 by the Turk-ish International Strategic Research Organisation,have shown that approximately 25% to 30% ofTurks believe that the USA poses the most seriousthreat to the security of their country. In pollsconducted by Pollmark in early March 2005, over30% of Turks stated that the USA could attackTurkey in the near future. Polls conducted by the 4. The platform of common However, Washington's ability to support Tur- key's membership using political means was re-duced as a consequence of the outbreak of the Regardless of existing discrepancies and negative second war in Iraq, which led to a sudden wors- opinions, Turkey and the United States share ening in trans-Atlantic relations. This was affect- a broad platform of common interests. Ankara's ed by the following two factors: (1) the crisis in
reserve in its policy towards Washington has not relations between the USA and France & Germany, fundamentally affected the activities undertaken the countries which play a key role in the Union's by the USA with regard to Turkey. For the United decision-making process and (2) the cooling of
States, a Turkey which is stable, democratic and US-Turkish relations and the increasing similari- integrated into Western structures (NATO and the ty of Turkey's position to that of its European EU) is a necessary precondition the for stabilisa- tion and democratisation of the Middle East, Washington's support for Turkish membership which is a top priority objective of US policy. The may still turn into a disservice for Ankara. Many key areas of Turkish-US co-operation principally European politicians fear that American support cover the process of Turkey's European integra- for Turkey's accession stems from the US' desire tion. In this context, the issue of divided Cyprus to weaken the European Union by preventing its can be used as a positive example, which plays further internal integration, as a result of which an important role in mutual Turkish-US relations Brussels could become a more equal partner in and is essential for the Turkey's prospects of join- trans-Atlantic relations. In the opinion of these politicians, such support is also a manifestation Security co-operation, which covers combating of American arrogance. The negative reception to terrorism, preventing ethnic conflicts and mili- the US lobbying for Turkey in Europe was perfect- tary & energy collaboration, is still very impor- ly illustrated by a statement made by the French tant. Owing to the extensive field of common in- President Jacques Chirac in June 2004; ‘It's a bit urkish-US political relations af terests, the US-Turkish alliance still works, regard- as if I told the United States how they should less of existing differences of opinion on the manage their relations with Mexico'52.
The US operation in Iraq posed a dilemma forTurkish diplomacy; whether to support the United a) Turkey's integration States or the European Union, mainly France and with the European Union Germany, which had adopted a critical stance on The cold alliance. T American activities. Turkey's negative opinion on EU membership is a priority of the Turkish go- US policy towards Iraq brought it closer to the vernment's policy. The United States also sees the EU's position. However, from the end of 2004, pro- ‘European anchor' as the most effective tool to blems appeared in relations between Turkey and guarantee Turkey's establishment in the Western those EU member states which had become in- world and for maintaining a democratic political creasingly critical of Turkey's membership aspira- system in the country49. For this reason, Washing- tions. As a consequence of the criticism, Turkey ton has for many years been the chief advocate started feeling rejected by the European Union.
of Turkey's EU membership. The intensified acti- This situation created a possibility of the worst- vity of US diplomacy can be proven by its enga- case scenario coming true, in which Turkey's gement in lobbying among European partners relations with both the EU and the USA would (especially Germany) for establishing a customs clearly worsen53. A dangerous effect of that could union between the EU and Turkey (1995) as well be a certain revaluation of Ankara's foreign policy as during the Helsinki summit in 1999, when and closer relations with Russia, Iran and Syria54.
Turkey was officially granted candidate status50.
Although such a scenario is currently far from The USA lobbied for Turkey in European capitals coming true, it still cannot be excluded. To side- before each summit when the EU took decisions step this potential threat, Washington – regard- on future relations between Ankara and the Union less of the bilateral tensions – continues its efforts (2002, 2004 and 2005)51.
to maintain correct relations with Turkey andstrongly supports Turkish membership in the EU.
However, the United States does see certain pro- on 24 April 2004. However, the Annan Plan did blems that may arise out of Turkey's rapproche- not come into force, as it was rejected by the ment with Europe. If Turkey establishes closer Greek community in the Republic of Cyprus. Due relations with the EU, Ankara will have to har- to the rejection of the peaceful plan, the process monise its foreign policy activity with Brussels of political settlement of the conflict was with- to a greater extent, and not with Washington, as held. Thereafter, the United States concentrated has so far been the case. Differences of opinions its efforts on economic support for the Turkish and controversies existing between Americans part of the island and reinforcing democratic in- and Europeans may provide another point of dis- stitutions. In 2005, the American programme of pute in US-Turkish relations in addition to the support for the KKTC economy was worth US$30.5 current three major areas of disagreement, which million56. The United States also activated con- are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey's sup- tacts with representatives of the Turkish Cypriots.
port for the establishment of the International A US trade delegation made an official visit to Court of Justice (ICJ) and the stance on possible Northern Cyprus on 17 February 2005. In turn, on military intervention in Iran55.
19 June 2005, the US and KKTC ambassadors inTurkey met in Ankara57. The official visit in Wa- shington on 28 October 2005 by the KKTC Presi-dent Mehmet Ali Talat, who had been invited by The unsettled conflict over the divided island of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, was a ve- Cyprus is a major issue in Ankara's relations with ry important event. During her visit to Greece both Brussels and Washington, and is one of the and Turkey in April 2006, the American head of key problems in the process of Turkey's integra- diplomacy criticised the policies of Athens and the tion with the EU. In turn, from the United States' Cypriot Greeks and appealed to them to change perspective, it is a significant factor in building their stance on the KKTC. Although the problem urkish-US political relations af stability in the Mediterranean region. Although of Cyprus had not been settled, the efforts made Cyprus does not currently play a major role in to do so were positively received by the Turkish Turkish-American relations it could still be a sig- public. In Ankara's opinion, the position taken by nificant stimulant to improve relations between Washington is much more constructive and fa- the two countries, thanks to the positive recep- vourable than the EU policy, which is believed to tion by the Turkish side of the US engagement in be insincere58.
settling the conflict.
The cold alliance. T During the cold war period, the United States at- c) The Broader Middle East tached great significance to alleviating the nega- and North Africa Initiative tive consequences of the division of Cyprus. Themain objective was to prevent a conflict between The US intervention in Iraq was part of a broader two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, for which concept to democratise the Muslim world, which this issue was the main point of dispute.
the Bush administration perceived as a necessary As of 2002, the United States, along with the UN precondition for achieving a lasting stabilisation and the EU, actively participated in developing of the Middle East and eliminating terrorism. The a plan for the peaceful unification of the island, concept was translated into the Broader Middle the so-called Annan Plan. It very warmly welcom- East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI), which ed the constructive engagement by Prime Mini- is a priority issue of US foreign policy59. The pro- ster Erdogan in activities for a peaceful settlement ject was initiated by the United States in June of the problem of Cyprus; he played an essential 2004 at the G-8 summit in Sea Island. Its objec- role in convincing domestic Turkish public opi- tives include socioeconomic reforms and the de- nion to accept some of the concessions necessa- mocratisation of Muslim states from Morocco ry for the conflict resolution. He backed the poli- through to Pakistan. Turkey has declared its sup- tical forces which supported the Annan Plan port for the initiative. Ankara's engagement in (these were now ruling the Turkish Republic of the BMENAI may provide a significant stimulus Northern Cyprus (KKTC)), and appealed to the Cy- to improving Turkish-US relations. Turkey belie- priot Turks to vote for the Plan in the referendum ves that it can be helpful in the following three areas60. Firstly, it can act as a mediator between nership for Peace with Moldova, Ukraine and Cau- the West (including the USA) and Iran & Syria. Se- casian & Central Asian countries. They both sup- condly, Ankara can play a similar part in the Is- port Georgia's and Ukraine's NATO membership, raeli-Palestinian conflict. Thirdly, it can contribute and are especially engaged in modernising the to fostering democratic processes in the countries Georgian army. The Incirlik Air Base has been of located within the area covered by the BMENAI.
