PAPER NO. 1 — JULY 2013 Reimaging the Internet:
The Need for a High-level Strategic
Vision for Internet Governance
Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPERS
PAPER NO. 1 — JULY 2013
Reimaging the Internet:
The Need for a High-level Strategic
Vision for Internet Governance
Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith
Copyright 2013 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Operating Board of Directors or International Board of Governors.
This work was carried out with the support of The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution — Non-commercial — No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit ( by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright notice.
Cover and page design by Steve Cross.
CIGI gratefully acknowledges the support of the Copyright Collective of CONTENTS
About the Authors
About Organized Chaos: Reimagining the Internet Project Executive Summary The Need for a High-level Strategic Vision for Internet Governance, 2015–2020 The Legacy System of Internet Governance Global Governance, Rule-making and the Future of the Internet Toward a Comprehensive, Research-based Vision for Internet Governance 15 Internet Governance PaPers
Mark Raymond
his personal involvement with the G7/G8, as the Sherpa (personal representative) for the prime minister at the G7/ Mark Raymond joined CIGI as a research fellow in August G8 summits in Halifax, Lyon and Denver. After retiring 2012. He has a B.A. in political science and international from the Government of Canada that same year, Gordon relations from the University of Western Ontario and an joined the University of Victoria as executive director of M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University the Centre for Global Studies (CFGS), and was appointed of Toronto, and he has taught international relations at chair of the board of governors at the International the University of Toronto and the University of Waterloo. Development Research Centre. During this period, he also His research interests include international law and lectured as a visiting professor at the Diplomatic Academy organization, international security and international of the University of Westminster in London and Paris. history, including the history of global governance.
After collaborating with the think tank for many years At CIGI, Mark contributes to the Global Security Program. on various projects, Gordon joined CIGI in 2010 as a Specifically, he is developing CIGI's work in the area of distinguished fellow, and has since been a key contributor Internet security and governance.
to its G20 research activities, events and publications. Gordon Smith
He looks forward to continuing this work at CIGI, and pursuing another long-time interest: the convergence of A political science graduate of McGill University (B.A.) technology and global affairs (you can follow Gordon on and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Ph.D.), Gordon Smith became interested in international security and global interdependence while attending university in the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. After graduation, Gordon returned to Canada to work on these issues, and began a long and distinguished career as a public servant with the federal government.
Initially, Gordon worked on Canada's relationship with NATO and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) within the Ministry of Defence and Department of External Affairs, but he quickly advanced to more demanding positions in the Privy Council Office. In 1979, Gordon became the deputy under-secretary of state at External Affairs, and in 1985, deputy minister. Shortly thereafter, he was dispatched to Brussels as the permanent representative and ambassador to the Canadian delegation to NATO, and subsequently, was named Canada's ambassador to the European Union.
Returning to Canada in 1994, Gordon was appointed deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, where he fondly remembers establishing a global issues bureau in the ministry to better understand emerging transnational trends affecting Canada. During this time, Gordon began Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
Distributed Denial of Service Governmental Advisory Committee (ICANN) Historically, Internet governance has been Group of 77 (United Nations) accomplished en passant. It has emerged largely from Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and the actions of computer scientists and engineers, in interaction with domestic legal and regulatory Internet Engineering Task Force systems. Beginning at least with the 2003–2005 Internet service providers World Summit on the Information Society process, International Telecommunications Regulations however, there has been an explicit rule-making agenda at the international level. This strategic International Telecommunications Union agenda is increasingly driven by a coalition of states Organisation for Economic Co-operation and — including Russia, China and the Arab states — that is organized and has a clear, more state-controlled and monetary vision for the Internet. Advanced World Conference on International industrial democracies and other states committed to existing multi-stakeholder mechanisms have a World Summit on the Information Society different view — they regard Internet governance as important, but generally lack coherent strategies for Internet governance — especially at the international level. Given the Internet's constant evolution and its economic, political and social importance as a public good, this situation is clearly untenable.
A coherent strategy is needed to ensure that difficult trade-offs between competing interests, as well as between distinct public values, are managed in a consistent, transparent and accountable manner that accurately reflects public priorities. Guided by these considerations, CIGI researchers believe they can play a constructive role in creating a strategy for states committed to multi-stakeholder models of Internet governance.
In aiming to develop this strategy, the project members will consider what kind of Internet the world wants in 2020, and will lay the analytical groundwork for future Internet governance discussions, most notably the upcoming decennial review of the World Summit on the Information Society. This project was launched in 2012. The Internet Governance Paper series will result in the publication of a book in early 2014.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
Internet governance is increasingly the stuff of INTERNET GOVERNANCE,
"high politics." As the Internet has become more 2015–2020
important, existing stakeholders have identified new interests; new entrants to the policy space, including The Internet has never been an ungoverned space. a number of emerging market states, are bringing Even in its earliest days, it had "rules of the road." their interests and distinct values to bear. This paper In fact, if not for such rules, the Internet would argues that the contemporary politics of Internet not — could not — exist. Peering agreements, the governance are best understood as a complex, high- naming and numbering system, and packet handling stakes case of rule-making. The key question is how protocols are only some of the critical rules that make to refine and update Internet governance given a the Internet possible and regulate its operation. secular increase in state interest, geopolitical rivalry, Equally important, however, is the observation the existence of legacy institutions and high levels that current standards are not the only possible set of civil society engagement. This task is complicated of such arrangements. As Laura DeNardis (2009) by the fact that participants have diverging views on explained in Protocol Politics, technical protocols are legitimate procedures for making, interpreting and applying rules. Understanding Internet governance The novel nature of the technology, combined with as rule-making yields two other insights. First, the an initial lack of obvious mass social purposes, Internet is not governed by a single set of rules. provided the researchers, engineers and other Accordingly, the view that the Internet is a commons technologists that comprised the bulk of the original should be set aside in favour of the image of a series Internet community with a great deal of autonomy in of overlapping voluntary and involuntary groupings creating and operating its first governance structure.1 governed by multiple sets of rules. Second, openness Early Internet governance arrangements were thus to employing informal rules and soft law instruments primarily the product of a decentralized social offers advantages in allowing policy makers time network in which authority emerged on the basis of to learn about the implications of alternative rules specialized expertise, and problems were typically for Internet governance and in allowing procedural understood as exclusively technical in nature.2 flexibility. The paper concludes by articulating the need for a high-level strategic vision for Internet As a result of the social endowments provided governance. The CIGI Internet Governance Papers by these "parental" influences, current Internet series aims to provide world-class research that can underpin the creation of such a vision.