key logistic significance for the US operation in However, Turkey's participation in the project is Iraq. Many of the supplies for US troops in Iraq rather potential than certain at this stage, due to are also delivered from Mediterranean ports by a number of limitations. Turkey is too weak an in- ground transport through Turkey.
ternational actor to be able to play a major role However, Turkey's strong sense of sovereignty, in negotiations with Iran. It also lacks any instru- together with improving Turkish-Russian rela- ments to influence the government in Tehran.
tions since 2003, have given rise to certain prob- Turkey has a greater potential for playing the part lems in Turkish-US military co-operation, espe- of mediator in the case of Syria, although an im- cially in the Black Sea region. Rapprochement be- provement of relations between Damascus and tween Turkey and Russia is an effect of the wors- Washington primarily depends on the settlement ening relations of these two countries with the of the Syrian-Israeli conflict over the Golan USA as well as tensions in Turkish-EU relations.
Heights. As for the conflict between Israel and This move is intended to expand the room for ma- Palestine, the Israeli side has lost confidence in noeuvre for both Russia and Turkey in their rela- Ankara as a result of worsening Turkish-Israeli tions with Washington and Brussels62. Turkey relations, which makes it difficult for Turkey to does not want the American military presence in act as a trustworthy mediator for both sides. Fi- the region to grow significantly because it sees nally, in the context of engagement in democra- such a scenario as causing confrontation with tisation in the BMENAI area, there are two major Russia and diminishing Turkish influence. In April problems concerning Turkey. Firstly, the secular 2005, Turkey's abstention enabled Russia to pre- urkish-US political relations af model of the Turkish state, which is presented as vent the USA from being granted the status of an one to be followed by Muslim states, is not attrac- observer in the Organisation of Black Sea Econo- tive to many of them and seems impossible to mic Co-operation (BSEC), the most important re- adopt. This is related to the special circumstances gional organisation, although the USA finally re- of Turkey's historical development. Secondly, Tur- ceived the status in September 2005 together key focuses too much on stabilisation in fear of with Belarus, which was accepted at Moscow's The cold alliance. T the negative consequences of overly hasty demo- special request.
The American desire to increase their military pre-sence in the Black Sea region was manifested in d) Co-operation in the areas the idea of expanding the NATO-led antiterrorist of security and economy operation Active Endeavour over the Black Sea.
However, to do so, it would have been necessary Security co-operation is still the main platform on to renegotiate the Montreux Convention (1936), which the alliance between Turkey and the USA which imposes a certain limit on the presence of is based. Although differences of opinions have warships of other countries than those border- somewhat weakened it, the existing threats – ing the Black Sea. The proposal was opposed by above all terrorism and destabilisation of the situ- Turkey, which saw the Convention as a pillar of ation in Turkey and neighbouring regions, and its national sovereignty. The US stopped pressing common interests in the fields of energy and the Turkey on this issue in May 2006. According to arms industry – still form a solid basis for further some analysts, Washington wanted to put off An- co-operation. Turkey and the USA are co-operat- kara's closer co-operation with Moscow by reco- ing especially intensively within the framework gnising Turkish interests63. As a result, in early of NATO. Turkish and US armed forces participate June 2006, Turkey took part in the new pro-Ame- in common operations in Afghanistan and Koso- rican regional initiative, the Black Sea Forum, vo, as well as in the Alliance's manoeuvres. The which was ignored by Russia.
two countries co-operate as part of NATO's Part- Another significant element to cement Turkish- 5. Conclusion and forecast US co-operation is the implementation of commonenergy projects64. Turkey, after Russia, is the most In 2006, three years since the emergence of the important country for energy transit from Central crisis, the greatest problems in US-Turkish rela- Asia and the Caucasus65. Ankara and Washington tions have not been solved. These have mainly are interested in developing this role for Turkey, been caused by the lasting instability in the Mid- and effectively reducing the Russian domination dle East region, especially in Iraq. One can hard- of the energy market. The most important pro- ly expect that the main problems of the Middle ject in which Turkey and the USA currently par- East, the Kurdish issue, the stabilisation of Iraq, ticipate is the start-up of the Baku–Tbilisi–Cey- Iran's atomic programme and the conflict be- han (BTC) oil pipeline, which officially took place tween Israel and the Arab world will be resolved in July 2006. The BTC pipeline enables oil transit soon. It must be taken into account that these from the Caspian Sea region without involving issues may cause some problems in relations be- Russia. This is one of the largest oil projects that tween Washington and Ankara for a long time to have been recently implemented; its construc- come. The status of the city and environs of Kirkuk tion cost nearly US$4 billion. The construction of may be an especially controversial issue in the im- the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, planned mediate future. The Iraqi constitution provides to be launched in autumn 2006, is another pro- for a referendum on the status of Kirkuk to be held ject in which the USA and Turkey are strongly en- by the end of 2007. Considering the problems gaged. Since early 2006, Washington and Ankara with setting the borders between polling dis- have been trying to convince Turkmenistan to ac- tricts and designating the electorate authorised cept the idea of exporting gas via the Caspian Sea, to vote, the referendum, if held, may cause ten- Caucasus and Turkey, and skipping Russia.
sion between Turkey and the USA.
As part of its plan to diversify its energy sources, However, it is worth noting both sides' clear will urkish-US political relations af Turkey is planning to build three nuclear power to improve mutual relations. Neither the USA nor plants by 2015. Pursuant to an agreement with Turkey wants to escalate the disputes. Regard- the United States, which was accepted by the less of their existing differences of opinion, since Turkish parliament in July 2006, the nuclear tech- 2003 many major Turkish politicians, diplomats nology will come from America.
and military officials have visited the USA, and Last but not least, the United States and Turkey vice versa. Both countries have been trying to are engaged in very close military co-operation, take actions that will bring them closer to rappro- The cold alliance. T the key manifestations of which are the education chement. In early July 2006, during the visit by of Turkish officers at US military universities and the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Wa- the purchase of US military equipment by the shington, both countries signed a document in- Turkish army. A great majority of weapons in its tended to revive the strategic US-Turkish part- arsenal come from the USA66.
nership. The Strategic Vision document specifies For Turkey, the United States has been an impor- areas of their co-operation (including the stabilisa- tant trade partner for many years (on average, it tion of Iraq and the region covered by the BMENAI, takes fifth place, and trade exchange with the USA Central Asia and the Caucasus; settling Arab-Is- accounts for nearly 5% of Turkish trade exchange) raeli conflicts; combating terrorism and other as well as a significant foreign investor (fourth threats such as smuggling, arms trafficking, etc.) place, nearly 10% of foreign investments). The and is aimed at intensifying the dialogue to carry USA is also a guarantor of financial aid granted out specific tasks67. The United States has been via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and trying to emphasise Turkey's significance as a key to a lesser extent via the World Bank to the Turk- ally and partner during the visits. Events of this ish economy, which is still not exactly stable.
kind improve the atmosphere of mutual relations, Turkey is the most significant IMF debtor.
even though they do not predetermine that thecrises will be overcome.