For an overview of this history, see Barry M. Leiner et al. (2012), "A Brief History of the Internet," available at: www.internetsociety.
Such networks or "epistemic communities" have been previously studied by international relations scholars in other issue areas. See, for example, Peter M. Haas (1992), "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1: 1–35.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE governance arrangements reflect a particular set of the change has not yet been determined. Second, of values: resilience, openness and interoperability, the last seven to 10 years have seen considerable high potential for anonymity, content neutrality maturation of Internet services aimed at mass and disregard for national borders in the routing of publics — e-commerce, social networking and cloud information between users. These values are at odds, computing are obvious examples. Third, multiple at least in some significant respects, not only with critical infrastructure systems are now dependent domestic expectations in some states about freedom on the Internet in significant, albeit varying, ways: of expression and the handling of information, but financial markets and banks, oil and gas production also with central rules and norms of the international and distribution networks, as well as power grids system, including classical understandings of state are vulnerable, as are major transportation and logistics systems. Fourth, there has been significant expansion of what might be termed the Internet's These tensions were emerging by the time of the "dark side." This label includes an array of activities initial World Summit on the Information Society performed by a variety of actors for a number of (WSIS), which met in Geneva in 2003 for its first purposes; the common thread is that they are socially phase, with the second phase held in Tunis in 2005. undesirable. Cybercrime — including fraud, identity In the intervening years, a number of trends have theft, and the creation and operation of illegal combined to exacerbate these issues. First, Internet botnets — is becoming increasingly widespread technology penetration rates have increased and more sophisticated (Glenny, 2011). Multiple significantly in all but the most authoritarian and reports have shed light on cyber-espionage practices impoverished states.4 This trend is almost certain to conducted either by states or state agents. There are continue; however, even today the changing cultural recent indications that these activities have moved composition of global Internet users means that new beyond information gathering to include probing voices (and in some cases different values) are being for vulnerabilities in both government and private heard in Internet governance debates and processes. sector networks (Information Warfare Monitor, 2009; This can be expected to result in a differently Mandiant, 2013). Further, although the evidence is governed Internet — although the nature and extent fragmentary, there is reason to suspect that several states have conducted or authorized actual cyber On sovereignty, see Jens Bartelson (1995), A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hedley Bull (1977), The Anarchical Society, New York: Columbia University Press; Andreas Osiander (2001), "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," International Organization 55, no. 2: 251–287; Daniel Philpott (2001), Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press; and Hendrik Spruyt (1996), The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
For one estimate, see World Bank, "World Development Indicators," Internet Users (per 100 people), available at http://data.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE attacks.5 More governments are working to establish Internet governance and to generate demand for a and enhance their capabilities to conduct such more global alternative.
The desire to extend state control over Internet As a result of these pressures and tensions, as governance is widely shared, even by advanced well as the desire to monetize the Internet to industrial economies. The Internet is now simply too their advantage (or at least the advantage of their important to leave entirely to the technologists. There corporations), states have increasingly become are, however, significant differences among states determined to exert influence and authority over with respect to their preferences over the substantive Internet governance. The contractual arrangement content of such change. The December 2012 World between the National Telecommunications and Conference on International Telecommunications Information Administration (part of the United (WCIT) held in Dubai, confirmed the existence of States Department of Commerce) and the Internet complex fault lines in the international community.
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers A broad coalition led by Russia and China (ICANN), the California-based non-profit that engineered the adoption of updated International oversees naming and numbering, has also served to Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) as well complicate the legitimacy of the current system for as International Telecommunications Union (ITU) resolutions affirming an expanded state role in Internet governance, and empowering the ITU to On Stuxnet, see David Sanger (2012), "Obama Order further debate and discuss Internet issues. This Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," New York Times, June 1, coalition attracted broad participation from the developing world, including key support from Arab states; however, it also included key emerging =2&seid=auto&smid=tw-nytimespolitics&pagewanted=all. On the economies such as South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Mahdi malware, see Nicole Perlroth (2012), "Cyber Attacks from Iran and Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. A smaller group Gaza on Israel More Threatening than Anonymous's Efforts," Bits Blog, of states (including key advanced industrial democracies such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand, efforts/. On the Flame malware, see Nicole Perlroth (2012), "Researchers joined by a number of other states including India Find Clues in Malware," New York Times, May 30, available at: www.
and Kenya) refused to accept either the new ITRs or the accompanying non-binding resolutions stuxnet-and-duqu.html. For information on the Aramco attacks, see (Pfanner, 2012).