The USA needs Turkey's favourable stance to-wards and support for its policy in the Middle East,especially on the issues of Iran and Iraq. A grad- ual improvement of stability in Iraq would enable The process of Turkey's integration with the Eu- Turkey, the Kurds of northern Iraqi and the USA ropean Union will also have a great impact on to take more effective political and military action the further development of US-Turkish relations.
against the PKK, and thus to remove one of the A possible failure of the Turkish-EU negotiations greatest problems in their mutual relations. A fur- may lead to anti-Western sentiments rising, and ther change of Turkish internal policy on the Turk- the Turkish government's search for compensa- ish Kurds is equally important to resolve the pro- tion for such failures by developing relations with blem, however. If the conflict between Iraq's Sun- Muslim countries, Russia and China. Such a swing nis and Shiites escalates further and turns into in Turkish policy would undoubtedly make it im- a full-scale civil war, the country may disintegrate possible to maintain a close alliance with the USA.
and another challenge, to wit the possible inde- A crisis in Turkey's relations with the European pendence of Kurdistan, may arise in Turkish-US Union does not have to mean a collapse of its al- relations. Washington would have to take on the liance with the United States, provided that a mo- difficult task of finding a modus vivendi between derately positive scenario is realised in the Middle Ankara and Irbil, without alienating any of the East. In such a case, the alliance with the USA could become an alternative for Ankara to its re- Turkey's favour for the American policy in the lations with the EU. In turn, the USA would gain Middle East would certainly grow if the USA and an important ally in its possible political rivalry the EU could reach a compromise in their talks with Europe.
with Tehran. Unfortunately, such an optimistic The ‘worst-case scenario', i.e. open enmity be- scenario is rather improbable. Possible UN sanc- tween Turkey and the EU & the USA, and Anka- tions on Iran will be supported by Ankara, which ra's rapprochement with anti-Western states is will not take the risk of being isolated by the in- rather unlikely. Washington will try to avoid such ternational community. This policy will be unpo- a situation, as will some of the EU's member sta- pular in Turkey because of the financial losses it tes. The scale of politico-economic relations be- urkish-US political relations af will entail. If the violent scenario is realised and tween Turkey and the West is so great that an un- the USA attacks Iran (bombardments, paratroops certain alliance with China, Russia, Iran and Syria attacks by special units), Ankara's consent for is perceived by a majority of realistically–dispos- the US Air Force to use the airbase in Incirlik will ed Turkish elites as merely a sham alternative to be a problem. Turkey will probably accept Wa- the Western direction. However, it is possible that shington's request, if the United States receives a prolonged period of colder relations between The cold alliance. T approval for its activities from the European Turkey and the Western world is imminent.
Union. As was the case in the US intervention in Rafa∏ Sadowski Iraq, the great majority of the Turkish public will Co-operation Adam Balcer be against the American actions. Turkish-US re-lations may worsen as a result of Tehran's reac-tion to an American attack (such as large-scalesupport for terrorism), which would destabilisethe situation in the region. If the internationalcommunity grants only limited support for theattack on Iran, this may also lead to Turkey re-fusing the US access to the airbase in Incirlik.
Another development in the Turkish-Americanrelations which would have grave consequencesmay be the potential vote by the US Congress ona resolution concerning the Armenian genocide.
Such a motion has became even more likely as theDemocrats, who enjoy close ties with the Arme-nian lobby in the US, secured a majority in the USCongress in the mid-term elections in November2006.
1 F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy units to take part in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The deal also in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND, 2003, p.162.
included permission to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq.
2 Çagri Erhan, ‘Türkiye-ABD iliskileri mantiksal ˜er˜evesi', in Pursuant to arrangements with the Americans, Turkey could Türk Dis Politkasi, (ed.) Idris Bal, 2004 Ankara, pp. 139–150.
have sent nearly 60,000 troops to the 30-kilometre border 3 George Sellers Harris, ‘Turkish-American Relations Since zone, extended to 40 kilometres, and would have gained con- the Truman Doctrine', in, Turkish-American Relations: Past, trol over the roads to Mosul and Kirkuk. Additionally, the Present and Future, ed. Mustafa Aydin, Çagri Erhan, London United States would have given Turkey US$15 billion in fi- 2003, pp. 66–91.
nancial aid and loans. It is worth adding that although a great 4 F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy majority of the Turkish public were against the American in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND, 2003, p.163.
intervention, at the same time in March 2003, more than half 5 Mehmet Y. Kalin, Implications of EU Admittance of Turkey of Turks supported the engagement of the Turkish army in on Turkish-EU Relations and Turkish-US Relations, U.S.
northern Iraq, and a significant minority (nearly 40%) be- Army War College, Carlise, 2005, p.16 lieved the rejection of the deal had been a mistake. Soner Ari- 6 In 1975, the US Congress passed a resolution on the issue kanoglu, ‘45 bin asker yolda', Radikal, 28 February 2003, of the Armenian genocide. 38 states (parliaments and gover- nors) made declarations regarding this issue. The Greek and 17 Barak A Salmoni., ‘Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Armenian diasporas in the USA are much more numerous Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom', and wealthier than the Turkish community. The previously Strategic Insights, vol. II, issue 7, July 2003.
good relations between Turkey and the Jewish lobby have been weakened because of the worsening relations be- 19 Gareth Jenkins, ‘Turkish parliament votes to send troops tween Turkey and Israel. Suhnaz Yilmaz, ‘Impact of Lobbies to Iraq', Al-Ahram Weekly Online, no. 659, 9–15 October 2003.
on Turkish American Relations', in, Turkish-American Rela- 20 In May 2003, Paul Wolfowitz in an interview for CNN Türk tions: Past, Present and Future, ed. Mustafa Aydin, Cagri sharply criticised the Turkish parliament's decision, and espe- Erhan, London 2003, pp. 181–212.
cially the passivity of the generals. Deputy Secretary of De- Çagri Erhan, ibid. fense Wolfowitz's Interview with CNN Türk, http://www.