Nicole Perlroth (2012), "In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees Iran There are, undoubtedly, power politics at play in Firing Back," New York Times, October 23, available at: www.nytimes.
producing these coalitions. Russia and China seek to relocate Internet governance to an institution disquiets-us.html?pagewanted=all. Russia is thought to have employed in which American influence is attenuated, at least offensive cyber operations against both Estonia and Georgia. See, in comparison to its current legal and normative respectively, "A Cyber-riot" (2007), The Economist, May 10, available at: dominance of ICANN and its normative influence, and John Markoff (2008), "Before over the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The the Gunfire, Cyberattacks," New York Times, August 12, available at: United States clearly understands and opposes this Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE attempt by the Russians and the Chinese. In another to unwelcome efforts to change the status quo.6 indication that the two coalitions are not separated Broader civil society groups are also becoming purely by principle, the advanced industrial increasingly engaged. A range of corporate interests democracies have greatly expanded their technical are pursuing their own agendas, some of which are and legal ability to monitor both the online activity in direct conflict. Network operators, Internet service of their own citizens and of foreigners, often over the companies, equipment manufacturers, intellectual objections of domestic civil society groups. Attempts property holders, insurers and others all have to enforce intellectual property laws have also significant stakes in Internet governance outcomes. drawn determined opposition (Wortham, 2012). The The divisions among corporate actors are geographic existence and success of that opposition, however, is as well as sectoral. Legacy telecommunication firms a clear indicator that value-based differences among (many of them state-owned and many of these in the states on Internet governance issues remain highly developing world) face daunting competition from consequential. It is not purely a cynical matter of the migration of voice communication to Internet national advantage-seeking.
networks; network operators in some areas of the developing world (such as the Middle East) also act The contemporary politics of Internet governance are as key intermediaries for the routing of information also not as simple as the impression that emerged between advanced industrial economies, and of mutually exclusive camps from the WCIT, for a are eager to monetize this transshipment role. number of reasons. Eighty-nine states signed the This heterogeneous array of interested actors 2012 ITRs, while 55 states announced publicly that simultaneously complicates the process of reaching they would not. This leaves roughly 50 (admittedly agreement and creates opportunities for the assembly minor) states officially undecided on the matter. of unorthodox coalitions.
Further, even the signatories need to complete the process of ratifying the treaty. Some may yet be Capitalizing on these various opportunities to update persuaded to reconsider. Most important, while the and refine global governance of the Internet will WCIT matters, it is hardly the final word on Internet require skillful, coordinated diplomacy in a protracted governance. Indeed, 2013 has already seen modest and contentious process of rule-making that has success at the World Technology Policy Forum in clear implications for human rights, the future course Geneva, as well as positive developments from the of the global economy and for international security. United Nations Group of Governmental Experts. This paper aims to contribute to this process. It The 2013 Internet Governance Forum, 2014 ITU begins with a brief description of the incumbent Plenipotentiary and the ongoing decennial review Internet governance institutions, and then provides of the WSIS (culminating in 2015) will also provide an analysis of prospects for rule-making in Internet opportunities for further progress.
governance. It concludes by articulating the need for Finally, Internet governance is not only a function of state positions. Elements of the global community of Internet users have shown they are prepared 6 For example, the WCIT spawned Distributed Denial of to engage in disruptive behaviour in response Service (DDoS) attacks against the ITU website. See Associated Press (2012), "Hackers Said to Hit United Nations Telecoms Talks in Dubai," Huffington Post, December 12, available at: www.huffingtonpost.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE a high-level strategic vision of Internet governance Instagram or Flickr, among others). Both ISPs consistent with democratic values and human rights.
and OTT providers are, increasingly, called on to THE LEGACY SYSTEM OF
engage with law enforcement and security services to provide information about the activities of their users. Finally, governments play an often indirect Discussion of Internet governance tends to focus role in governing the Internet, largely through law disproportionately on ICANN, which plays a central, enforcement activity, competition policy and judicial but limited, role in administering the global system review of individual lawsuits.
of naming and addressing. There is a range of other The critical point is that Internet governance is key actors that also play indispensable governance complex and highly decentralized, as illustrated roles. Among them are a number of other non-state by the examples above. Efforts to cut through this actors. The IETF develops, approves and promulgates complexity typically begin and end with the assertion vital technical standards that govern packet handling that the Internet is governed in a "multi-stakeholder" and exchange, among other issues. The World Wide (rather than a multilateral) fashion. A great deal of Web Consortium (known as W3C) plays a similar care should be taken when using this terminology, standard-setting role specifically for the Web. for three reasons.
Without uniform standards, the Internet would not be globally interoperable. If standards were not of First, it is certainly true that non-state actors, both high quality, the Internet would have diminished for-profit and not-for-profit, play critical roles in functionality.
Internet governance; however, this is not unique to this issue area. Private actors play major governance In addition, private network operators (including roles with respect to the global financial system, commercial Internet service providers [ISPs] and the International Committee of the Red Cross companies that provide "over-the-top" [OTT] online plays an important role in managing the legal services , such as Google or Instagram) also perform regime governing conduct in armed conflict, and governance roles. For example, interconnection NGOs help individual states and international between network operators is privately governed, organizations provide crucial goods and services to often on the basis of informal, unwritten agreements large populations in the developing world. Each of that provide for the exchange of traffic on the basis these issues (finance, laws of war and development) of reciprocity rather than payment. This practice is could thus be described, to varying degrees, as referred to as "settlement-free peering." To facilitate examples of multi-stakeholder governance.
stable, low-cost exchange of traffic, industry has also played a key role (alongside the Internet Society, known Second, these examples illustrate that the as ISOC, and the ITU) in encouraging the creation involvement of multiple kinds of stakeholders is not and maintenance of Internet exchange points. OTT sufficient to ensure good governance. The aftermath service providers perform content filtering by virtue of the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the perils of their roles as information intermediaries. Terms of industry self-regulation or regulatory capture; of service adopted by large market players shape similarly, the highly uneven record of international what a user will see online, whether in search results development efforts shows that a combination of (for example, Google, Yahoo or Bing), in streaming state and non-state actors is not necessarily able to video (YouTube) or shared photos (Facebook, deliver goods and services efficiently or effectively. Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE "Multi-stakeholderism" must not be seen as a that global governance consists of attempts to make, panacea. It also must not become an ideological alter, interpret and apply social rules. In the modern commitment or article of faith.
international system, this is accomplished by drawing on established (but sometimes unwritten) Third, the "multi-stakeholder" descriptor is procedural rules drawn from international law and indeterminate — even within the Internet diplomacy (Raymond, 2011).