8 Çagri Erhan, ibid. 9 Çagri Erhan, ibid. 10 F. Stephen Larrabee, Ian O. Lesser , Turkish Foreign Policy 21 Michael Rubin, ‘A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Di- urkish-US political relations af in an Age of Uncertainty, RAND, 2003, p.166.
plomacy and the Iraq War', Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 11 Approximately 15 to 20% of Turkey's residents, i.e. 12 to 15 million people, are Kurds. They account for nearly half of 22 Soner Çagaptay, ‘Whither the U.S.-Turkish Relationship?', the Kurds living in the Middle East. Kurds are also numer- Middle East Quarterly, 2004.
ous among the populations of Turkey's neighbours (Iraq, 23 For more information on the Kurdish issue, see the chap- Iran and Syria). In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), ter The hurdle race: The greatest political and social barriers a Marxist organisation of Turkish Kurds (which was not on Turkey's way to the EU.
supported by most of Turkey's Kurdish community), started The cold alliance. T ‘Rice Visit to Turkey: A New Turning Point for US-Turkey a rebellion in south-eastern Turkey, striving for setting up Relations', The Journal of Turkish Weekly, www.turkishweekly.
an independent Kurdistan. According to estimates, between 35,000 and 40,000 people have died so far in clashes between 25 The US policy adjustment may be a result of information the PKK and the Turkish army.
on the tactical co-operation of Turkish and Iranian armed 12 Mehmet Y. Kalin, The Implications of EU Admittance of forces against the PKK. Ümit Enginsoy, ‘US probes shelling Turkey on Turkish-EU Relations and Turkish-US Relations, of northern Iraq', 24 August 2006, Turkish Daily News.
U.S. Army War College, Carlise, 2005, p. 16.
26 ‘Irak PKK'yi yasakladi', Milliyet, 20 September 2006.
13 Ömer Taspinar, Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turk- 27 Michael Rubin, ‘A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Di- ish Relations, 2005, p.19.
plomacy and the Iraq War', Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 14 Steven A Cook, U.S.-Turkey Relations and the War on Ter- rorism, 2001. The participation in the operation in Afgha- 28 The great majority of Turks condemn suicide attacks. How- nistan was also expected to enable Turkey to reinforce its ever, in some surveys, such as those conducted by the Poll- influence in the Central Asian region, which it has cultural mark centre, most Turks have expressed positive opinions and historical ties with.
about the anti-American resistance in Iraq. For the poll re- 15 In autumn 2001, two-thirds of Turks were against the US- sults see the Pollmark website; http:// www.pollmark.com.tr led operation in Afghanistan. In turn, in 2004, nearly half of 29 Conversation with Sanli Bahadir Ko˜, a specialist at the the respondents were against Turkish involvement in Afgha- Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara in nistan. See Transatlantic Trends 2005, p. 39. http://www.
30 In June 2004, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, representing Turkey, 16 The Turkish parliament voted to decide on consent to de- was elected secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic ploy 62,000 US soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, 255 aircraft, 65 combat heli- 31 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, Istanbul 2001.
copters and an unspecified number of special and support 32 As a matter of convention, we can assume that this trend cold attitude) to 100 (very warm attitude), while the next began in March 2002, when General Tuncer Kili˜, the Secre- state whose society was negatively disposed to the USA was tary of the National Security Council, gave up efforts to- Spain, with the rate of 42 points. Transatlantic Trends 2005, wards EU membership and established closer co-operation with Iran and Russia.
33 Ümit Enginsoy, ‘US probes shelling of northern Iraq', 46 According to Pollmark surveys conducted in March 2005, 24 August 06, Turkish Daily News.
a definite majority of Turks did not mind the possibility of 34 The most significant were the visits by the Syrian Pre- an American receiving Turkish citizenship, or working and sident Bashir Assad in January 2004, and by Prime Minister living together with an American. Most respondents also ac- Recep Tayyip Erdogan in July 2004 to Iran and in December cepted the possibility of marriage of a close relative with an 2004 to Damascus.
35 Iran is a major import partner for Turkey, and Turkey is 47 ‘US Image up slightly but still negative', pp. 44-45. http:// a major partner in Iran's exports (in both cases seventh or eighth position in importance). It is estimated that the trade exchange between Turkey and Iran exceeded US$5 billion in 49 Morton Abramovitz, ‘An American Perspective on Turkey 2006. Turkey has an enormous trade deficit in its relations and the EU', Zaman, 30 December 2005.
with Iran. Turkish exports to Iran constitute as little as under 50 Ömer Taspinar, Changing Parameters in U.S.-German-Turk- 20% of Iranian exports to Turkey. Syria is not an important ish Relations, 2005.
trade partner for Turkey, while Turkey has become one of the Morton Abramovitz, ibid. key trade partners for Syria since 2004 (second or third in 51 On 2 October 2005, when Austria's resistance put the be- importance, over 10% of trade exchange). ‘T.C. Basbakanlik ginning of EU-Turkish negotiations in jeopardy, Prime Mini- Dis Ticaret Müstesarligi', http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr ster Erdogan asked Washington for help. Political pressure 36 The US Ambassador in Turkey, Eric Edelman, openly criti- from American diplomacy was one of the reasons why Vienna cised President Ahmet Sezer's visit to Syria in April 2005.
changed its stance.
37 In November 2005, after Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah 52 Joshua Chaffin, ‘EU anger as Bush calls for Turkish mem- Gül's visit to Syria, Damascus transferred those suspected bership', 30 June 2004, Financial Times.
of the murder of the Lebanese prime minister to the UN. Ab- 53 Soner Çagaptay, European Recalcitrance toward Turkey: dullah Gül visited Damascus shortly after meeting Condo- An Agenda for U.S.-Turkish Ties in Summer 2005, 2005.
urkish-US political relations af leezza Rice at the Bahrain summit of the Broader Middle East 54 Considering the fact that Turkey is competing with Iran and North Africa Initiative. In early July 2006, during a visit and Russia in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, by Foreign Minister Gül, Secretary of State Rice thanked Tur- such an alliance would be tactical and calculating in its na- key for its diplomatic mediation between the USA and Da- 55 Morton Abramovitz, ‘An American Perspective on Turkey 38 Turkey is one of Israel's major trade partners (seventh or and the EU', Zaman, 30 December 2005.
eighth in importance, nearly 3% of Israel's trade exchange).
56 John Sitildes, ‘The Road Through Brussels: Cyprus on the Their co-operation in the arms industry is especially impor- US-Turkey Agenda', Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 4, No. 1, The cold alliance. T tant. Apart from that, many Israeli tourists visit Turkey every Spring 2005.
57 Soner Çagaptay, Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving An- 39 Seymour M Hersh., ‘Plan B', 30 June 2004, The New Yorker, kara's Western Orientation, Washington, 2005.
58 Soner Çagaptay, European Recalcitrance toward Turkey: An Agenda for U.S.-Turkish Ties in Summer 2005, 2005.
40 One of the companies was directed by a former head of 59 Turkey on the Threshold: Europe's Decision and U.S. Inte- Israeli special forces. BBC, ‘Kurdish soldiers trained by Israe- rests, ed. Morton I. Abramovitz, Richard R. Burt, Atlantic lis', 20 September 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/program- Council, Washington, 2004.
60 Ömer Taspinar, Changing Parameters in U.S.-German- 41 Brian Mahler, Israel's Shifting Geopolitical Security Con- Turkish Relations, 2005.
cerns Threaten its Relationship with Turkey, 2004.