governance issue area, there are various kinds of multi-stakeholder governance. ICANN and the Our entire social world is made possible by sets of IETF can usefully be treated as limiting cases for written and unwritten rules that direct our behaviour, the purpose of illustration. ICANN has a relatively shape our identities and define basic categories formal governance structure headed by a board and that determine the horizons of the possible. For a chief executive officer; board seats are allocated to example, the rules of chess define the objective or particular stakeholder groups. The management is purpose of the game, establish conditions for victory also counselled by a number of advisory committees. and simultaneously empower and constrain the Among these, the Governmental Advisory player to move pieces in various ways. These rules Committee (GAC) is accorded special rights and shape players' behaviour in ways they may not fully powers by virtue of the fact that it represents states. realize. It would be strange to imagine a chess player When the GAC issues formal advice to the board, physically threatening or attacking an opponent. the board is obligated either to accept this advice Even the thought of doing so simply would not occur or to justify its decision to the GAC and enter a to most players and, if suggested, would likely be reconciliation process. In contrast, the IETF is much less formalized and more consensus-based. The IETF Like chess, rule-making in diplomacy and global does not have a formal membership structure, has governance is a social game governed by rules. This a modest secretariat and its decisions on particular rule-making game has extremely high stakes. The standards are made in the "Request for Comments" power and durability of rules ensure that the creation, process that emphasizes technical soundness alteration and interpretation of rules are some of the and expert consensus. Finally, people participate most intensely political human activities. The power in IETF processes in their capacity as individuals to write the rules amounts to ruling over others.7 rather than as representatives of organizations. Multi-stakeholder bodies thus vary in the kinds of stakeholders included and in the authority relations On rules in social life and specifically in international between those stakeholders. This variation means relations, see Nicholas Greenwood Onuf (1989), World of Our Making: that understanding how a particular domain of Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: Internet governance operates is impossible without University of South Carolina Press, and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1991), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, RULE-
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge: MAKING AND THE FUTURE OF
Cambridge University Press. On the connection between rule-making THE INTERNET
and power, see also Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), "Power in International Politics," International Organization 59, no. 1: 39–75. The conceptual starting point of this paper, and of Finally, on rules about rule-making, see H.L.A. Hart (1994), The Concept CIGI's Internet Governance project as a whole, is of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE Internet governance has been complicated by the this view of procedures for rule-making resembles collision of at least five different sets of procedural rules. The first, employed most consistently by Third, some basic similarities on procedural rules the Organisation for Economic Co-operation can be identified among the members of the and Development (OECD) states, is drawn from Group of 77 (G-77).9 While this group of states is international law and diplomacy. These rules have culturally heterodox, they can generally be said to increasingly been codified, in large part due to the prioritize the principle of sovereign equality and to work of the International Law Commission, which be highly concerned about issues of equity. These played a significant role in the development of the commitments reflect the colonial experiences of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the vast majority of G-77 members.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, among other instruments. The International Court of Justice These alternate interpretations of legitimate has also played a key role in establishing procedures procedural rules nevertheless bear a clear family for determining, interpreting and applying both resemblance in that they accord a central place to treaty law and customary international law. The states. In contrast, there are two sets of procedural result is a set of generally well-understood (if rules that do not do so. The rejection of a role, admittedly not always followed) procedural rules. or at least a privileged role, for states in Internet These rules require good faith conduct, encourage governance is, in some respects, part and parcel of what has been called "thick multilateralism" and a democratizing trend in international relations; specifically empower states as the actors competent this pattern has been repeated across a number to make, change, interpret and apply rules, either of issue areas, including trade, the environment, directly or by delegating these tasks to international human rights, global economic governance and organizations and other agents.8 even international security (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; O'Brien et al., 2000; Khagram, Riker and A second set of rules is embraced most prominently Sikkink, 2002; Price, 1998; Glasius, 2006). One early by Russia and China, the core members of the expression of these ideas can be found in John Perry Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russian Barlow's 1996 articulation of "A Declaration of the and Chinese conduct suggests a preference for Independence of Cyberspace." 10 procedural rules that accord the state significant latitude (both with respect to domestic actors and Corporate procedural rules are hierarchical in nature, to international monitoring, whether by other states entail executive decision making that is subject to or by international organizations) and that privilege investor oversight and are rooted in contract law. great powers over secondary states. In many respects, These rules shape the understanding and approach The G-77 is a working coalition of developing states in the On "thick multilateralism," see John Gerard Ruggie (1992), United Nations. It now includes 132 active members; for a current list, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization 46, no. 3: 561–598. For further discussion, see Christian Reus-Smit (1999), The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, To read the full text of "A Declaration of the Independence and Institutional Rationality in International Relations, Princeton: of Cyberspace," see: barlow/Declaration-Final.
Princeton University Press.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE of key players such as network operators, equipment of Internet users, including other states. At a manufacturers, software companies and companies minimum, this is a powerful rhetorical weapon. that provide online services (for example, Google Second, existing procedural rules provided a basis and Facebook).
to exclude hacktivists and many other segments of civil society from WCIT negotiations. Third, this Finally, there is a distinct view on legitimate decision sparked DDoS attacks on the ITU website procedures for rule-making in the technology during the conference, and has arguably made community. This view emphasizes distributed, peer- further such disruptions more likely in the future. produced rule-making on the basis of rough consensus. Fourth, whether as the result of a daring attempt Influence and authority are typically derived from to manipulate procedural rules or a lack of social expertise rather than organizational roles, and claim competence in utilizing them, negotiations on to represent a community or financial interest. These the updated ITRs collapsed over a controversial views have sparked determined opposition to state procedural move, in which what was purported involvement in Internet governance on the part of to be an informal poll was treated ex post facto as "hacktivist" groups, and have led them to minimize an official and authoritative vote on an important substantive differences between the positions of question, in contravention of the ITU's established states (Coleman, forthcoming 2013). Whether such tradition of consensus decisions (Pfanner, 2012). a system would be workable at the global level or This incident led, finally, to the rejection of the ITRs broadly accepted as legitimate by mass publics is and the accompanying resolutions by a significant beside the point, which is that these expectations minority of states, including the bulk of the advanced (however unrealistic they may be in the short term) are driving the reactions and behaviour of these actors, as well as (in more muted form) the views Under established international procedural rules, of legacy institutions of Internet governance such as this outcome could potentially significantly ICANN and the IETF.
complicate international telecommunications, as it creates a situation where there will be two treaties The existence of these distinct views on how to concurrently in force on the same subject matter. legitimately make and interpret rules for Internet Such situations are explicitly contemplated by Article governance has had, and will continue to have, 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.11 significant effects on actual outcomes. A full The general approach is to determine applicable accounting of these is beyond the scope of this rules of law according to the treaty in force between paper, but a few significant examples can be the specific states involved in a particular instance briefly enumerated. First, while it is unlikely that of conduct governed under the treaties. This general the relationship between ICANN and the US approach yields four possible cases: where both government is the source of Russian and Chinese states are parties only to the 1988 ITRs, those terms desires for alternate Internet governance bodies, apply; where one state is party only to the 1988 the relationship causes significant political unease ITRs and the other is party to both the 1988 and in a range of states because it raises concerns over state sovereignty. Specifically, the concern is that the United States is able to unilaterally make The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is decisions that affect the entire global community available at: Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2012 ITRs, the 1988 ITRs apply; where both states procedural rules also greatly complicates what is are parties to the 2012 ITRs, those terms apply; and already a daunting task. This suggests the need to where one state is party only to the 1988 ITRs and focus consciously on a procedural modus vivendi in the other state is party only to the 2012 ITRs, there is order to prevent negotiations and discussions from no treaty in force between those two states and, thus, foundering on procedural grounds.
no legally binding rules.
Viewing Internet governance as a matter of making, The fourth case is the most immediately problematic interpreting and applying rules yields two other of the four, although the larger problem in the important insights. First, the Internet is not governed long term is the overall degree of complexity by a single set of rules. Accordingly, the misleading introduced into the governance of international assertion that the Internet is a commons should be telecommunications, the potential for increased abandoned in favour of the more nuanced view that transaction costs and the eventual possibility of it is comprised of a series of overlapping voluntary significant divergence between the two treaty and involuntary groupings governed by a heterodox regimes over time. Given the similarity between the variety of written and unwritten rules.12 This move two treaties, as well as the long history of routine has the advantage of more effectively delineating cooperation on international telecommunications issues where global coordination is required and and the resulting business relationships and those where varying degrees of subsidiarity are accumulated social practice, there are reasons to possible, and even desirable. It also clearly highlights believe that this complexity may be manageable, the importance of the rules that govern different if suboptimal. This assessment may not apply, social groups. Second, it is important not to conflate however, in the event that the parties to the new rules and law; rather, there are good reasons to take a ITRs engage in subsequent negotiations, building broad view of the available means for accomplishing on the accompanying resolutions to erect a parallel Internet governance. It is vital to avoid the mistake institution for Internet governance. In the event of fixating on multilateral treaties and formal such a parallel institution duplicates the function international organizations. The current political of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority or the context and the nature of the issues indicate that soft IETF, the potential exists for serious harm to global law instruments are likely to be more plausible and interoperability. Further, since routing is currently more effective.
done without regard for international borders, the The assertion that the Internet is a commons is existence of parallel Internet governance regimes that made, paradoxically, both by civil society activists may evolve with very different privacy protections poses challenging questions about the sustainability and desirability of legacy routing practices.
The key question is how to update and refine systems for Internet governance in light of the general increase in interest on the part of states, geopolitical rivalry, the existence of legacy institutions and intense commitment to the status quo by a wide array of civil society actors. Disagreement on legitimate 12 These groupings can be thought of as nested clubs, in the sense of "club goods" (as opposed to common goods).
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE and by major Western militaries.13 Relying on large number of users may mean that many receive the mistaken understanding of the Internet as a lower-quality service.15commons encourages overly expansive approaches In practice, however, such problems have relatively to Internet governance, which apply rules with easy solutions: more physical infrastructure (fibre insufficient regard for differences between issues optic cable, switches and routers) can be constructed, and that neglect the importance of fostering the easing congestion; more efficient protocols for routing club governance arrangements that can ensure the and directing traffic can perform a similar function, continued smooth development of the Internet's directing traffic through portions of the network multitude of clubs.
with excess capacity; and usage-based billing can Economists define a commons as a good that is incentivize users to moderate their consumption of rivalrous and non-excludable.14 A good is rivalrous if bandwidth. These three solutions are already part of it cannot be used simultaneously by multiple people Internet governance, and while there are potential or if its use by one person reduces the quantity and/ drawbacks or limitations associated with each, or quality of the good available for others. A good is there is little reason to expect that combinations of non-excludable if people cannot be prevented from such policies cannot continue to meet demand for using it (whether on the basis of payment or some bandwidth, given appropriate investment strategies.
other similar principle). Neither of these criteria are The case for regarding the Internet as non-excludable applicable to the Internet.
is even weaker than the case for believing that it is The Internet is technically rivalrous in the sense that rivalrous. Multiple kinds of exclusion are already the computer networks on which it depends (its occurring, many of them at the Internet's physical "physical layer") accommodate a finite amount of traffic. At peak usage times, especially in congested First, many states already employ their domestic sections of the network, users may receive a degraded law to block various kinds of content, including experience — that is, bandwidth-intensive use by a child pornography, hate speech, intellectual property violations and political dissent. This kind of exclusion is typically accomplished by requiring ISPs to prevent the resolution of certain domain names For a military assertion, see Maj. Gen. Mark Barrett et al. and their associated Internet Protocol addresses. In (2011), "Assured Access to the Global Commons," Supreme Allied the extreme, it entails states ordering the physical Command Transformation, Norfolk: NATO, available at: www.act.nato.
shutdown of Internet service. The governments of int/mainpages/globalcommons. A commons mentality is evident in the Egypt and Myanmar have both employed this tactic, statements and actions of Anonymous, at least after 2008. See Coleman (forthcoming 2013).