Yakup Beris, Asli Gurkan, Broader Middle East Initiative: Per- 42 Soner Çagaptay, Changing Turkish Public Attitudes to- ceptions from Turkey, 2004. TUSIAD, Turkey in Focus, issue 7, ward United States: Premises and Prospects, 2005.
July 2004, http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/ 43 Ömer Taspinar, ‘The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Tur- key', The Brookings Institution, 2005.
44 ARI Hareket, Turkish Public Opinion about the USA and 61 Turkey criticised the fixing of the parliamentary elections Americans, p. 3, http://www.ari.org.tr/arastirma/Turkish% in Azerbaijan in 2005 much more mildly than Washington did. The latter has gradually softened its criticism of Ilham Aliev's regime. However, the USA and Turkey took a simi- 45 Transatlantic Trends 2005 surveys concerning the attitude larly critical stance on the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan to the USA among selected NATO member states indicated in 2005, for which Islam Karimov's regime was responsible.
that the attitude is the least favourable in Turkey. In the case 62 Turkey and Russia do not want any significant enhance- of Turkey the rate was 28 points on the scale from 0 (very ment of the US presence, especially military, in the Black Sea region or in the Caucasus. They are sceptical about the US po- tion aircraft. Turkey announced plans to buy 100 F-35s worth licy of putting pressure on some authoritarian regimes, for nearly $11 billion over the next 15 to 20 years. The F-35 example Syria. They are critical of the US intervention in Iraq, program is the largest and most strategic defence procure- a possible attack on Iran and Washington's unconditional ment project in Turkey's history. On 7 February 2007, the support for Israel. Turkey and Russia claim they are willing Turkish state-owned TÜSAS Aerospace Industries (TAI) sign- to co-operate in the transit of Russian gas through Turkey ed a letter of intent with a principal member of Lockheed to Europe and the Middle East.
Martin's F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft team to be a second However, Turkish-Russian relations are ambivalent in many source for the aircraft's construction, a deal which was worth fields, and the two countries' interests are often in conflict.
more than $3 billion for TAI.
66 Russia's approach to the US engagement in Asia is more un- Ümit Enginsoy, ‘Turkey, US invest hopes in shared vision compromising than that of Turkey. Ankara is interested in document', 7 July 2006, Turkish Daily News.
67 common activities with the USA, however on the under- Yüksel Söylemez, ‘The first testing of Turkey's shared stra- standing that it is treated as a partner, which means less tegic vision with the United States', 23 July 2006, Turkish direct involvement by the USA. Russia is Turkey's second big- Daily News.
gest trade partner; however, this trade exchange is based on the enormous (and still growing) deficit on the Turkish side. Russia's key export commodity is gas, which Turkey de- pends on. Due to unfavourable trade contracts entered into during the 1990s, the gas prices are high and supplies ex- ceed Turkey's demand. Ankara has for several years been try- ing in vain to convince Russia to renegotiate the contracts.
Turkey is interested in diversifying its energy sources, and in the transit of gas and oil from Central Asia without Mos- cow's control. Russia and Turkey also have differing visions of the planned routes of pipelines to go around the straits.
Ankara has curtailed the activity of supporters of Chechen separatists, and Russia that of the PKK sympathisers. How- ever, Russia has not included the PKK in its list of terrorist urkish-US political relations af organisations. In turn, some local AKP activists have sup- ported Chechen separatists. Moscow is the patron of Arme- nia, which Turkey has very bad relations with, and supports Cyprus in the international arena, which has not been re- cognised by Ankara. Most importantly, Moscow is not inte- rested in significantly increasing Turkey's influence in the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia ir the Black Sea re- The cold alliance. T gion, or in Turkey's EU membership. According to Fionna Hill and Ömer Taspinar, ‘As both sides will admit, there is not yet much political substance to their relations. The states are still more natural rivals than regional allies.' Fionna Hill, Ömer Taspinar, Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?, survival.pdf63 Umit Enginsoy, ‘US drops Black Sea plan, Turkey relieved',Turkish Daily News, 8 May 2006.
64 Agata ¸oskot, Turkey – an energy transit corridor to the EU?, CES Studies no. 17, 2004, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/ 65 The Turkish armed forces' equipment includes over 1600 M60 tanks (some of them are older models which have been modernised), over 3300 M-113 armoured personnel carriers, 280 F-16 aircraft and over 150 F-4 aircraft, more than 70 Blackhawk helicopters and 40 Cobra helicopters, and 11 fri- gates built by the United States. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2006; http://www.iiss.
In January 2007, Turkey and the United States signed a me- morandum of understanding for the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, officially making Ankara one of the nine partner states in the production of the next-genera- 1. Over the last four years, Turkey has managed
to implement changes which have significantly
strengthened its economy. This has been possi-
ble thanks to a coincidence of several external and
internal factors, both economic and political. The
prospect of integration with the European Union
has played a pivotal role in improving Turkey's
economic policy and its progress in other fields.
Its effect may last into the future, provided that
the prospect is real. Uncertainties about the ac-
cession negotiations, which are appearing now,
may seriously weaken that same mechanism
which has mobilised Turkish society and its poli-
ticians to carry out reforms. It is still unclear whe-ther the social and political consensus necessary the Turkish economy at for further transformation can be achieved if theprocess of Turkey's integration with the EU finds the onset of negotiations itself in a serious crisis.
with the European Union 2. In terms of demographic and economic poten-
tial, Turkey is comparable to the bloc of 10 states
which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.
Wojciech Paczyƒski The country's development level is still similarto, or even slightly lower, than those of Bulgariaand Romania.
3. For several decades Turkey has been strongly
urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union integrated with the European Union in terms oftrade. The rapid growth in foreign direct invest-ments noticeable since 2005 may be a significantfactor contributing to the modernisation of thecountry.
4. The major challenges Turkey's social and eco-
nomic policy will have to face include ensuring
Chasing Europe: the T good conditions for creating new jobs for peoplewho reach working age or have left agriculture;increasing employment; improving the educationsystem; raising the levels of education & employ-ment of women; and lessening the developmen-tal differences between particular regions.
5. Short-term forecasts for Turkey's economic de-
velopment are optimistic, although a risk of ma-
croeconomic instability cannot be excluded.
1. A brief historical overview ternational Monetary Fund)4. Then Ankara, moni- of the Turkish economy's tored by those institutions, carried out structuralreforms (such as making the central bank inde- development during pendent, amending the banking laws and the twentieth century changing the system of agricultural subsidies),which created favourable conditions for an eco- When the Republic of Turkey was established in nomic stabilisation for the first time in the last 1923, it was a very poor and backward country.
past 25 years.
Between 80% and 90% of its inhabitants werefarmers and could not read or write. Over the sub-sequent eight decades, Turkey has made a civili- 2. General characteristics sational leap. Currently, nearly 30% of its popu- of the present condition lation are employed in agriculture, and only about of the Turkish economy 13% of the country's residents are illiterate. Al-though the civilisational gap between WesternEurope and Turkey has significantly shortened, Turkey is now in a crucial moment of its econo- it is still quite considerable. Since the 1920s, Tur- mic history. As recently as six years ago, follow- key has been developing at an average rate of over ing a very serious financial crisis, its economy 4% annually, yet its per capita GDP growth has was in deep recession, the inflation rate reached been significantly lower (nearly 2.5%). This is an 70% and the public debts exceeded 90% of the effect of high population growth1, the rate of GNP. The depreciation of the Turkish lira by 50%, which has consistently been falling, as well as the interest rates of nearly 100%, the serious break- considerable slowdown in the Turkish economy down in the banking sector and a wave of bank- between the mid-1970s and the beginning of this ruptcies were elements of a rather sad picture.