Two critical works on the concept of the common goods and The recent DDoS attack on Spamhaus targeted Internet the problems associated with their management are Garrett Hardin Exchange Points and resulted in significant service degradation for a large (1968), "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162, no. 3859: 1243–1248, number of users. See John Markoff and Nicole Perlroth (2013), "Attacks and Elinor Ostrom (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Used the Internet Against Itself to Clog Traffic," New York Times, March Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University 27, available at: Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE albeit for limited periods of time (Williams, 2011; club membership. Experience tells us that some clubs Wang, 2007).
are more exclusive than others, and that different clubs have varying rules, norms and bylaws. The Second, some recently proposed pieces of legislation Internet is easily mistaken for a commons because (for example, the Stop Online Piracy Act, or SOPA, it has historically been an extremely open club, with in the US Congress, and Bill C-32 in the Canadian incredibly sparse rules for its members.
Parliament) have sought to strengthen copyright protections, including requiring Web hosting In some ways, barriers to joining the club continue companies, search engines and ISPs to sever to fall rapidly: Internet access is more affordable for relations with websites and users found to violate more people than it has ever been. However, in other copyright. While such measures have met strong important respects, the Internet club looks not only resistance, it is likely they will remain on the agenda less like a commons than it once did, but also less at the insistence of copyright-owning firms.
like a single club.
Third, DDoS attacks accomplish short-term exclusion Rules increasingly circumscribe user behaviour by bombarding a targeted website with requests online and pockets of the Internet are now more for information, overwhelming server capacity and likely to allow access only to members — with highly preventing servicing of legitimate requests. These variable requirements for membership, ranging from attacks are inexpensive and sometimes difficult unverified assertions that a user is above a certain to attribute to particular agents, making them an age or resides in a particular place (often employed attractive option for hackers and for cybercriminals. to restrict access to various kinds of entertainment They are also blunt instruments, which can have content), to contractual arrangements on a fee-for-significant unintended consequences such as service basis (such as pay walls on major newspaper denying access to additional, unintended targets. websites), to requirements that the user be a Finally, they allow virtually anyone with minimal member of a particular offline organization such as a technical expertise and computer hardware to corporation or government.
engage in excluding others from the Internet.
Accordingly, the Internet is best understood as a set Fourth, it is possible to exclude people from the of nested clubs. At the most basic level, all Internet Internet by destroying physical infrastructure (fibre users are members of the club of people with Internet or wireless) critical to their connectivity. Such attacks connections. However, they are also members of are imaginable both in the context of terrorism and smaller clubs composed of people who access the in the context of a major military conflict. While Internet via a particular ISP, and people who access the decentralized nature of the Internet means the Internet from a particular country. It is impossible that terrorist attacks would be unlikely to cause for an Internet user to avoid membership in any widespread long-term disruption, major military of these three kinds of clubs. Beyond this minimal conflict could pose a significant risk to the Internet.
baseline, users will typically also be members of other clubs based on their personal identities and If the Internet is, in fact, non-rivalrous and excludable, it more closely resembles what economists call a club good. Club goods include access to satellite This view of the Internet facilitates a more nuanced television or the status that comes with a country discussion of online rights and responsibilities, one Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE that recognizes that different areas of the Internet has taken the specific forms of multilateral treaties may correspond closely with the open-access norms and the creation of formal, chartered international associated with commons regimes while others organizations; however, it is critical to avoid may not, and that while trade-offs between distinct conflation of these particular mechanisms with the public values such as liberty, property rights and concept of legalization in general.17 For at least two security may not be entirely avoidable, applying main reasons it is likely that less formalized legal different rules to particular portions of the Internet mechanisms will be more helpful and successful in can help ensure that restrictions on online rights are this issue area for the foreseeable future.
minimized and do not cause unintended collateral First, Internet governance is a novel and highly damage to freedom.
complex issue from the perspective of the diplomats Understanding the Internet as a set of nested clubs and government officials who will be tasked with calls attention to the need to think explicitly about negotiating and implementing international rules. the rules for the three most basic types of clubs: While existing institutions tasked with Internet the club of all Internet users; the clubs comprised governance have a greater degree of familiarity with of each individual ISP and its clients; and the clubs the technical issues involved, these organizations of national users. Maintaining the global reach and lack expertise in the technical aspects of international interoperability of the Internet, and thus maximizing law, public policy and regulation. Kenneth Abbott its value to humanity, requires ensuring that access to and Duncan Snidal (2000) have argued persuasively these clubs remains open to all, and that restrictions that in complex, novel situations, so-called "soft law" on member behaviour do not exceed the minimum instruments (for example, voluntary codes of conduct requirements of public safety.
and best practices) are often a superior choice relative to traditional "hard law" instruments such as treaties. The vibrancy of any club over time depends on its Their rationale is that soft law offers decision makers ability to respond effectively and legitimately to opportunities to learn about the social effects of its members' desires. This highlights the need to particular sets of rules over time — and to amend them augment fora that enable discussion and potential accordingly, typically with lower negotiation costs revision of shared understandings about online than entailed by the renegotiation of hard law (ibid.). rights and duties at each level of the nested clubs that This pattern is especially likely to hold with respect comprise the Internet. Doing so will be especially to the governance of cyber security. Just as attempts difficult, but is particularly important at the most to craft rules for the global governance of nuclear fundamental level — the club of all Internet users.
weapons required an extended period of mutual (if Beyond conceiving of the Internet as a series of nested often highly conflictual) learning, attempts to govern clubs, thinking clearly about Internet governance cyber-security and even to govern the Internet more requires attention to the legal forms employed. generally are likely to develop via various forms of Legalization has been noted as a distinctive soft law and norm development prior to the creation characteristic of modern international relations and global governance.16 A great deal of legalization 17 This point has been recognized both by rationalist scholars and by scholars of international law drawing on constructivist theories See Kenneth W. Abbott et al. (2000), "The Concept of of international relations. For the rationalist view, see Abbott and Snidal Legalization," International Organization 54, no. 3: 410–419.