Nevertheless, recovery from the crisis has appear- From the onset of the Republic until the early ed to be rapid and successful. Beginning in 2002, 1980s, Turkey's economic policy was state-con- Turkey showed fast economic growth and mana- trolled and protectionist. It yielded high economic ged to restore its macroeconomic balance; for the growth, on the average at over 7% annually (with first time in the past 35 years the inflation rate urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union the exception of World War II), although in the has dropped to single digits, and the proportion 1970s, when globalisation of the world's economy of public debt to the GNP has decreased from expanded and the oil shocks took place (in 1973 nearly 100% in 2001 to 55% in 2005.
and 1979), this policy proved inefficient2. In the Turkey owes its recent success to several factors; 1980s, Turgut Özal's government started free- political stabilisation since the 2002 elections, market economic reforms (liberalisation of trade the prospect of European integration and backing & finances and privatisation). However, political from international financial institutions have all Chasing Europe: the T instability (the conflict with Kurdish separatist helped it embark on an ambitious reform pro- guerrilla forces) and the continuation of the popu- gramme. Deep-seated changes in the operation list economic policy by subsequent governments of public finances, the institutional basis of the (including social expenses) caused high inflation monetary policy and labour, commodity and fi- (the average annual rate was nearly 90% in the nancial markets offer an opportunity for Turkey 1990s), the development of the informal economy, to break out of the vicious circle of economic in- high growth of public and foreign debt, and re- stability which the country has been trapped in peated economic crises (1994, 1999 and 2001).
for decades. On the other hand, further reforms, This led the economic growth to be smaller in which are necessary to maintain the high pace comparison with the preceding periods (the ave- of economic growth, reduce delays and bring the rage annual rate in the 1980s and 1990s was country closer to European standards of develop- about 4%)3. The last of these crises was the worst ment will be hard, and successes in this field will in the Republic's history, although Turkey mana- not be easy to achieve.
ged to overcome it thanks to support from inter- The prospect of European integration still plays national financial institutions (principally the In- a key role in stimulating reforms. The European Union's decision to start accession negotiations 3. Turkey as compared with Turkey in December 2004 and the beginning to Europe and the world of the negotiations in October 2005 was an im-portant sign for the government, society and fi- Turkey is one of the largest European countries nancial markets. According to an optimistic sce- in terms of territory and population number. In nario, the mechanism will work for many years 2004, the number of Turkey's inhabitants (over as Turkey will slowly make progress on its way 71 million) was equivalent to over 15% of the po- towards EU membership (which, however, will pulation of the entire European Union. Moreover, not take place any earlier than 2014). However, population growth is much faster in Turkey than on the other hand, a positive outcome of the ac- in EU countries. Between 2003 and 2004, Turkey's cession negotiations is not a foregone conclusion, population grew by as much as 1.5%, while the and the idea of accepting Turkey into the EU re- same rate was at 0.4% in the EU-15 and even low- mains very unpopular in many member states.
er in most of the new member states. Turkish Therefore, making a strong connection between society is very young; the share of people under Turkish reforms and the accession process can also 15 years of age in the total population reached be risky. If the process encounters serious impe- 29.2% in 2004, as compared to 16.2% in the EU-15, diments, either posed by the EU or arising inter- 17% in Poland and 14% in Germany, the latter be- nally in Turkey, confidence in the reforms could ing the only EU country whose population is larg- suddenly be undermined, which may cause seri- er than that of Turkey.
ous unrest or a financial crisis.
Turkey's economic role in Europe is also signifi-cant, albeit definitely smaller than its demogra- phic potential. According to data from the Inter-national Monetary Fund, Turkey's GDP in 2005,calculated according to market currency exchangerates (US$362 billion), is the 19th largest in theworld and 8thlargest among the group of EU mem- urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union Figure 1. GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2000 and 2005 (EU-25 mean = 100)
Chasing Europe: the T Notice: Data for 2005 are forecasts.
ber and candidate states, just behind Belgium. If faster, and so in some areas the differences have the comparison is based on currency exchange increased rather than lessened.
rates which take into account the purchasing po-wer parity (PPP), Turkey would rise to 6th in the A characteristic feature that distinguishes Turkey group of EU member and candidate states, just in from its European partners is its employment stru- front of the Netherlands and Poland. In terms of cture. Nearly 50% of professionally active Turks, GDP per capita, Turkey is the poorest country as including over 30% of non-agricultural workers, compared to the current EU member states and are employed in the informal sector. The under- the candidates to membership engaged in acces- ground economy generates more than a third of sion negotiations, although the differences be- Turkey's GDP7.
tween Turkey and Romania or Bulgaria are very The rate of professional activity in Turkey is much lower than in any EU member state. Moreover,some data indicates that the levels of professional Other standard of living indices do not reach the activity and employment have fallen over recent levels that a developed country would normally years. According to Eurostat's data on economic have. In 2004, life expectancy in Turkey (71) was activity in 2005 (data for the first three quarters), definitely lower than in any other country which only 46% of Turkey's residents aged between 15 belonged to the Organisation for Economic Co- and 64 were employed. This was about 2 to 3 per- operation and Development (OECD). In the same centage points less than in the years 2000–2001.
year, Turkey's infant mortality rate was over three For comparison, the same survey indicated that times higher than the highest in the European the employment rate was at nearly 64% through- OECD member states, namely Slovakia, Poland out the EU, 56% in Bulgaria and 58% in Romania.
This disproportion is an effect of the especially According to the Human Development index pu- low professional activity by women in Turkey blished by the UN, Turkey is 92nd of the 177 coun- which, at 27% in 2006, was less than half of the tries for which the index has been calculated.
respective levels in the EU, Bulgaria or Romania.
For comparison, Poland is 37th, Bulgaria 54th and The low level of professional activity by women Romania 60th 6.
is principally a consequence of the patriarchal and The vast gaps in the level of development be- conservative model of a major part of Turkish so- urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union tween the western and eastern regions of Tur- ciety, and the low education level, which serious- key (which are larger than those in EU member ly diminishes opportunities of employment in ot- states) are a serious problem. This concerns both her sectors than agriculture or the informal eco- the GDP per capita rates and many other human nomy. In effect, uneducated women who migrate development indices such as life expectancy, edu- from rural to urban areas are unable to find legal cation, infant mortality, etc. Moreover, although jobs, and work in the informal sector much more the poorer regions are developing economically, often than men do.