(2000). For the constructivist view, see Brunnée and Toope (2010).
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE of any multilateral treaties or formal international focus on treaties and hard law is insufficient, organizations. Put simply, states need time to learn because it neglects what they call "the hard work of about the technology and to arrive at conclusions international law" — or the ongoing social process about the kinds of governance arrangements they of enacting legal rules (whether hard or soft) by prefer. The recent conclusion by the UN Group of interpreting and applying them in concrete cases. Governmental Experts on Developments in the On this view, law always entails soft law processes Field of Information and Telecommunications in the and processes of adjudication that are vital to the Context of International Security that international operation of even the most well-developed hard law law applies in cyberspace is a welcome development, regime. International soft law, like domestic statutory but this must be understood as a starting point rather law, will never yield perfect compliance. Spoilers than a conclusion (US Department of State, 2013). may remain, but this is likely to be the case even Agreeing on specific interpretations for applying under the most well-developed treaty regime and, general international legal rules to particular cases thus, is not an argument against the advantages of will require a great deal of work.
soft law instruments for rule-making, interpretation and application in an uncertain environment Second, informal soft law instruments are also characterized by political contention.
attractive, given the current political context for Internet governance, which is characterized by Refining and updating Internet governance entails geopolitical rivalry and by disagreement over a process of rule-making for a series of nested clubs legitimate procedural rules. The distributional in a difficult and uncertain context that privileges consequences of different Internet governance procedural flexibility and a willingness to employ arrangements are not yet well understood, and soft law instruments.
states are increasingly sensitized to the potential for TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE,
relative losses associated with being on the losing RESEARCH-BASED VISION FOR
end of newly established institutions. This argument is related to the prior argument about the impact of uncertainty on the desirability of hard versus soft The goal of this rule-making process should be a law instruments. Soft law instruments are also more vibrant, responsibly governed Internet that safeguards attractive in this context because they are typically privacy and other essential rights. The difficulty, subject to less precise procedural rules. Whereas the of course, is managing the trade-offs between the procedures for creating a legally binding treaty are distinct values and interests of a variety of public and highly specific, the procedures and forms for creating private actors in an effective and legitimate manner. informal codes of conduct are less demanding and To date, both state and civil society actors have require less prior agreement. They also allow more generally lacked coherent, comprehensive strategic flexibility and innovation, thus increasing the scope visions of the kind of Internet they want and how to for agreement between parties that do not agree get there.
completely on procedural rules.
The major exception to this lack of strategic vision, These observations dovetail with the perspective unfortunately, has been the coalition of states (led by on international law offered by Jutta Brunnée and Russia and China) seeking the greatest degree of state Stephen Toope (2010: 5), who argue that an exclusive control over the Internet. These states have sought to Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE trade cynically on the global legitimacy of the UN companies engage in questionable behaviour,18 the system in order to consecrate the worst excesses of diversity of this community and its strong normative state conduct against domestic populations. They bias in favour of decentralized social organization have done so while simultaneously developing and complicate efforts to articulate a coherent, positive deploying significant offensive cyber capabilities.
vision for Internet governance that extends beyond denunciation of attempts to alter the status The advanced industrial democracies and other quo. Further, many members of this community states committed to the maintenance of Internet understand themselves to primarily be "activists." governance structures that balance security, rights Such an identity can encourage mono-value thinking and economic dynamism have begun to devote antithetical to a governance mindset, which attempts additional attention to these issues; however, these to balance and partially satisfy multiple perspectives efforts have lacked coordination both at the national and values in cases of tension or conflict.
level (between agencies with a primary interest or responsibility in one particular policy area) and at The diversity of basic social institutions among the international level. The lack of a well-organized democracies suggests there is little chance that there coalition advancing what might be termed a liberal is a unique legitimate liberal democratic system of democratic vision for Internet governance has left a Internet governance. Indeed, given that modern vacuum that is increasingly being filled by the more global governance often leans heavily on the principle authoritarian coalition led by Russia and China. of subsidiarity, crucial components of Internet Given the expectations of good faith attempts at governance are likely to continue to reside at the compromise in many established international national level and, therefore, handled differently by organizations, the likelihood is that this coalition will different political communities. Having a coherent, attain a portion of its agenda. This risk is amplified if legitimate strategic vision for Internet governance other states lack a positive vision and are routinely does not mean an all-encompassing multilateral in the position of simply blocking the coalition's treaty or even an informal global agreement on every proposals. In such a situation, wavering and currently issue. Rather, the key is to identify critical issues undecided states might be persuaded or induced where truly global norms, rules and standards are to support proposals that undermine basic rights, required. On other issues, especially including rights, alter the monetization of the Internet in ways that it will be necessary to identify broad parameters that coincide with Russian and Chinese interests, and bound legitimate difference in state practices.
further establish a permissive environment for cyber espionage and cyber attacks.
The Chilling Effects website is one example of such a Similarly, while hacktivists and other highly campaign; see There are also indications of motivated segments of the global community emerging alliances between hacktivists and civil society groups engaged of Internet users have been adept at "naming in protest over other issues. See Boris Manenti (2013), "Hacktivism and shaming" in cases where governments and United: NGOs, Hackers Team Up to Take Down Common Enemies," Worldcrunch, February 5, available at: c4s10811/#.UTjNNTD_l8F. Such campaigns appear to follow many of the patterns identified in Keck and Sikkink (2002).
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE Among the principles critical to a liberal democratic A strategic vision must also be research-based. While view of Internet governance are: guarantees of due a great deal of attention has been paid to specific process, freedom of expression and other basic Internet issues in a number of academic disciplines, freedoms; mixed public and private ownership there has been a relative neglect of core governance of property, with a government regulatory and issues. Accordingly, CIGI has commissioned a set oversight role to protect public interests and to correct of papers from leading experts that address both a market failures; compliance with international law, range of pressing governance challenges and also especially including restriction on hostile acts to the international political implications of a handful instances of self-defence and collectively authorized of the most likely Internet governance scenarios in response to threats; and the creation, alteration the 2015–2020 timeframe. The papers, of which this and interpretation of rules in good faith and in is the first in a series, are divided into two clusters.
accordance with transparent, mutually accepted The first cluster identifies the pressing near-term rules of procedure.
governance challenges on a number of fronts. These There are tensions within and between these will include technical standards and the governance principles. For example, certain kinds of speech of interconnection, cyber security issues, including are often deemed incompatible with other basic state efforts at monitoring and surveillance, civil freedoms. Restrictions on both privacy and due society hacktivism by groups such as Anonymous process are sometimes deemed acceptable in the and the future of intellectual property in a digital age.
name of ensuring public safety. The appropriate The second cluster of papers examines various scope of state regulatory involvement in areas of plausible outcomes for Internet governance in the private investment is also politically controversial. remainder of the current decade and attempts to With respect to hostile acts, the last decade witnessed assay their implications for global governance and a notable and as-yet-unresolved debate on the the international system as a whole. These papers are, legitimate scope for preventive (as opposed to pre- of necessity, somewhat speculative; however, social emptive) self-help action.
science has developed scenario-based methods for As a result, a complete strategic vision for Internet forecasting the proximate future within reasonable governance must go beyond first principles to tolerances.19explicitly contemplate these and other key trade- In order to impart a degree of structure and offs. It must provide guidance in differentiating comparability to the scenario papers, authors were critical areas for global rule-making from other areas asked to consider and engage with four ideal-typical that, while important, are best handled at regional, scenarios. The first entails incremental change to the bilateral, national and even sub-national levels. On current model for Internet governance built largely these latter issues, a strategic vision should, where around ICANN and the IETF. The second involves possible and appropriate, go at least some distance the creation of largely self-contained yet functional toward discussing the bounds of legitimate difference "blocs"; for example, an Internet comprised largely in state conduct while recognizing that answers to these questions must, ultimately, be crafted by states themselves in consultation with civil society and 19 See, for example, Steven Bernstein et al. (2000),"God Gave other relevant actors.
Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World," European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1: 43–76.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
REImAGING THE INTERNET: THE NEEd FOR A HIGH-LEVEL STRATEGIC VISION FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE of users from OECD-member states, and another of users primarily drawn from Russia, China and the Arab world. Each bloc would have distinct governance structures and global interoperability could be expected to be both technologically limited and subject to substantial political control. Third, authors were asked to consider an outcome in which failure to agree on a global Internet governance regime for key issues leads to major breakdowns in interoperability and in the basic functioning of the Internet. While this kind of generalized governance failure is relatively unlikely, there is reason to think carefully about low-probability, high-significance outcomes. This is especially true in complex and novel issue areas, where the implications of new rules and other actions are not well understood in advance. The final scenario is one in which hacktivists (such as Anonymous), cyber criminals, terrorists and other groups successfully destabilize large portions of the Internet as an expression of protest.
These scenarios are intended as analytical aids rather than straitjackets. Reality is not expected to wholly match any of them; rather, it will blend elements of multiple scenarios, including some not enumerated here. However, it is also true that the four scenarios are not equally probable. So long as there is some realistic prospect of identifying and selecting policy that is more likely to lead to better outcomes, such efforts to understand the costs and benefits of alternate outcomes remains worthwhile.
Together, these two clusters of papers provide: a clear sense of the critical problems facing efforts to update and refine Internet governance; the appropriate modalities for doing so; and the costs and benefits associated with the most plausible outcomes. They therefore provide the foundation for developing the research-based, high-level strategic vision required to successfully navigate a complex, shifting and uncertain governance environment.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
O'Brien, Robert et al. (2000). Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000). "Hard and Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Soft Law in International Governance." International Organization 54, no. 3: 421–456.
Pfanner, Eric (2012). "U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty." New York Times, December 13. Available at: Brunnée, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope (2010). Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Price, Richard (1998). "Reversing the Gun Sights: Coleman, Gabriella (forthcoming 2013). "Anonymous in Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines." Context." CIGI Internet Governance Paper Series No. International Organization 52, no. 3: 613–644.
Raymond, Mark (2011). "Social Change in World Politics: DeNardis, Laura (2009). Protocol Politics: The Globalization Secondary Rules and Institutional Politics." Ph.D. of Internet Governance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
dissertation. University of Toronto, Canada.
Glasius, Marlies (2006). The International Criminal US Department of State (2013). "Statement on Consensus Court: A Global Civil Society Achievement. New York: Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Cyber Issues," press release, June 7. Available at: Glenny, Misha (2011). Dark Market: How Hackers Became the New Mafia. Toronto: Anansi.
Wang, Stephanie (2007). "Pulling the Plug: A Technical Information Warfare Monitor (2009). "Tracking GhostNet: Review of the Internet Shutdown in Burma." OpenNet Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network." Available Initiative Bulletin. Available at: Williams, Christopher (2011). "How Egypt Shut Down Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). Activists the Internet." The Telegraph, January 28. Available Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (2002). Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Wortham, Jenna (2012). "Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: Bills Began as Grass-Roots Grumbling." New York University of Minnesota Press.
Times, January 19. Available at: www.nytimes.
com/2012/01/20/technology/public-outcry-over- Mandiant (2013). "APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units." Available at: http://intelreport.
Mark rayMond and Gordon SMith Internet Governance PaPers
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CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.
Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry). Il collabore avec de Vice President of Programs
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