Chasing Europe: the T the richer part of the country is developing even Table 1. Regional differences in Turkey in 2000
East Marmara Region
GDP per capita (PPP) in US$ Total fertility rate Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) Hospital beds per 100,000 residents Rate of illiteracy among the entire population Agricultural employment share Source: Türkiye Istatik Kurumu (Turkish Board of Statistics), http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr
Agricultural employment share, which was 29% make the European Union. For the EU, Turkey is in 2006, twice as much as in Poland and almost now its sixth or seventh biggest trade partner.
six times more than the average in the OECD, is Turkey's other key trade partners, apart from the very high8. However, the share has been dropping EU, are Middle Eastern countries, the USA, China as a consequence of rural-urban migration; as and other Asian states, and Russia, from which recently as six years ago it exceeded 40%.
Turkey imports a significant part of its raw ener- The aforementioned issues give a true picture of gy materials, mainly gas. Russian gas supplies the vast challenges Turkey has to face, the need to meet around 60% of Turkey's demand.
provide conditions to ensure the very fast emer- Since 1996, Turkey has been the only country with gence of new jobs (mainly in the services sector) which the EU has a customs union. The customs for legions of young people and emigrants from union does not cover trade in agricultural or steel rural areas, and to reduce the informal sector.
industry products (these areas of trade are regu- In comparison to EU member and candidate states, lated under separate agreements), or service ex- Turkey has much poorer results in the fields ofeducation and investment in human resources.
Nearly 13% of its residents cannot read or write, Figure 2. Geographic structure of Turkish exports,
percentage shares (2005)
and the illiteracy rate among women is even high-er, reaching nearly 20%. Regardless of significantthe progress which has been made in this field,pre-school education is at a level several timeslower than in EU member states; nearly 10% ofchildren between the ages of 6 and 14 (predomi- nantly girls) do not go to school, and despite re-cent enormous changes the disproportion in thenumbers of male and female students at secon-dary schools and higher education facilities is stillsignificant. Improving the accessibility, universa-lity and quality of education, especially women'seducation, is of key importance for many econo- urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union mic and social processes in Turkey. For example, Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
the problem of the low professional activity bywomen in cities does not concern women with Figure 3. Geographic structure of Turkish imports,
higher education at all, and affects female secon- percentage shares (2005)
dary-school graduates only to a limited extent.
4. Trade integration with the EU Chasing Europe: the T and direct foreign investments Turkey is very strongly integrated with the Euro-pean Union in terms of trade. In 2005, over 52%of total Turkish exports went to the 25 memberstates. Over 42% of its total imports came fromthe EU. Turkey also has quite strong trade rela-tions with Romania and Bulgaria (nearly 4% of ex-ports and 3% of imports), which are about to jointhe Union in 2007. Trade integration with the EU Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
is not a recent issue; from as early as the 1950s,nearly half of total Turkey's foreign trade hasbeen carried on with the 25 countries which now change (this is not regulated under any agree- pean countries also shows Turkey in a disadvan- ment). The union has caused not only a signifi- tageous light. In 2004, Moldova and Greece were cant growth in the trade exchange between Tur- the only two countries to have lower FDI-to-GDP key and the EU but also a deepening trade deficit rates than Turkey. However, the results for the on the Turkish side. Practically, the customs union years 2005–2006 and forecasts for the immediate obliges Turkey to adjust its trade policy to that of future are much more optimistic11. In 2005 the the European Union. In the EU's opinion, Turkey FDI influx (including real estate) reached US$9.8 has failed to meet all its commitments related to billion. The amount for 2006 exceeded a record- the operation of the customs union9. Turkey has breaking level of US$20 billion. For comparison, the also signed free trade agreements with EFTA and total value of foreign investments made in Turkey with several countries in the Mediterranean Sea before 1999 was as low as US$2.1 billion, and in- region (including Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ma- creased in the period 2000–2004 to US$10 billion.
cedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).
Approximately 75% of the FDI flowing into Turkeybetween 2000 and 2006 came from the EU. In turn, Turkey mainly exports textiles to the EU (making the absolute majority of Turkish investments went up nearly 40% of its total exports), while the to the European Union. Turkey is an important Union's key export merchandise to Turkey are ma- partner for EU investors in the strategic energy chines and equipment (28%) and chemical pro- sector, since it can become a transit state, and ducts (16%). Turkish imports from Russia are do- thus enable the diversification of energy supplies minated by raw energy materials (over 70%) and for the EU. In May 2005, Austrian, Bulgarian, Ro- manian, Turkish and Hungarian companies sign- A relatively large part of Turkish foreign trade is ed an agreement to construct the Nabucco pipe- officially unregistered, and so the statistical data line, to enable gas supplies from the Middle East quoted above should be seen as giving only an ap- and Asia to run through Turkey to the Balkans and proximate picture of the trade structure. This ob- Central Europe. At the same time, Turkish foreign viously has a great impact on the operation of investments were increasing; between 1999 and some commodity markets, as well as serious fiscal 2005, Turkey invested nearly US$5.7 billion abroad.
consequences. For example, liquid fuel smugglingis a big problem. As a consequence of very heavy It cannot be said that Turkey's lower FDI inflows urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union tax levies, petrol and diesel oil prices in Turkey are are caused by the activity of foreign investors be- higher than in most OECD countries10. The large- ing hindered. Turkey has one of the most liberal scale smuggling causes serious problems to oil regulations of the OECD countries concerning such sector companies, especially as this is happening investments. However, a real barrier is posed by while reforms intended to improve the operation problems which all enterprises, domestic and fo- of the sector are being conducted, and where the reign, have to face, namely red tape, a weak judi- rapid growth of domestic demand should be con- ciary authority, changing regulations, including Chasing Europe: the T tributing to new companies entering the refinery tax regulations, and corruption. The factors which discouraged investors in the past were the rather Exports of services, especially tourist services, are unpredictable political situation and a lack of ma- growing rapidly. Turkey has become a popular de- croeconomic stability. In the World Bank's Doing stination for European tourists. Between 2001 and Business in 2007, which ranked 175 countries ac- 2004, sales of tourist services doubled. 21.2 mil- cording to the ease of doing business (regulations lion tourists visited Turkey in 2005, most of who and practice), Turkey was 91st, a position that – came from the EU and candidate states. However, in comparison with EU member and candidate the latest statistical data indicates that the num- states – was better only than that of Croatia, Ma- ber of tourists for 2006 will be lower by nearly cedonia and Greece12. In the Transparency Inter- national 2006 report, which presented the per- In contrast to the new EU member states and can- ception of corruption in 146 countries, Turkey re- didates to membership, the level of foreign direct ceived 3.8 points on the 1–10 scale, which put it investments in Turkey was relatively low until ahead of Croatia, Macedonia, Poland and Roma- recently. Comparison to other South-Eastern Euro- nia. In the Economic Freedom 2007 report prepared by the Heritage Foundation, Turkey's economy parliamentary elections) is of key importance to was determined as ‘mostly unfree'. The countries minimise the risk of financial instability.
among EU member and candidate states to have The institutional background of the monetary po- received worse results than Turkey were Croatia, licy changed as of January 2006, when Turkey join- Greece and Poland. Only these four countries were ed the group of countries which have adopted the ranked as countries whose economies are mostly direct inflation targeting strategy. The central unfree13. Therefore, eliminating these shortcom- bank announced target inflation levels at 5% for ings is the key to increasing FDI inflows, which the end of 2006, and of about 4% for the end of would contribute to the modernisation and struc- 2007 and 2008. However, the significant reduc- tural transformation of the Turkish economy.
tion of the price of the Turkish currency in Mayand June 2006 is likely to raise inflation in the se-cond half of 2006 and in 2007. Maintaining and 5. Current economic trends reinforcing the reputation of the central bank asa successful inflation stopper and achieving a sta- Turkey has shown strong economic growth since ble low level of inflation expectations are the hard 2002. Over that time it has managed to achieve tasks which the monetary authorities will have macroeconomic stabilisation, which gives hope that these good trends will be continued in the The current high influx of capital to Turkey is a future (Figure 4).
sign that investors believe that this country hasgood prospects. However, this influx also poses The structural change to the inflation mecha- challenges to the country's economic policy due nisms which enabled price stabilisation was pos- to the growing current account deficit (over 6% sible inter alia thanks to fiscal reforms. After the of the GDP in 2005) and the pressure of apprecia- period of double-digit deficits in the public finance tion on the lira. In addition to a cautious fiscal sector in 1999–2003, the deficit was reduced to policy, reforms must be undertaken which will just under 2% of the GDP in 2005. The continua- increase the adjustability and competitiveness of tion of a responsible fiscal policy in the immedi- the Turkish economy.
ate future (regardless of the results of upcoming urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union Figure 4. GDP growth and average annual inflation between 1999 and 2005
Chasing Europe: the T GDP growth
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook database and Turkish Statistical Institute
living, and on the other, much more ‘modern' ur-ban communities associated with the services Short- and mid-term forecasts for Turkey are rela- sector and partly with industry. Creating condi- tively optimistic. Strong domestic demand, includ- tions for the better social integration of women ing investments encouraged by low interest rates, is also a task that cannot wait.
makes it possible to continue the economic growthat the annual level of 4% to 5% in 2006 and 2007.
The scale of the problems and the very ambitious Considering the weakening of the lira, inflation goal of EU membership have obliged Turkish po- at the end of 2006 is likely to reach a higher level liticians and Turkish society in general to take on than that targeted by the central bank. Still, there very difficult tasks. Previous reforms have been is a chance that the inflation growth will only be successful inter alia thanks to the existence of temporary. The low public-finance sector deficit a clear goal, namely EU membership. The way will enable further reduction of the public debt- Turkish politicians and the EU use the accession to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, the risk still exists of negotiations as a mechanism to mobilise reform a financial destabilisation that may prevent this efforts may decide on the prospects of the coun- optimistic scenario from being realised (proof to try's development in the next decade. The Euro- this being the size of the current account deficit pean Union is aware of this fact, at least at the le- and the debt structure). Continuation of an ambi- vel of official publications. The Communiqué from tious and internally consistent reform programme the European Commission of November 2005 no- is therefore vital.
tes that ‘in Turkey, the effectiveness of conditio- The key goals of Turkey's economic policy are clo- nality in driving reforms depends on maintaining sely related to its ambition to join the European a credible political perspective for eventual inte- Union, and to the task of reducing the develop- gration into the Union. Aspirant countries can ment differences and achieving a level similar to best sustain public support for bold and often those of EU member states. The following four painful reforms when the EU supports them, main areas of the country's developmental chal- works with them, and keeps its own promises'16.
lenges can be distinguished: (January 2007) – a stable and responsible macroeconomic policy, – fair social and human resources development, CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union – a good business climate, and Co-operation Adam Balcer – a system for managing natural environmentand disaster responses14.
Limiting the state's role in the economy (by con-tinuing privatisation) and reducing the scope ofthe informal economy appear to be the major Chasing Europe: the T tasks for the economic policy. It is estimated thatas much as one-third of urban workers, and up tothree-quarters of those working in rural areas, arenot registered in the social insurance system15.
In the longer term, further improvement of theeducation sector is also a serious challenge, consi-dering the role education plays in preparing youngpeople to function in society, and in particular onthe labour market. It is also essential to continuework on increasing social integration; contem-porary Turkey is to a great extent divided on theone hand into traditional rural communities(mainly farmers), characterised by very weak tieswith the state institutions and low standards of 1 Turkey's population increased nearly six times, from 12million to 72 million, between 1923 and 2006.
2 Between 1970 and 1979, the average annual inflation rategrew from less than 10 percent in the preceding period to 25%. Turkey's foreign debt rose from US$2 billion to US$14 billion. The levels of public debt and the trade deficit signi- ficantly increased. Deniz Akagül, ‘L'economie turque depuis l'avencement de la République: performances ou contre-per- formances', in La Turquie, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp.
4 Ankara concluded three financial agreements covering asa total US$40 billion with the IMF in 1999, 2002 and 2005.
So far, it has borrowed over US$30 billion from the IMF.
http:// www.internationalmonetaryfound.org5 Ibid.
6 UNDP (2006), Human Development Report 2006, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf7 Teoman Pamuk˜u, Ahmet Hasim Köse, ‘L'Èconomie grise', inLa Turquie, ed. Samih Vaner, Paris 2005. pp. 468–470.
8 The agricultural sector (in contrast to Poland) also has a si-gnificant share in generating added value in the economy, up to almost 12% in 2003 (compared to 3% in Poland), al- though the values are not really comparable. In absolute va- lues, Turkey has the largest agricultural population among all the other candidates to EU membership. On the other hand, the agricultural employment share in employment as a whole is higher in Romania than in Turkey. It is worth ad- ding that as recently as the early 1980s, most professional- ly active people in Turkey worked in the agricultural sector.
OECD, OECD in Figures 2005 Edition, Paris 2006.
9 A discussion of this subject has been presented amongother documents in the European Commission's Turkey 2005 urkish economy at the onset of negotiations with the European Union ort_tr.pdf10 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Coun-tries. Turkey 2005 Review, Paris 2005.
11 US Department of State, 2005 Investment Climate Sta-tement: Turkey, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/12 Doing Business in 2007, http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings/Default.aspx?direction=asc&sort=1 _ Chasing Europe: the T 13 The ranking considers the following criteria: propertyrights, regulation, informal economy, prices and wages, bank- ing and finance, foreign investments, fiscal policy, state in- terventionism, trade and taxes. Heritage Foundation, 2007 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.org14 World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy Progress Reportfor the Republic of Turkey for the Period FY 2004 – 2007, 2005, World Bank, Turkey – Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 33549-TR, 2006, http:// www.worldbank.org.tr15 World Bank, Turkey – Labor Market Study, Report No.
33254-TR, 2006, www.worldbank.org.tr16 European Commission, Communication from the Com-mission. Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM (2005) 561, Brussels, 9 November 2005.
International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 23S1 (2004) S67–S74 Bacterial biofilm formation on urologic devices and heparin coating as preventive strategy Peter Tenke , Claus R. Riedl , Gwennan Ll. Jones , Gareth J. Williams , David Stickler , Elisabeth Nagy a Department of Urology, Jahn Ferenc South-Pest Hospital, H-1204 Budapest, Köves u. 2-4, Hungary b Department of Urology, Thermenklinikum Baden, Baden, Austria